GREGG BUTTERWORTH, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
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The court reversed the denial of a motion to suppress because the officer lacked reasonable suspicion to stop the defendant's vehicle based solely on observing a man leaning toward a parked car at 3:00 a.m.
An officer's observation of a man leaning toward a parked car at 3:00 a.m. in a drug-prone area, without more, does not constitute reasonable suspicion to justify a traffic stop.
[1] Reasonable suspicion to justify a traffic stop requires articulable facts suggesting criminal activity; observation of a man leaning toward a parked vehicle at 3:00 a.m. …
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAn officer on patrol at 3:00 a.m. in an area known for drug transactions observed a man standing next to the defendant's parked car leaning down as if…
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STONE, Judge.
The defendant appeals an order denying a motion to suppress. The arresting officer testified that while on patrol at 3:00 a.m. in an area known for drug transactions, he observed a man standing next to the defendant’s automobile, leaning down, “as if conversing” with the defendant. The car was parked on the shoulder of the road and the occupants looked straight ahead as the officer passed by. As the officer approached again, the defendant drove away. The individual on foot walked quickly into the shadows. These were the only facts asserted to justify the officer stopping the car. The state contends that this situation constituted a sufficient basis for a well founded suspicion that appellant was engaged in criminal activity. See State v. Stevens, 354 So. 2d 1244 (Fla. 4th DCA 1978). However, we conclude that the totality of the circumstances were insufficient to support a determination that the officer had adequate grounds to reasonably suspect that criminal activity was taking place, had taken place, or was about to take place. See, e.g., State v. Hoover, 520 So. 2d 696 (Fla. 4th DCA 1988); McCloud v. State, 491 So. 2d 1164 (Fla. 2d DCA 1986); Carter v. State, 454 So. 2d 739 (Fla. 2d DCA 1984); § 901.151(2), Fla.Stat. (1985). Therefore the court erred in denying the motion to suppress.
The judgment and sentence are reversed and the cause is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
ANSTEAD and DELL, JJ., concur.
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Abraham v. State, 532 So. 2d 91 (Fla. 4th DCA 1988)…it arises out of observations of the police officer which, when considered in the light of the officer’s knowledge, reasonably indicate that the suspect is committing, is about to commit, or has committed a criminal violation. Butterworth v. State, 522 So. 2d 1039 (Fla. 4th DCA 1988); State v. Stevens, 354 So. 2d 1244 (Fla. 4th DCA 1978); § 901.151(2), Fla.Stat. (1985). The acts of driving out of a business parking lot late at night and picking up another person are not sufficient to create a founded suspicio…
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J.A.S. v. State, 952 So. 2d 638 (Fla. 2d DCA 2007)…have reasonably concluded that [defendant’s] unauthorized and unannounced entry into the victim’s house coupled with his immediate flight from the house, without explanation, when seen by the victim constituted ‘stealthy entry’ ”); Florida v. State, 522 So. 2d 1039,1042 (Fla. 4th DCA 1988) (determining there was sufficient circumstantial evidence of stealthy entry where defendant entered completely enclosed and locked screened-in porch in a condominium complex with gated security). In contrast, courts have de…
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Jackson v. State, 703 So. 2d 515 (Fla. 3d DCA 1997)…m’s house coupled with his immediate flight from the house, without explanation, when seen by the victim constituted “stealthy entry.” See State v. Waters, 436 So. 2d 66 (Fla.1983); West v. State, 579 So. 2d 288 (Fla. 3d DCA 1991); Florida v. State, 522 So. 2d 1039 (Fla. 4th DCA 1988). Additionally, we disagree with Jackson’s claim that certain comments by the prosecutor, regarding the truthfulness of the victim’s testimony, made during closing argument were improper. Following our decision in Vazquez v. Sta…
Previewing 3 of 7 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- State v. Stevens, 354 So. 2d 1244 (Fla. 4th DCA 1978)
- LaMarcus Edward Carter v. State, 454 So. 2d 739 (Fla. 2d DCA 1984)
- McCLOUD v. State, 491 So. 2d 1164 (Fla. 2d DCA 1986)
- State v. Hoover, 520 So. 2d 696 (Fla. 4th DCA 1988)