LENNY BROOKS A/K/A DARRYL JOHNSON, APPELLANT,
v.
THE STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
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Brooks was convicted of two separate cocaine possession charges and sought appellate review of denied suppression motions. The court reversed one conviction based on an unlawful pretextual traffic stop but affirmed the second conviction where cocaine was found in an abandoned vehicle.
The first conviction is reversed because the stop was pretextual under Kehoe v. State—the officers lacked founded suspicion of criminal activity and arrested Brooks for a traffic infraction (improper start) under which arrest would not normally occur. The second conviction is affirmed because there is no reasonable expectation of privacy in property abandoned in a public street to avoid police search.
[1] A traffic stop is pretextual and invalid if the officer's primary motive for the stop is unrelated to a founded suspicion of criminal activity and the detention is for a…
[2] A defendant has no reasonable expectation of privacy in property abandoned in a public street in an attempt to avoid a police search.
Previewing 2 of 2 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“a search as pretextual where the officers had another motive for the stop that was not based on a founded suspicion of criminal activity and the detention was for a traffic infraction for which an arrest would not otherwise have been made”
Establishes the standard for invalidating pretextual traffic stops under Kehoe v. State
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceIn the first case, police stopped Brooks for an improper vehicle start after he accelerated from a suspected drug house, discovering cocaine in his tr…
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PER CURIAM.
These appeals are brought from two convictions and concurrent seven year sentences in two separate cases charging possession with intent to sell cocaine. The defendant entered pleas of nolo contendere to the offenses reserving the right to appeal the denial of motions to suppress filed in both cases. We reverse one conviction and sentence and affirm the other. In one case two police officers were patrolling an area of Miami known for drug trafficking. The officers saw the defendant drive his car away from a suspected base house and accelerate suddenly, causing gravel to fly over the road. According to the officers the tires made a “screeching” noise when they hit the pavement. Brooks was pulled over by the officers to be ticketed for “an improper start.” The officers arrested Brooks for failing to produce a driver’s license. Subsequent events led to a search of the vehicle’s trunk where bags of rock cocaine were found.
The police attempted to stop Brooks three weeks later when Brooks ran a stop sign. After the marked police unit turned on its emergency lights, Brooks stopped in the middle of the intersection, opened the car door and fled along with a companion. Brooks was apprehended within minutes and placed under arrest for driving without a license. A search of the vehicle uncovered 400 cocaine rocks. He was charged with the second narcotics offense.
The first case is controlled by Ke-hoe v. State, 521 So. 2d 1094 (Fla.1988), which invalidated a search as pretextual where the officers had another motive for the stop that was not based on a founded suspicion of criminal activity and the detention was for a traffic infraction for which an arrest would not otherwise have been made. But for the unfounded suspicion that Brooks was involved with illegal drugs, he would not have been detained for an improper start of a motor vehicle which had traveled all of ten yards.
As to the second case, we hold that there is no reasonable expectation of privacy in property abandoned in a public street in an attempt to avoid a police search. See State v. Oliver, 368 So. 2d 1331 (Fla. 3d DCA 1979), cert. dismissed, 383 So. 2d 1200 (Fla.1980), and State v. Lawson, 394 So. 2d 1139 (Fla. 4th DCA 1981) (defendant had no reasonable expectation of privacy in car abandoned in “no loitering” zone).
Accordingly, we reverse the conviction and sentence arising out of the first police stop, affirm the conviction and sentence for the second narcotics offense, and remand for resentencing.
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Thomas v. State, 583 So. 2d 336 (Fla. 5th DCA 1991)…g an ordinance relating to failing to admit a building official for an inspection and was issued a notice to appear. In neither case does it appear that the defendant was “taken into custody” or that a search was conducted. See also Brooks v. State, 524 So. 2d 1102 (Fla. 3d DCA 1988) (search was pretextual where officer had motive not based on founded suspicion of criminal activity and detention was for traffic infraction for which an arrest would not otherwise have been made). The evidence in this case shoul…
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Porcher v. State, 538 So. 2d 1278 (Fla. 5th DCA 1989)…he circumstances a reasonable officer would have stopped the appellant’s vehicle. Kehoe v. State, 521 So. 2d 1094 (Fla.1988). This was a pretextual stop and all that flowed from that stop is tainted with the unlawful police conduct. Brooks v. State, 524 So. 2d 1102 (Fla. 3d DCA 1988). The order denying suppression is reversed, the conviction is reversed and appellant discharged. REVERSED. ORFINGER, J., concurs. SHARP, C.J., concurs specially with opinion.…
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Diaz v. State, 548 So. 2d 843 (Fla. 3d DCA 1989)…fendant’s flight from the vehicle, leaving it unattended and running in the middle of the street, was effectively an abandonment, thus relinquishing any reasonable expectation of privacy in the property abandoned in a public street. Brooks v. State, 524 So. 2d 1102, 1103 (Fla. 3d DCA 1988); State v. Lawson, 394 So. 2d 1139, 1141 (Fla. 4th DCA 1981); see 1 W. LaFave Search and Seizure § 2.5(a), at 446-447 (1987). The denial of the motion to suppress is therefore affirmed. As to the cross-appeal, the fine impos…
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Kehoe v. State, 521 So. 2d 1094 (Fla. 1988)
- State v. Oliver, 368 So. 2d 1331 (Fla. 3d DCA 1979)
- State v. Lawson, 394 So. 2d 1139 (Fla. 4th DCA 1981)