K.C., A JUVENILE, PETITIONER,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, RESPONDENT

Fla. | 1988-05-05
No. 70779
EHRLICH, SHAW, BARKETT, GRIMES and KOGAN, JJ., concur., OVERTON, J., dissents with an opinion, in which McDONALD, C.J., concurs.
524 So. 2d 658 Florida Supreme Court (1988) Positive Treatment
Cited by 6 cases

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Synopsis

The Florida Supreme Court held that section 812.015(6), which prohibits resisting a merchant's efforts to recover merchandise, requires that the defendant first be convicted of the underlying theft before the state can charge the resist-a-merchant offense. The court reversed K.C.'s convictions for resisting a merchant because the state charged this offense before obtaining a theft conviction, despite the statute making the theft conviction a material element of the resist-a-merchant crime.


Holding

Yes. Section 812.015(6) requires a finding of guilt on the underlying theft as a material element of the resist-a-merchant offense. The state cannot charge the resist-a-merchant offense until it has first obtained a conviction for the underlying theft. K.C.'s convictions for resisting a merchant were reversed because they were charged prior to the theft conviction.


Headnotes

[1] A subsequent finding of guilt for the underlying theft is a material element of the offense of resisting a merchant under section 812.015(6), Florida Statutes.

[2] An information must allege each of a crime's essential elements to be valid.

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Key Quotes

“An information must allege each of the crime's essential elements to be valid.”

Establishes the fundamental principle that the state cannot charge an offense without alleging all its material elements

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Facts & Procedural History

K.C., a juvenile, was charged with petit theft for taking candy from a grocery store and two counts of resisting a store employee's efforts to recover…

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Opinion of the Court
PER CURIAM.

PER CURIAM.

We have for review K.C. v. State, 507 So. 2d 769 (Fla. 3d DCA 1987), which is in express and direct conflict with decisions of other district courts. We have jurisdiction. Art. V, § 3(b)(3), Fla. Const. The state charged K.C., a juvenile, with one count of petit theft for taking candy from a grocery store, in violation of section 812.014(2)(c), Florida Statutes (1983), and two counts of resisting a store employee’s efforts to recover the merchandise, in violation of section 812.015(6), Florida Statutes (1983), which provides

[a]n individual who resists the reasonable effort of a law enforcement officer, merchant, merchant’s employee, or farmer to recover merchandise or farm produce which the law enforcement officer, merchant, merchant’s employee or farmer had probable cause to believe the individual had concealed or removed from its place of display or elsewhere and who is subsequently found to be guilty of theft of the subject merchandise or farm produce is guilty of a misdemeanor of the first degree, ... unless the individual did not know, or did not have reason to know, that the person seeking to recover the merchandise or farm produce was a law enforcement officer, merchant, merchant’s employee, or farmer. (Emphasis supplied.)

Petitioner was adjudicated delinquent on all counts, and argued on appeal that section 812.015(6) precludes the state from charging the offense of resisting a merchant prior to the conviction for the underlying theft. The district court affirmed both convictions, reasoning that the trial court’s finding of guilt as to the petit theft charge “satisfied the requirement of section 812.-015(6) that in order to be convicted for resisting a merchant, one must be found guilty of the underlying theft.” K.C., 507 So. 2d at 770.

The court recognized conflict with the First and Fifth District Courts of Appeal which have held that section 812.015(6) requires a finding of guilt on the underlying theft before the state can bring the charge of resisting a merchant. See In the Interest of J.L.P., 490 So. 2d 85 (Fla. 1st DCA 1986); K.M.S. v. State, 402 So. 2d 593 (Fla. 5th DCA 1981). Accord In the Interest of W.L.B., 502 So. 2d 50 (Fla. 1st DCA 1987). We find these holdings consistent with the plain language of section 812.015(6). As defined, the subsequent finding of guilt as to the underlying theft is a material element of the offense of resisting a merchant. An information must allege each of the crime’s essential elements to be valid. State v. Gray, 435 So. 2d 816 (Fla.1983); State v. Dye, 346 So. 2d 538 (Fla.1977). The state cannot charge the offense of resisting a merchant until it can allege the essential element that the accused has been convicted of the theft.

The state argues that this interpretation results in separate trials, unnecessarily and unduly burdening the judicial system. Regardless of our views on this argument’s merit, the clear and unequivocal language of section 812.015(6) leaves no room for interpretation. We have consistently recognized that courts are powerless to modify statutory language which is clear, plain and unambiguous. See, e.g., Graham v. State, 472 So. 2d 464 (Fla.1985); Dade County v. National Bulk Carriers, 450 So. 2d 213 (Fla.1984); State v. Elder, 382 So. 2d 687 (Fla.1980).

Accordingly, we quash the district court’s decision, reverse K.C.’s convictions for resisting efforts to recover merchandise, and remand to the trial court for proceedings consistent with this opinion.

It is so ordered.

EHRLICH, SHAW, BARKETT, GRIMES and KOGAN, JJ., concur. OVERTON, J., dissents with an opinion, in which McDONALD, C.J., concurs.

Dissent
OVERTON, Justice,

OVERTON, Justice,

dissenting.

I dissent. In my view, section 812.015(6), Florida Statutes (1983), can reasonably be construed to require the jury to first consider whether theft occurred and then, following a guilty verdict for theft, the same jury may determine whether the defendant resisted the merchant with force.

I do not believe the legislature intended two separate jury trials before a conviction could be obtained under the statute.

McDONALD, C.J., concurs.


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Citator

Cited By

  • Sanders v. State, 654 So. 2d 1279 (Fla. 2d DCA 1995)
    …esisting a merchant. He also maintains that the court compounded that error by preventing defense counsel from informing the jury of that offense, thus precluding appellant from presenting his defense to the jury. We agree. Although K.C. v. State, 524 So. 2d 658 (Fla.1988) and the version of the statute interpreted therein, section 812.015(6), Florida Statutes (1991), previously required that the defendant be convicted of theft before he or she could be charged with resisting a merchant, the statute, appare…
  • P.D.W. v. State, 620 So. 2d 1112 (Fla. 2d DCA 1993)
    …dication and commitment for resisting a merchant and affirm in all other respects. The state correctly asserts that a conviction for the underlying theft must be obtained before the state can bring a charge for resisting a merchant. K.C. v. State, 524 So. 2d 658 (Fla.1988). The state, however, never charged the appellant with resisting a merchant; therefore, the trial court lacked jurisdiction to adjudicate the appellant guilty of that offense, and this error is fundamental. See Saskowitz v. State, 498 So.…
  • Coffie v. State, 562 So. 2d 423 (Fla. 2d DCA 1990)
    …could not be tried on that charge until there was a conviction of the underlying theft. Although there was sufficient evidence to find that the appellant was guilty of the crime of resisting a merchant, the supreme court’s decision in K.C. v. State, 524 So. 2d 658 (Fla.1988) (also rendered after the appellant was sentenced in this case), requires us to reverse on this charge as well. In K.C., the supreme court held that section 812.015(6) requires a finding of guilt on the underlying theft before the state ca…

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