GLENDA PECK, PETITIONER,
v.
JOEL M. MESSINA, D.O. AND SUMESH CHANDRA, M.D., RESPONDENTS

Fla. 2d DCA | 1988-01-06
No. 87-1887
Ryder, A.C.J., Campbell, J., Thread Gill, J.
523 So. 2d 1154 Florida District Court of Appeal, Second District (1988) Caution
Cited by 5 cases

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Synopsis

Court denied certiorari petition and held that expert reports prepared for trial testimony are not protected by work product privilege and are discoverable in medical malpractice actions, absent statutory protection under the newly enacted presuit screening statute.


Holding

Expert reports prepared by experts expected to testify at trial are not protected by the work product privilege and are discoverable.


Headnotes

[1] Expert reports prepared by experts expected to testify at trial are not protected by the work product privilege and are discoverable in civil litigation.

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Key Quotes

“reports prepared by experts expected to testify at trial are not protected by the work product privilege and are discoverable”

Court citing Mims v. Casademont to establish the rule governing expert report discoverability

Facts & Procedural History

Petitioner filed a medical malpractice action against two physicians and sought to withhold an expert's report prepared at her request to determine wh…

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Opinion of the Court
PER CURIAM.

PER CURIAM.

This matter involves a petition for the issuance of a writ of certiorari to review an interlocutory order which directed petitioner to produce a report of an expert witness who is expected to testify for petitioner at trial in her action against respondents for medical malpractice. The expert’s report was prepared at petitioner’s request to determine whether there was a medical basis for a malpractice action.

We deny the petition and, in doing so, we embrace the decision reached in Mims v. Casademont, 464 So. 2d 643 (Fla. 3d DCA 1985), wherein the third district held that “reports prepared by experts expected to testify at trial are not protected by the work product privilege and are discoverable.” Id. at 644. We do note that the legislature has recently provided a discovery privilege in medical malpractice actions for work product, such as the report here, generated by the presuit screening process. See § 768.57(5), Fla.Stat. (1985). Petitioner admits, however, that section 768.57(5) is not applicable to this case because her malpractice action was filed before the statute became effective. See § 768.57(10), Fla.Stat. (1985).

The petition for the issuance of a writ of certiorari is denied.

RYDER, A.C.J., and CAMPBELL and THREAD GILL, JJ., concur.


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Citator

Cited By

  • James D. Grimshaw, D.O. v. Schwegel, 572 So. 2d 12 (Fla. 2d DCA 1990)
    …uous. The legislature did not provide an exception to the discovery privilege for certain documents created during the presuit screening process when such documents are relied upon by experts who are expected to testify at trial. Cf Peck v. Messina, 523 So. 2d 1154 (Fla. 2d DCA 1988) (prior to enactment of section 768.57(5), reports of experts expected to testify at trial were not protected by work product privilege). In so doing, it is apparent that the legislature considered that the exchange of information…
  • …rdinary check, stands on its own foundation as an independent, unconditional, and primary obligation of the bank. Pennsylvania v. Curtiss National Bank, 427 F. 2d 395 (5th Cir.1970); Riverside Bank v. Maxa, 45 So. 2d 678 (Fla.1950); Crosby v. Lewis, 523 So. 2d 1154 (Fla. 5th DCA 1988). People accept a cashier’s check as a substitute for cash because the bank stands behind the check, rather than an individual. National Newark & Essex Bank v. Giordano, 111 N.J.Super. 347, 268 A. 2d 327 (1970). Because the bank,…
  • First Am. Bank & Tr. v. Rishoi, 553 So. 2d 1387 (Fla. 5th DCA 1990)
    …a summary judgment in favor of William M. Rishoi as receiver for Clara Lamstein and the business she operated under the name of Interamerican Business Consultants and Associates, Inc. This case is a logical sequel to our decision in Crosby v. Lewis, 523 So. 2d 1154 (Fla. 5th DCA 1988). In Crosby v. Lewis, the Crosbys had purchased $180,000 in cashier’s checks, payable to Lamstein, from various banks and financial institutions. The checks were all delivered to Lamstein as investments. Lamstein’s business was l…

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