S. CHRISTINE CANTRELL, APPELLANT,
v.
HOME LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY, ETC., ET AL., APPELLEES
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An appellant sought life insurance proceeds under a property settlement agreement incorporated into her parents' divorce decree, which made her a beneficiary of her father's policies. The trial court found the beneficiary designation was merely incidental to child support and could be changed, but the appellate court reversed, holding that the agreement constituted an unconditional conveyance of a third-party donee interest in the insurance proceeds.
The court held that while courts can order life insurance maintained as security for support obligations, parties can voluntarily agree to name someone as a beneficiary in an unconditional manner that constitutes a binding conveyance of benefits. Here, the agreement was part of a property settlement and made appellant an unconditional third-party donee beneficiary, so the father's later attempt to change the beneficiary was ineffective.
[1] A property settlement agreement incorporated into a dissolution judgment can create a binding and unconditional obligation to maintain a beneficiary on a life insurance p…
[2] A parent or spouse can voluntarily agree to name and maintain another person, including a support beneficiary, as an insured under a life insurance policy, and such an ag…
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“a parent or spouse can voluntarily agree to name and maintain another person, including a support beneficiary, as an insured under a life insurance policy. Such an agreement need not be limited to security for a support obligation and can constitute a binding and unconditional conveyance of the benefits payable under such policy.”
Establishes the key distinction between court-ordered insurance (limited to support) and voluntary agreements (which can be unconditional conveyances)
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAppellant's father agreed in a property settlement agreement as part of his divorce to maintain appellant and her brother as sole beneficiaries of his…
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COWART, Judge.
Appellant’s father, as part of his divorce from appellant’s mother, entered into a property settlement agreement in which the appellant and her brother were to be maintained as sole beneficiaries of the father’s life insurance policies. This settle ment agreement was approved and incorporated in the dissolution judgment, which ordered its performance. The father remarried. Disregarding his settlement agreement with his first wife, the father removed appellant as beneficiary of his life insurance policies, and named his new wife, an appellee herein, as sole beneficiary.
After the father died, the appellant brought an action against the father’s new wife for one-half the proceeds of the policies named in the settlement agreement.1 On stipulated facts, the trial court found that the requirement in the settlement agreement, that the appellant be maintained as one-half beneficiary of the policies, was incidental to the father’s child support obligation and upon satisfaction of that obligation, the father was free to change the beneficiary of his policies. The court entered summary judgment against the appellant and in favor of the new wife. We reverse.
Trial courts in dissolution proceedings can require a spouse to maintain a life insurance policy as security for support. See, e.g., Bosem v. Bosem, 279 So. 2d 863 (Fla.1973); Eagan v. Eagan, 392 So. 2d 988 (Fla. 5th DCA 1981). See also sections 61.08(3) and 61.13(l)(d), Florida Statutes (1987). Because it merely is security for support, a court can order insurance only be maintained to secure a court ordered support obligation. See Kirkwood v. Kirkwood, 365 So. 2d 793 (Fla. 2d DCA 1978), cert. denied, 376 So. 2d 73 (Fla.1979).
However, a parent or spouse can voluntarily agree to name and maintain another person, including a support beneficiary, as an insured under a life insurance policy. Such an agreement need not be limited to security for a support obligation and can constitute a binding and unconditional conveyance of the benefits payable under such policy.
We find that the agreement in this case was not limited to security for a support obligation but was part of a settlement of the marital property rights between the father and his first wife and constituted an unconditional agreement making the appellant a third party donee one-half interest beneficiary of the insurance policies in question. In making the agreement, the father conveyed an unqualified interest in one-half of the proceeds thereof in the appellant and the father’s later attempt to change the beneficiary was ineffective. See Pensyl v. Moore, 415 So. 2d 771 (Fla. 3d DCA 1982), rev. denied, 424 So. 2d 762 (Fla.1982); Dixon v. Dixon, 184 So. 2d 478 (Fla. 2d DCA 1966), cert. discharged, 194 So. 2d 897 (Fla.1967).
Accordingly, the summary judgment is reversed and the cause remanded for the trial court to enter summary judgment in favor of the appellant.
REVERSED and REMANDED.
DAUKSCH and ORFINGER, JJ., concur. . The appellant also named the father’s life insurance companies as party defendants. The insurance companies were dropped as parties after paying the proceeds of the policies into the registry of the court.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
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Longo v. Longo, 533 So. 2d 791 (Fla. 4th DCA 1988)…elman, 490 So. 2d 225 (Fla. 2d DCA 1986) (,Sobelman I). By necessary implication both the third and fifth districts have adopted a similar interpretation. See Turner v. Turner, 507 So. 2d 170 (Fla. 5th DCA 1987); Cantrell v. Home Life Insurance Co., 524 So. 2d 1063 (Fla. 5th DCA 1988); Benson v. Benson, 503 So. 2d 384 (Fla. 3d DCA 1987). The first district has apparently adopted a different view. In Kooser v. Kooser, 506 So. 2d 81, 82 (Fla. 1st DCA 1987), the district court affirmed the trial court’s denial o…
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Cooper v. Karin Muccitelli, 682 So. 2d 77 (Fla. 1996)…C.J., recused, . Of course, a settlement agreement that specifically requires one of the parties to maintain a named individual as beneficiary will control the disposition of proceeds upon notice to the insurer. See Cantrell v. Home Life Ins. Co., 524 So. 2d 1063 (Fla. 5th DCA 1988).…
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Cooper v. Karin Muccitelli, 661 So. 2d 52 (Fla. 2d DCA 1995)…owner of a life insurance policy can fix or vest the right to the proceeds by a [*54] separation agreement approved by the court. We recognize that this would override the insured’s right to designate the beneficiary. Cantrell v. Home Life Ins. Co., 524 So. 2d 1063 (Fla. 5th DCA 1988). In this case, however, there was no agreement fixing the beneficiary. Based on this analysis, we have concluded the following. Pasquino had complete control of the life insurance policy in question, including the right to chang…
Previewing 3 of 4 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Bosem v. Arie Lionel Bosem, 279 So. 2d 863 (Fla. 1973)
- Dixon v. Dixon, 184 So. 2d 478 (Fla. 2d DCA 1966)
- McQUIGGAN v. State, 392 So. 2d 988 (Fla. 5th DCA 1981)
- Eagan v. Eagan, 392 So. 2d 988 (Fla. 5th DCA 1981)
- Mosier v. State, 415 So. 2d 771 (Fla. 3d DCA 1982)
- Dixon v. Dixon, 194 So. 2d 897 (Fla. 1967)
- Kirkwood v. Kirkwood, 365 So. 2d 793 (Fla. 2d DCA 1978)