ALPHONSO WILLIS, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE

Fla. 4th DCA | 1988-05-04
No. 87-1464
GLICKSTEIN and DELL, JJ., concur.
523 So. 2d 1283 Florida District Court of Appeal, Fourth District (1988) Positive Treatment
Cited by 8 cases

AI-generated. These summaries, headnotes, and key points are machine-generated and may contain errors or omissions. Always verify against the full opinion text below. Not legal advice.

Synopsis

Alphonso Willis appeals his convictions for burglary and grand theft following a jury trial. The appellate court affirmed the convictions, finding no error in the trial court's handling of a discovery violation or its refusal to allow Willis's personal participation in a sidebar conference during jury selection.


Holding

The court affirmed the convictions, holding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in either instance. The discovery violation inquiry was adequate and the admission of photographs was proper. The defendant's exclusion from the sidebar conference was permissible because the defendant was present during the main jury selection process and had sufficient opportunity to consult with counsel before jury decisions.


Headnotes

[1] A trial court does not abuse its discretion by admitting previously undisclosed photographs into evidence if the court conducts an adequate inquiry into a discovery viola…

[2] A defendant does not have a right to be present at a sidebar conference concerning jury challenges when the defendant has had ample opportunity to consult with counsel.

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Key Quotes

“We find no error by the trial court in the way it handled a discovery violation by the state. While we agree with appellant that a discovery violation was demonstrated, we find the inquiry by the trial court concerning the violation to be adequate and no abuse of discretion demonstrated in permitting the previously undisclosed photographs to be admitted into evidence.”

Establishes that despite acknowledging a discovery violation, the court found no reversible error in the trial court's handling and admission of the evidence.

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Facts & Procedural History

Willis was tried by jury for burglary and grand theft. During trial, the state violated discovery rules by failing to disclose photographs in advance.…

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Opinion of the Court
ANSTEAD, Judge.

ANSTEAD, Judge.

We affirm appellant’s convictions of burglary and grand theft after a jury trial.

We find no error by the trial court in the way it handled a discovery violation by the state. While we agree with appellant that a discovery violation was demonstrated, we find the inquiry by the trial court concerning the violation to be adequate and no abuse of discretion demonstrated in permitting the previously undisclosed photographs to be admitted into evidence.

We also find no error in the refusal of the trial court to allow appellant’s personal participation in a side bar conference between the court and counsel conducted for the purpose of allowing counsel to advise the court of any peremptory challenges of jurors sought to be excluded. During the selection of the jury the following exchange took place between the court and defense counsel:

MS. YOUNG: Alright. Thank you very much for listening to me. That is all I have. THE COURT: Thank you, Miss Young. Speak with your client and when you are finished, come side bar, please. (Whereupon, the following discussion was held at the bench) THE COURT: Alright. State? MR. GEESEY: I accept the panel, Judge. THE COURT: You accept? Yes, ma’am? MS. YOUNG: Your Honor, at this time, I’d like to make a motion to strike the panel because there are no members of my client’s ethnic race in the whole venire. My client is a black male and there are no blacks on the whole panel. THE COURT: Alright, fine. That motion is denied. MS. YOUNG: Your Honor, I would also like to ask if my client could be present while I pick the jury? THE COURT: Your client is present when you pick the jury. He is sitting at the table. He is not present at the side bar on the conference on the challenges. You are asking that he be present here? MS. YOUNG: Yes. THE COURT: That is denied. You have the right to consult with him before you accept and I keep telling you, “consult with your client and come side bar,” and you have been talking with him no less than five minutes so I am going to deny his right to be present up here at this side bar because we are cramped for space here. He simply does not have that right, period. Do you have any challenges? MS. YOUNG: No, we will accept the panel.

The record reflects that the jury was selected in appellant’s presence and with no limitations on appellant’s ability to consult with counsel before any decisions or challenges were made. Cf. Smith v. State, 476 So. 2d 748 (Fla. 3d DCA 1985).

The trial court is entitled to substantial discretion and latitude in conducting a trial, and we do not believe that appellant has demonstrated any abuse of that discretion on the record presented here.

GLICKSTEIN and DELL, JJ., concur.


Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus


Citator

Cited By

  • Matthews v. State, 687 So. 2d 908 (Fla. 4th DCA 1997)
    …erpreted this rule to merely require the defendant’s presence in the same room while jury challenges were made at the trial bench. See, e.g., Lewis v. State, 566 So. 2d 270 (Fla. 2d DCA 1990), rev. denied, 581 So. 2d 165 (Fla.1991); Willis v. State, 523 So. 2d 1283 (Fla. 4th DCA 1988). Early in 1995, the supreme court clarified the scope of rule 3.180(a)(4). In Coney v. State, 653 So. 2d 1009, 1013 (Fla.), cert. denied, — U.S. —, 116 S.Ct. 315, 133 L.Ed.2d 218 (1995), the supreme court concluded that rule 3.1…
  • Lewis v. State, 566 So. 2d 270 (Fla. 2d DCA 1990)
    …as present in the courtroom during the selection and challenging of the jurors, and the fact that he was not present with counsel at side bar conferences regarding those challenges is not a basis for reversal under the case law. See Willis v. State, 523 So. 2d 1283 (Fla. 4th DCA 1988); Smith v. State, 476 So. 2d 748 (Fla. 3d DCA 1985), aff'd, 500 So. 2d 125 (Fla.1986). Lewis also has failed to demonstrate reversible error with respect to other instances in which he claims he should have been present but which…
  • Quince v. State, 660 So. 2d 370 (Fla. 4th DCA 1995)
    …e actual selection was made, this court held that the jury was selected in the defendant’s presence where there were no limitations on the defendant’s ability to consult with counsel before any decisions or challenges were made. See Willis v. State, 523 So. 2d 1283 (Fla. 4th DCA 1988); see also Lewis v. State, 566 So. 2d 270 (Fla. 2d DCA 1990); Smith v. State, 476 So. 2d 748 (Fla. 3d DCA 1985). In this ease, the defendant had the opportunity to consult with counsel and to actually come to the bench to do that…

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