CHARLES BRAXTON, SR., APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
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Florida appellate court reversed defendant's conviction for firearm possession by a convicted felon because the trial court erred in denying the motion to suppress evidence obtained from a warrantless search of defendant's home while on community control.
A warrantless search of a home belonging to a person on community control cannot produce admissible evidence for a new criminal prosecution, even though community control is a severe alternative to probation.
[1] Evidence obtained from a warrantless search of a community control offender's home is inadmissible in a criminal prosecution for a new offense, though such evidence may b…
Previewing 1 of 1 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“While evidence seized in violation of the Fourth Amendment is admissible at a parole revocation hearing, such evidence is not admissible during a criminal trial.”
Court explaining the distinction between admissibility at revocation proceedings versus criminal trials.
Defendant Braxton, on community control, was subjected to a warrantless search of his home conducted by officers including his community control offic…
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PER CURIAM.
We reverse defendant’s conviction for possession of a firearm by a convicted felon. We agree with defendant’s contention that the trial court erred in denying defendant’s motion to suppress a firearm found during a warrantless search of his home. Defendant was on community control, and the search was conducted by officers including defendant’s community control officer. As a result of the search, defendant was charged with the criminal offense from his conviction for which he is now appealing.
While the product of a warrant-less search of a jail inmate’s cell is admissible in evidence, Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 104 S.Ct. 3194, 82 L.Ed.2d 393 (1984), the product of a warrantless search of a probationer’s home is not admissible to prove a new criminal offense. Grubbs v. State, 373 So. 2d 905 (Fla.1979); Croteau v. State, 334 So. 2d 577 (Fla.1976). Community control is “a harsh and more severe alternative to ordinary probation,” State v. Mestas, 507 So. 2d 587, 588 (Fla.1987), but for present purposes we do not equate community control with incarceration. For these purposes we think community control should be considered akin to parole. A parolee does not, by accepting parole, give up his Fourth Amendment rights. Kinsler v. State, 360 So. 2d 24, 25 (Fla. 2d DCA 1978). “While evidence seized in violation of the Fourth Amendment is admissible at a parole revocation hearing, such evidence is not admissible during a criminal trial.” Id., citing Croteau.
The conviction is reversed.
SCHOONOVER, A.C.J., and LEHAN and FRANK, JJ., concur.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
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Ogden v. State, 605 So. 2d 155 (Fla. 5th DCA 1992)…e community involving restrictions of the freedom of the offender). In State v. Mestas, 507 So. 2d 587, 588 (Fla.1987), the court noted that community control is a “harsh and more severe alternative to ordinary probation.” See also Braxton v. State, 524 So. 2d 1141 (Fla. 2d DCA 1988); Stranigan v. State, 457 So. 2d 546 (Fla. 2d DCA 1984). More recently, the supreme court stated that community control was “a more coercive deprivation of liberty and a more serious penalty than probation.” Fraser v. State, 602 So…
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Mathews v. State, 529 So. 2d 361 (Fla. 2d DCA 1988)…e served while on community control. We do not agree with defendant’s contention on appeal which is to the effect that community control is the functional equivalent of jail. Butler v. State, 530 So. 2d 324 (Fla. 5th DCA 1988). See Braxton v. State, 524 So. 2d 1141 (Fla. 2d DCA 1988) (“[W]e do not equate community control with incarceration.”). Compare Tal-Mason v. State, 515 So. 2d 738, 739 (Fla.1987) (“[C]oercive commitment to a state [mental] institution was indistinguishable from pretrial detention in a ‘j…
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In the Interest of B.A., 546 So. 2d 125 (Fla. 1st DCA 1989)…ement pending disposition of the case. Compare Mathews v. State, 529 So. 2d 361 (Fla. 2d DCA 1988), in which the court disagreed with that defendant’s contention that community control is the functional equivalent of jail. See also Braxton v. State, 524 So. 2d 1141 (Fla. 2d DCA 1988), in which, in consideration of Fourth Amendment rights, the court refused to equate community control with [*126] incarceration. Therefore, since appellant was not sentenced to institutional incarceration and in consideration of t…
Previewing 3 of 9 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517 (U.S. 1984)
- Grubbs v. State, 373 So. 2d 905 (Fla. 1979)
- State v. Mestas, 507 So. 2d 587 (Fla. 1987)
- Croteau v. State, 334 So. 2d 577 (Fla. 1976)
- Kinsler v. State, 360 So. 2d 24 (Fla. 2d DCA 1978)