DUANE EARP, APPELLANT,
v.
THE STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
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Duane Earp appealed his convictions for aggravated battery, death by an impaired driver, and leaving the scene of an accident. The appellate court reversed and remanded because the trial court improperly entered judgments referring to crimes of which the defendant was not convicted and erred in using two separate sentencing guidelines score sheets.
The trial court erred in both respects. The court reversed and remanded with directions to correct the judgments to recite only the crimes for which the defendant was convicted and to resentence the defendant in accordance with proper sentencing guidelines procedures while considering any plea agreement from the original sentencing.
[1] A trial court errs by utilizing two separate score sheets when sentencing a defendant under the sentencing guidelines.
[2] Judgments must accurately recite the crimes for which a defendant has been convicted.
Previewing 2 of 4 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“In entering both of the judgments, the court referred to crimes of which the defendant was not convicted. In sentencing the defendant under the sentencing guidelines, the trial court utilized two separate score sheets. This was erroneous.”
Establishes the two primary errors: judgments referencing unconvicted crimes and improper use of two separate sentencing score sheets.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceEarp was originally convicted of aggravated battery with adjudication withheld and given community control under an alleged plea agreement. He was sub…
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PER CURIAM.
The appellant appeals convictions under trial court numbers 85-197-CF-A-33 and 86-207-CF-A-33 which are lodged in this court under the above file numbers. The appellant was originally convicted of aggravated battery, adjudication was withheld and he was given community control based upon an alleged plea agreement. He subsequently was charged with: Death by an impaired driver in violation of Section 316.193, Florida Statutes (1986); Vehicular Homicide in violation of Section 782.071, Florida Statutes (1985); Leaving the scene of an accident with personal injuries in violation of Section 316.027, Florida Statutes (1985); and Driving with a revoked or suspended license in violation of Section 322.34, Florida Statutes (1985).
He pleaded nolo contendré to the charges of death by an impaired driver and leaving the scene of an accident. The remaining charges were nolle prossed. Thereupon, the trial court adjudicated him guilty on the aggravated battery charge and sentenced him to five years. The sentence was to run consecutively with the sentences imposed on the convictions of death by an impaired driver and leaving the scene of an accident. The appellant was sentenced on those charges to ten years and five years respectfully, said sentences to run concurrently. In entering both of the judgments, the court referred to crimes of which the defendant was not convicted. In sentencing the defendant under the sentencing guidelines, the trial court utilized two separate score sheets. This was erroneous. See Vileta v. State, 454 So. 2d 792 (Fla. 2d DCA 1984).
Therefore, we reverse with directions to correct the judgments to properly recite the crimes for which the defendant was convicted and then to sentence the defendant in the death by impaired driver conviction in accordance with the provisions of Vileta v. State, supra. In so doing, the trial court should take into account any plea agreement that may have been made at the time of the original sentencing for aggravated battery as well as the applicable law. See Yarberry v. State, 510 So. 2d 1117 (Fla. 1st DCA 1987); Lawson v. State, 497 So. 2d 288 (Fla. 1st DCA 1986)
Reversed and remanded with directions.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Cited By
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Richardson v. State, 564 So. 2d 564 (Fla. 1st DCA 1990)…et when imposing the challenged sentences. The various offenses were all pending before the court for sentencing at the same time, and Fla.R. Crim.P. 3.701(d)(1) thus requires a current guidelines scoresheet covering all offenses. See Earp v. State, 522 So. 2d 992 (Fla. 3d DCA 1988); Bembow v. State, 520 So. 2d 312 (Fla. 2d DCA 1988); cf., Peters v. State, 531 So. 2d 121 (Fla.1988). Appellant interposed no objection below, but the court’s obligation to use a guidelines score-sheet in connection with guideline…
Authorities Cited
- Vileta v. State, 454 So. 2d 792 (Fla. 2d DCA 1984)
- Lawson v. State, 497 So. 2d 288 (Fla. 1st DCA 1986)
- Yarberry v. State, 510 So. 2d 1117 (Fla. 1st DCA 1987)