KIMBERLY VOTH COOK, APPELLANT,
v.
DAVID HOWARD VOTH, APPELLEE
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In a family law appeal, the Florida District Court of Appeal reversed the trial court's denial of a motion to dissolve a temporary injunction that prevented the former wife from relocating with the parties' minor child from Hillsborough County to Collier County. The court held that the settlement agreement did not prohibit the mother's relocation within Florida and that no evidence showed the father's visitation rights would be impaired by the move.
The court reversed the trial court's denial of the motion to dissolve the temporary injunction, holding that Cook was entitled to relocate to Collier County within Florida so long as she continued to comply with the visitation provisions. The court found no express limitation in the dissolution judgment restricting Cook to Hillsborough County and no showing that Voth's visitation rights would be impaired by the move.
[1] A temporary injunction enjoining the removal of a child from a county should be dissolved when the moving party demonstrates that the other parent's visitation rights wil…
[2] A dissolution judgment specifying a child's primary residence in a particular county does not necessarily prohibit the custodial parent from moving to a different county…
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“There is no showing that Voth's visitation rights will be impaired by Cook's prospective move to Collier County.”
Establishes the key standard for evaluating relocation disputes—the focus is on whether the non-custodial parent's visitation rights will be impaired.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceCook and Voth divorced after an eight-year marriage with one minor child. Their settlement agreement provided that the child's primary residence would…
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PARKER, Judge.
Cook, the former wife, appeals the trial court’s denial of Cook’s motion to dissolve a temporary injunction, which enjoined Cook from removing the parties’ minor child from Hillsborough County. We reverse.
This appeal stems from the dissolution of the parties’ eight-year marriage. One child was born of the marriage. The settlement agreement, which was incorporated in the final judgment of dissolution, contained the following pertinent language:
3. The Husband and Wife agree that the best interests of the child will be served if both parents retain full parental rights and responsibilities with respect to said minor child, subject to the following terms and conditions:
a. The primary physical residence of the minor child shall be in the home of the mother located in Hillsborough County, Florida.
d. The parties may not remove the child from the State of Florida without the written consent of the other party or a court order. f. The father shall have rights of visitation including frequent and continuing contact with the child at reasonable times and places, with no less than 14 days per month including two consecutive days per week and every other weekend being Friday, Saturday and Sunday nights.
Both parties have now remarried. Cook’s new husband received an employment promotion requiring a move from Tampa to Naples. Upon Voth’s motion, a temporary injunction, without notice, was entered by the trial court enjoining and restraining the removal of the child from the jurisdiction of the Thirteenth Judicial Circuit, which includes Hillsborough County, until further order of the court. Cook’s motion to dissolve the temporary injunction was denied.
We find error in the trial court’s denial of the motion and reverse. There is no showing that Voth’s visitation rights will be impaired by Cook’s prospective move to Collier County. Foss v. Foss, 392 So. 2d 606 (Fla. 3d DCA 1981). See also Bergman v. Bergman, 434 So. 2d 1037 (Fla. 3d DCA 1983). On the contrary, the record discloses that Cook has made every attempt to ensure and facilitate Voth’s visitation privileges, and has expressed her intention to continue to do so after the move.
There is also no express limitation in the dissolution judgment that Cook remain within Hillsborough County, but only that the child not be removed from the state without the other party’s consent or a court order. Therefore, Cook should be free to move to Collier County so long as she continues to comply with the visitation provisions set out in the dissolution judgment. Giachetti v. Giachetti, 416 So. 2d 27 (Fla. 5th DCA 1982). To the extent that the statement in the final judgment, that “[t]he primary physical residence of the minor child shall be in the home of the mother located in Hillsborough County, Florida,” can be interpreted to require Cook to stay within the county, that portion of the judgment should be modified as its scope is too broad. Foss.
Accordingly, we remand the case to the trial court for the entry of an order dissolving the temporary injunction and other proper order(s) not inconsistent with this opinion.
LEHAN, A.C.J., and THREADGILL, J., concur.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Cited By
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Mast v. Reed, 578 So. 2d 304 (Fla. 5th DCA 1991)…well disrupt frequent visitation for noncustodial parents and may require modification of custody decrees regarding visitation rights. See DeCamp v. Hein, 541 So. 2d 708 (Fla. 4th DCA), rev. denied, 551 So. 2d 461 (Fla.1989). See also Cook v. Voth, 522 So. 2d 899 (Fla. 2d DCA), rev. denied, 531 So. 2d 1355 (Fla.1988); Zediker v. Zediker, 444 So. 2d 1034 (Fla. 1st DCA 1984); McGregor v. McGregor, 418 So. 2d 1073 (Fla. 5th DCA 1982).…
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Eddy v. Napier, 558 So. 2d 199 (Fla. 2d DCA 1990)…elfare. This court has held that, absent a showing that the move will significantly impair the visitation rights of the noncustodial parent, there is no prohibition against a custodial parent moving to another county within the state. Cook v. Voth, 522 So. 2d 899 (Fla. 2d DCA 1988). Although the final judgment granted sole custody to the mother, and included no express requirement that she notify the father of an intrastate move, the trial court appears to have ignored the best interests of the child and to…
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Ferguson v. Baisley, 593 So. 2d 319 (Fla. 4th DCA 1992)…gan); Anderson v. Anderson, 461 So. 2d 130 (Fla. 3d DCA 1984) (same; Missouri); see also DeCamp v. Hein, 541 So. 2d 708 (Fla. 4th DCA 1989) (same; New Jersey); Bachman v. Bachman, 539 So .2d 1182 (Fla. 4th DCA 1989) (same; New Jersey); Cook v. Voth, 522 So. 2d 899 (Fla. 2d DCA 1988) (same; Collier County), reviewed denied, 531 So. 2d 1355 (Fla.1988). But cf. Delgado v. Silvarrey, 528 So. 2d 1358 (Fla. 3d DCA 1988) (father not permitted to move with children to Iowa). See generally Holder v. Polanski, 111 N.J.…
Previewing 3 of 5 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Quest v. Joseph, 416 So. 2d 27 (Fla. 3d DCA 1982)
- Foss v. Foss, 392 So. 2d 606 (Fla. 3d DCA 1981)
- Bergman v. Bergman, 434 So. 2d 1037 (Fla. 3d DCA 1983)