LAMAR ADVERTISING COMPANY, APPELLANT,
v.
DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION AND HEADRICK OUTDOOR ADVERTISING, APPELLEES
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The court held that the Department of Transportation provided Lamar Advertising a clear point of entry for administrative appeal, despite not using the exact phrase 'final agency action' in its notice.
[1] A notice of agency action is sufficient to establish a clear point of entry into the administrative process if it informs the applicant of the denial of their application…
[2] Failure to request an administrative hearing within the time specified in a notice of agency action results in the waiver of the right to seek administrative review.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceLamar Advertising appealed a Department of Transportation order dismissing its request for an administrative hearing as untimely and denying a sign pe…
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ERVIN, Judge.
Lamar Advertising Company appeals a final order of the Department of Transportation (DOT), dismissing a request for administrative hearing as untimely and denying a sign permit application. Finding that Lamar had a clear point of entry into the administrative process, we affirm the order of the department.
Appellant argues that the agency did not provide it a clear point of entry for an administrative appeal because the notice of agency action given by DOT did not track the department’s rule requiring the notice of the sign permit denial to state that “the Department’s action shall become conclusive and final agency action if no request for a hearing is filed within thirty days of receipt of the notice of the Department’s intended action.” Florida Admin. Code Rule 14-10.004(8)(a)3 (e.s.). While the department’s notice did not use the term, “final agency action,” the agency’s memorandum of returned application clearly informed appellant that the application had been denied and that appellant had the right to request a § 120.57 hearing within 30 days of the date of the notice. In our judgment it should have been readily apparent to the applicant that if it failed to exercise its right to seek administrative review within the time specified in the notice, the consequence was that such relief would be considered waived.
Accordingly, we fail to see how appellant was prejudiced by the notice provided. Compare Henry v. State, Department of Administration, 431 So. 2d 677, 679 (Fla. 1st DCA 1983), holding the department’s letter of determination “did not bear the hallmarks of finality required for final orders affecting substantial interests in that it failed to inform appellant of his right to request administrative review and failed to state the time within which he was required to request proceedings under Section 120.57.” We therefore conclude that Lamar was provided a clear point of entry to the administrative process, and that DOT was under the circumstances correct in dismissing the appeal.
AFFIRMED.
SMITH, C.J., and NIMMONS, J., concur.
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Fla. League OF Cities, Inc. v. Admin. Comm'n & Dep't of Cmty. Affairs, 586 So. 2d 397 (Fla. 1st DCA 1991)…statutory provisions verbatim, so long as it clearly informs the affected party of its rights and the time limits. Capital Copy Inc. v. University of Florida, 526 So. 2d 988 (Fla. 1st DCA 1988); Lamar Advertising Co. v. Department of Transportation, 523 So. 2d 712 (Fla. 1st DCA 1988). A properly noticed clear point of entry does not have to set forth the Commission’s sanctions policy which will be employed. An agency is entitled to apply its evolving, non-rule policy without prior notice so long as the affect…
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Earnest Mathis, Jr. v. Fla. Dep't OF Corr., 726 So. 2d 389 (Fla. 1st DCA 1999)…tated denial of Mr. Mathis’s petition. Neither are we concerned here with a party who has failed to take advantage of a point of entry to initiate formal administrative proceedings in a timely fashion. Cf. Lamar Adver. Co. v. Department of Transp., 523 So. 2d 712 (Fla. 1st DCA 1988); Woodard v. Florida State Univ., 518 So. 2d 336 (Fla. 1st DCA 1987); Shalom Manor, Inc. v. Department of Health and Rehabilitative Servs., 497 So. 2d 740 (Fla. 4th DCA 1986); Xerox Corp. v. Florida Dep’t of Prof'l Regulation, 489…
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Se. Grove Mgmt. Inc. v. McKINESS, 578 So. 2d 883 (Fla. 1st DCA 1991)…e considered waived, we are of the view that the failure to so explicitly state could not have prejudiced appellants due to the other language in the notice advising them of a clear point of entry. See Lamar Advertising Co. v. Department of Transp., 523 So. 2d 712, 713 (Fla. 1st DCA 1988).…
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- Henry v. State, 431 So. 2d 677 (Fla. 1st DCA 1983)