SCOTT ALAN SPENCE, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE

Fla. 5th DCA | 1988-04-14
No. 87-803
SHARP, C.J., and COWART, J., concur.
525 So. 2d 442 Florida District Court of Appeal, Fifth District (1988) Caution
Cited by 12 cases

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Synopsis

Scott Spence appeals the denial of his motion to suppress evidence of cocaine found in a car following a police encounter. The court reversed, holding that the officer lacked the requisite founded suspicion to detain the vehicle occupants under Florida's Stop and Frisk Law.


Holding

The court held that the trooper lacked founded suspicion because the observed conduct was equally consistent with non-criminal activity, and the officer's actions were motivated by mere curiosity rather than articulable facts supporting suspicion of a crime.


Headnotes

[1] A law enforcement officer must have a "founded suspicion" of criminal activity, based on articulable facts and the officer's knowledge, to justify a temporary detention u…

[2] Mere curiosity or a general suspicion that criminal activity might be occurring is insufficient to establish the "founded suspicion" required for a lawful detention.

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Key Quotes

“To justify a temporary detention under section 901.151, the Florida Stop and Frisk Law, the officer is required to have a 'founded suspicion' of criminal activity. This type of suspicion is one which is based upon the factual circumstances observed by the officer and interpreted in light of the officer's knowledge.”

Establishes the legal standard for founded suspicion necessary to justify a detention

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Facts & Procedural History

A trooper patrolling at 1:00 A.M. pulled into a cleared parking area near the Tomoka River known for both drug activity and as a 'lover's lane.' He en…

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Opinion of the Court
ORFINGER, Judge.

ORFINGER, Judge.

Following the denial of his motion to suppress, which the parties agree is dispos-itive here, the defendant entered a plea of nolo contendere to one count of possession of cocaine. The trial court withheld adjudication and placed defendant on probation for 4 years. He appeals and we reverse.

The arresting officer, the only witness at the suppression hearing, testified that while on patrol at approximately 1:00 A.M. on the day in question, he pulled off the main road onto a narrow path which led to a cleared area adjacent to the Tomoka River where two or three cars could park. The trooper knew this area as one where people do drugs and that it sometimes is a “lover’s lane.” As he pulled his vehicle into the clearing, the trooper came head to head with a car parked with its headlights off and its interior light on. There were two couples in the car. He saw the right front passenger lean down as if to put something on the floorboard. The left rear passenger did likewise. The defendant, sitting in the driver’s seat, did not move. The trooper got out of his car to see what the occupants were hiding and asked the occupants to step out of the vehicle.

After the occupants exited the car, the trooper looked into the car and was able to see a box, on top of which were a razor blade, two plastic packets of a white powdery substance and a short plastic straw. All four occupants of the car were then arrested. The trial court denied the motion to suppress on the ground that the entire episode was lawful as an encounter, and that even if there was a seizure, the movements of the passengers inside the car were sufficient to create reasonable suspicion, such as would authorize the brief seizure and further investigation.

The trial court relied upon State v. Smith, 477 So. 2d 658 (Fla. 5th DCA 1985) in reaching its decision. In Smith this court found that the facts provided founded suspicion for a brief seizure. The officer saw two men near a dumpster sharing something out of a paper bag, but when he attempted to approach the men, they ran. This court found that after the men fled and were tracked down, the encounter was elevated to a brief seizure supported by founded suspicion. Smith is not analogous to the case before us.

The trooper did not testify that he had any concern for his safety upon approaching the vehicle. His intent was simply to see what, if anything, the occupants were hiding under the seat. This was mere curiosity, not based on any articulable facts. To justify a temporary detention under section 901.151, the Florida Stop and Frisk Law, the officer is required to have a “founded suspicion” of criminal activity. This type of suspicion is one which is based upon the factual circumstances observed by the officer and interpreted in light of the officer’s knowledge. State v. Hunt, 391 So. 2d 760 (Fla. 5th DCA 1980). Mere or bare suspicion cannot support a detention.

There was nothing about the circumstances which would give the officer the “founded suspicion” required by law to detain the occupants of the automobile for further investigation. He testified that he had investigated other cars parked in the same area at other times and had found no sign of drugs. The parking area was also known as a “lover’s lane,” so it was not unusual for cars to be parked there, especially after dark. Therefore the detention was based on a brief observation of conduct which is at least equally consistent with non-criminal activity. See Carter v. State, 454 So. 2d 739 (Fla. 2d DCA 1984). See also G.J.P. v. State, 469 So. 2d 826 (Fla. 2d DCA 1985) (an officer who observes a car parked even in a high crime area and then sees one of the occupants make a quick movement may have his suspicions aroused, but he does not have the “founded suspicion” necessary to legally detain the person for the purpose of further investigation).

The order denying defendant’s motion to suppress is

REVERSED.

SHARP, C.J., and COWART, J., concur.


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Citator

Cited By

  • State v. Billingsly, 542 So. 2d 444 (Fla. 5th DCA 1989)
    …ange probable cause to arrest him. See Greene v. State, 532 So. 2d 1309 (Fla. 5th DCA 1988). Since there was no illegal police action, the trial court erred in suppressing the statements made by Bill-ingsly while in police custody. Spence v. State, 525 So. 2d 442 (Fla. 5th DCA 1988), relied on by the trial court, is distinguishable. In that case, the drugs were observed after the police officer had illegally detained the occupants of a vehicle. In contrast, here the contraband was observed prior to the time…
  • Smith v. State, 592 So. 2d 1239 (Fla. 2d DCA 1992)
    …milarly, flight from an officer does not justify detention, especially since it was not appellant, but his companion, who ran. See Daniels v. State, 543 So. 2d 363 (Fla. 1st DCA 1989). Neither do furtive movements justify detention. Spence v. State, 525 So. 2d 442 (Fla. 5th DCA 1988). In view of the fact that the stop and search procedure was improper, evidence [*1241] of the fruits of the search, the concealed weapon, must be suppressed. We, accordingly, reverse and remand for a new trial. HALL and PATTER…
  • State v. Starke, 550 So. 2d 547 (Fla. 2d DCA 1989)
    …er two grams of cocaine under the driver’s seat. The trial court granted appellee’s motion to suppress the cocaine seized by Thickens, and appellant/state filed this appeal. Appellant argues that the trial court improperly relied on Spence v. State, 525 So. 2d 442 (Fla. 5th DCA 1988). We agree with appellant that Spence does not apply here for the reasons set forth in State v. Billingsly, 542 So. 2d 444 (Fla. 5th DCA 1989). The Billingsly court distinguished Spence, 525 So. 2d at 442, on the grounds that in…

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