GERALD G. MICHALEK, PETITIONER,
v.
DAVID E. SHUMATE, ET UX., RESPONDENTS
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The Florida Supreme Court held that an automobile owner remains liable for negligent operation of a vehicle during transport to a service agency, even though the owner is generally not liable for negligence by service workers during actual servicing. The Court clarified that the Castillo exception to the dangerous instrumentality doctrine applies only to negligent use during servicing, service-related testing, or service-related transport by the agency itself, not to transport by the owner's agents to the agency.
An automobile owner remains liable for negligent operation of the vehicle during transport to a service agency. The Castillo exception to dangerous instrumentality liability applies only to negligent use during servicing, service-related testing, or service-related transport by the service agency itself, not to transport to the agency by the owner's agents. The owner's liability does not depend on distinguishing between types of services.
[1] An automobile owner is generally liable for another's negligent misuse of the vehicle under the dangerous instrumentality doctrine.
[2] An automobile owner is not liable for injuries caused by the negligence of a repairman or serviceman with whom the vehicle has been left, provided the owner does not exer…
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“the owner of a motor vehicle is not liable for injuries caused by the negligence of the repairman or serviceman with whom the vehicle has been left, so long as the owner does not exercise control over the injury-causing operation of the vehicle during the servicing, service-related testing, or transport of the vehicle, and is not otherwise negligent.”
States the Castillo exception to dangerous instrumentality liability for service and repair situations
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceRalph's Car Cleaning Service sent an employee to pick up the Shumate's car for cleaning. While driving the car to the service agency, the employee col…
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SHAW, Justice.
We have for review Michalek v. Shumate, 511 So. 2d 377 (Fla. 2d DCA 1987), in which the district court recognized conflict with Jack Lee Buick, Inc. v. Bolton, 377 So. 2d 226 (Fla. 1st DCA 1979), cert. denied, 386 So. 2d 638 (Fla.1980). We have jurisdiction. Art. V, § 3(b)(3), Fla. Const. Ralph’s Car Cleaning Service sent an employee to pick up the Shumate’s car for cleaning. The employee collided with Mi-chalek while driving the car to the service agency. Michalek sued the Shumates for damages. The trial court entered a final summary judgment for the car owners, and the district court affirmed, relying on Castillo v. Bickley, 363 So. 2d 792 (Fla.1978).
An automobile owner is generally liable for another’s negligent misuse of his vehicle under the dangerous instrumentality doctrine. Castillo; Susco Car Rental System v. Leonard, 112 So. 2d 832 (Fla.1959); Weber v. Porco, 100 So. 2d 146 (Fla.1958); Southern Cotton Oil Co. v. Anderson, 80 Fla. 441, 86 So. 629 (1920); Anderson v. Southern Cotton Oil Co., 73 Fla. 432, 74 So. 975 (1917). We recognized, however, in Castillo that
[a]n automobile owner is generally able to select the persons to whom a vehicle may be entrusted for general use, but he rarely has authority and control over the operation or use of the vehicle when it is turned over to a firm in the business of service and repair. 363 So. 2d at 793. Accordingly, as a matter of social policy and pragmatism, we created a limited exception to the general rule of liability, holding that the owner of a motor vehicle is not liable for injuries caused by the negligence of the repairman or serviceman with whom the vehicle has been left, so long as the owner does not exercise control over the injury-causing operation of the vehicle during the servicing, service-related testing, or transport of the vehicle, and is not otherwise negligent.
Id.
The district court applied Castillo to the instant case involving a cleaning service agency. Michalek urges that we limit Castillo and absolve the owner of liability only when he must relinquish control of his vehicle for necessary repairs. We decline to distinguish between types of service. The owner’s dilemma is the same regardless of the service offered. He has no more control over his vehicle’s use once delivered for cleaning than he has once delivered for transmission service.
Michalek next argues that Castillo does not apply where, as in the instant case, the accident occurred while a service agency employee was transporting the owner’s car to the agency for service. We agree. The Castillo exception applies only to the vehicle’s negligent use during servicing, service-related testing, or service-related transport of the vehicle. Accord Jack Lee Buick (Castillo limited to vehicle’s negligent use is “under the control and direction of repair and service agencies during their work related operations”). We decline to further extend the exception. An owner who authorizes another to transport his car to a service agency remains in control thereof and ultimately liable for its negligent operation until it is delivered to an agency for service.
Accordingly we disapprove the Second District Court of Appeal decision in Micha-lek, and remand for further proceedings consistent herewith. We approve the First District Court of Appeal decision in Jack Lee Buick.
It is so ordered.
MCDONALD, C.J., and OVERTON, EHRLICH, BARKETT, GRIMES and KOGAN, JJ., concur.
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Citator
Cited By (13 total)
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Kraemer v. Gen. Motors Acceptance Corp., 556 So. 2d 431 (Fla. 2d DCA 1989)…he party with beneficial ownership or control over the vehicle’s use at the time of the accident should bear responsibility for the vehicle’s use. This limited exception was created “as a matter of social policy and pragmatism.” Michalek v. Shumate, 524 So. 2d 426, 427 (Fla.1988). Here, GMAC maintained none of the indi-cia of beneficial ownership. The long-term lessee was free to use the vehicle in any way he chose, consistent with protecting the long-term lessor’s financial interest should the lessee elect…
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In re Standard Jury Instructions IN Civil Cases-Report NO. 09-01 (Reorganization of the Civil Jury Instructions). In re Standard Jury Instructions in Civil Cases-Report No. 09-02 (Greater Weight of the Evidence, 35 So. 3d 666 (Fla. 2010)…)(e). An owner or lessee who has delivered a vehicle to a repair shop for maintenance is ordinarily not liable for its negligent operation during servicing, service-related testing, or transport of the vehicle by the bailee. See Michalek v. Shumate, 524 So. 2d 426 (Fla.1988); Castillo v. Bickley, 363 So. 2d 792 (Fla.1978). Although an owner is liable for a personal injury or wrongful death negligently inflicted by a bailee upon a third party, an owner is not liable for a personal injury or wrongful death negl…
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Est. OF Reinaldo Villanueva v. Youngblood, 927 So. 2d 955 (Fla. 2d DCA 2006)…cial risks of injury. , Id. Since then, the supreme court has noted that the “shop” exception applies “only to the vehicle’s negligent use during servicing, service-related testing, or service-related transport of the vehicle.” Michalek v. Shumate, 524 So. 2d 426, 427 (Fla.1988). Courts have generally refused to expand the scope of this exception, to the point of refusing to apply it when the vehicle is being driven to or from the repair facility rather than during the course of the repairs themselves. See,…
Previewing 3 of 13 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Kraemer v. Gen. Motors Acceptance Corp., 572 So. 2d 1363 (Fla. 1990)
- S. Cotton Oil Co. v. Anderson, 80 Fla. 441 (Fla. 1920)
- Anderson v. S. Cotton Oil Co., 73 Fla. 432 (Fla. 1917)
- Miller v. Miller, 112 So. 2d 832 (Fla. 1959)
- Susco CAR Rental Sys. OF Fla. v. Leonard, 112 So. 2d 832 (Fla. 1959)
- Weber v. Porco, 100 So. 2d 146 (Fla. 1958)
- Castillo v. Bickley, 363 So. 2d 792 (Fla. 1978)
- Jack LEE Buick, Inc. v. Bolton, 377 So. 2d 226 (Fla. 1st DCA 1979)
- Michalek v. Shumate, 511 So. 2d 377 (Fla. 2d DCA 1987)