CHARLIE TEATE, JR. AND DOROTHY TEATE, HIS WIFE, APPELLANTS,
v.
WINN-DIXIE STORES, INC., A FLORIDA CORPORATION, APPELLEE
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Charlie Teate slipped on peas in a Winn-Dixie supermarket and fractured his femur. The jury apportioned 80% fault to Winn-Dixie, but the trial court entered a directed verdict for the defendant on grounds of insufficient evidence of constructive notice. The appellate court reversed, holding that the jury's verdict should stand because sufficient circumstantial evidence supported the constructive notice finding.
The court held that the jury verdict should be reinstated because sufficient circumstantial evidence supported a finding of constructive notice. The jury needed only to draw one inference from direct evidence (the presence of water on the floor) to decide why the water was there and whether the peas had been on the floor long enough to charge Winn-Dixie with constructive knowledge.
[1] A plaintiff must prove that a dangerous condition existed on the premises for a sufficient length of time to charge the defendant with constructive notice.
[2] Constructive notice of a dangerous condition may be proven by circumstantial evidence.
Previewing 2 of 6 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“To hold Winn-Dixie liable for his injuries, Teate had to prove that the peas were present on the floor for a sufficient length of time to charge Winn-Dixie with constructive knowledge. This may be proved by circumstantial evidence.”
Establishes the legal standard for constructive notice liability in premises liability cases and that circumstantial evidence is admissible for this purpose.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceCharlie Teate slipped and fell on peas in the frozen food department of a Winn-Dixie supermarket, fracturing his femur. The jury found Winn-Dixie 80% …
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PER CURIAM.
This is an appeal from a directed verdict entered in favor of Winn-Dixie. We reverse.
Charlie Teate slipped and fell on some peas in the frozen food department of a Winn-Dixie supermarket and fractured his femur.
The jury returned a verdict apportioning Winn-Dixie eighty per cent of the blame and Teate twenty per cent. The court then granted the defendant’s motion for a directed verdict on the ground that the evidence was insufficient to present a jury question on the issue of constructive notice of the dangerous condition. Teate appeals. To hold Winn-Dixie liable for his injuries, Teate had to prove that the peas were present on the floor for a sufficient length of time to charge Winn-Dixie with constructive knowledge. This may be proved by circumstantial evidence. Schmidt v. Bowl America Florida, Inc., 358 So. 2d 1385 (Fla. 4th DCA 1978); Grizzard v. Colonial Stores, Inc., 330 So. 2d 768 (Fla. 1st DCA 1976); Winn Dixie Stores, Inc. v. Williams, 264 So. 2d 862 (Fla. 3d DCA 1972).
In addition to showing that no employee had cleaned the area for fifteen to twenty minutes before the fall, Teate presented evidence that there was some water on the floor around the peas. Teate contends that the water was there because the peas had been on the floor for some time and had thawed. The jury could believe this and find that the peas had been on the floor for a sufficient time to put Winn-Dixie on notice of the dangerous condition. Winn-Dixie counters that the water was a result of “permafrost” or ice crystals on the bag of peas that instantly melted when it hit the floor. The jury could choose to believe this argument, find the peas had fallen perhaps only seconds before the fall, and decide that there was insufficient notice.
The resolution of this issue did not require the jury to build one inference on another as Winn-Dixie contends. Food Fair Stores, Inc. v. Trusell, 131 So. 2d 730 (Fla.1961); Voelker v. Combined Ins. Co. of America, 73 So. 2d 403 (Fla.1954); Public Super Markets, Inc. v. Schmidt, 509 So. 2d 977 (Fla. 4th DCA 1987); Gaidymowicz v. Winn-Dixie Stores, Inc., 371 So. 2d 212 (Fla. 3d DCA 1979). Since it was established that there was some water on the floor, it was completely within the jury’s province to decide why the water was there. Camina v. Parliament Ins. Co., 417 So. 2d 1093 (Fla. 3d DCA 1982); Grizzard, 330 So. 2d at 769.
The jury needed to draw only one inference from direct evidence to reach a decision as to the defendant’s constructive notice of the condition. See Montgomery v. Florida Jitney Jungle Stores, Inc., 281 So. 2d 302 (Fla.1973); Camina, at 1094. It was entitled to believe Teate and to select the inference that it did.
Consequently, it was error to set aside the verdict.
Reversed with directions to reinstate the jury verdict and enter judgment for Teate.
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Citator
Cited By (19 total)
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Owens v. Publix Supermarkets, Inc., 802 So. 2d 315 (Fla. 2001)…review Owens v. Publix Supermarkets, Inc., 729 So. 2d 449 (Fla. 5th DCA 1999) (en banc), and Soriano v. B & B Cash Grocery Stores, Inc., 757 So. 2d 514 (Fla. 4th DCA 1999), based on express and direct conflict with Teate v. Winn-Dixie Stores, Inc., 524 So. 2d 1060 (Fla. 3d DCA 1988), on the issue of whether, in a slip and fall ease, the condition of a transitory foreign substance1 is itself sufficient to establish constructive knowledge. We have jurisdiction. See art. V, § 3(b)(3), Fla. Const.2 For the reason…1 / 3
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Justa Patricia Delgado v. Laundromax, Inc., 65 So. 3d 1087 (Fla. 3d DCA 2011)…pool of the substance in which she slipped); Newalk v. Fla. Supermarkets, Inc., 610 So. 2d 528, 529 (Fla. 3d DCA 1992) (finding testimony that spots on the floor “appeared old,” was enough evidence to show notice); Teate v. Winn-Dixie Stores, Inc., 524 So. 2d 1060, 1061 (Fla. 3d DCA 1988) (finding that where plaintiff slipped and fell on peas in store’s frozen food aisle, that water on the floor around the peas could support an inference the peas had been on the floor long enough to thaw). Negligent Mode of…
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Harriette Wilson-Greene v. The City OF Miami, 208 So. 3d 1271 (Fla. 3d DCA 2017)…as that the soup was hot prior to it being spilled. The mere presence of soup which is “not hot” on the floor is not enough to establish constructive notice as to Vista or the City. Wilson-Greene relies heavily on Teate v. Winn-Dixie Stores, Inc., 524 So. 2d 1060 (Fla. 3d DCA 1988), for the argument that because the soup was “not hot” the jury could infer it was there for a substantial period of time for Vista and the City to have known of its existence. We find Teate distinguishable from the instant case. T…
Previewing 3 of 19 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Voelker v. Combined Ins. Co. of Am., 73 So. 2d 403 (Fla. 1954)
- Food Fair Stores, Inc. v. Phoebe C. Trusell et vir, 131 So. 2d 730 (Fla. 1961)
- Montgomery v. Fla. Jitney Jungle Stores, Inc., 281 So. 2d 302 (Fla. 1973)
- Winn Dixie Stores, Inc. v. Williams, 264 So. 2d 862 (Fla. 3d DCA 1972)
- Isaac v. State, 509 So. 2d 977 (Fla. 1st DCA 1987)
- Parra v. State, 371 So. 2d 212 (Fla. 3d DCA 1979)
- Gordon v. Gordon, 417 So. 2d 1093 (Fla. 3d DCA 1982)
- Schmidt v. Bowl Am. Fla., Inc., 358 So. 2d 1385 (Fla. 4th DCA 1978)
- Grizzard v. Colonial Stores, Inc., 330 So. 2d 768 (Fla. 1st DCA 1976)