STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLANT,
v.
ANTHONY RAY, APPELLEE
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The State of Florida appealed a trial court's dismissal of cocaine possession charges against Anthony Ray. The trial court dismissed the case as a sanction for the prosecution's discovery violations, but the appellate court reversed, finding dismissal was an abuse of discretion when less severe sanctions would suffice.
The court held that dismissal was an abuse of discretion because extreme sanctions should be imposed only when less severe sanctions would not accomplish the desired result. The record showed substantial speedy trial time remained, permitting a continuance to allow the defendant adequate time to obtain discovery and prepare for trial.
[1] Dismissal of a criminal charge is an abuse of discretion when less severe sanctions, such as a continuance, would suffice to remedy discovery violations.
[2] A continuance is a less severe sanction than dismissal and may be appropriate to cure discovery violations, provided sufficient speedy trial time remains.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“That extreme sanction should be imposed only when less severe sanctions would not accomplish the desired result.”
Establishes the legal standard for when dismissal is appropriate as a discovery sanction
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceRay was charged with possession of cocaine with intent to sell or deliver. Following a discovery demand, the state provided the police report with fou…
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PER CURIAM.
The state appeals the trial court’s dismissal of the charge against defendant. The dismissal was a sanction for discovery violations by the state. We reverse.
Defendant was charged with possession of cocaine with intent to sell or deliver. Defense counsel filed a demand for discovery. The state responded with a copy of the police report which included the names of the four arresting officers.
Three days before trial, at a status conference, defense counsel noted that the state had not furnished the names of any additional witnesses which the prosecution might intend to call at trial. The state gave the names of two more witnesses.
On the day of trial, defense counsel noted that no witness list had been received from the state. The state said that a response to the discovery demand had been prepared but was not yet typed and delivered to the defense. The state also said that the defense had not been given the names of the confidential informants and that the state would try to get those names to the defense that afternoon.
The trial court sua sponte indicated its inclination to dismiss the charge against defendant. The state then argued that dismissal was the most severe sanction and that a continuance would cure the problem. Defense counsel argued that his client’s right to a fair trial had been prejudiced by the state’s failure to respond to the discovery demand. The trial court then dismissed the charge.
We must conclude that the dismissal was an abuse of discretion. That extreme sanction should be imposed only when less severe sanctions would not accomplish the desired result. See State v. King, 372 So. 2d 1126 (Fla. 2d DCA 1979).
The record shows no discussion in the trial court about the amount of time remaining before defendant’s speedy trial time expired. However, our calculations indicate that substantial speedy trial time remained and that the trial could have been continued within that time for a period sufficient to allow the defendant to obtain discovery and prepare for trial. See State v. Perez, 383 So. 2d 923 (Fla. 2d DCA 1980).
Reversed and remanded for proceedings consistent herewith.
CAMPBELL, A.C.J., and LEHAN and FRANK, JJ., concur.
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Citator
Cited By
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State v. Amenhotep Alihakeem Kalfani, 968 So. 2d 599 (Fla. 2d DCA 2007)…al. At that point, the trial court invited defense counsel to make a motion. Kalfani’s counsel moved for dismissal, which the court granted as to both cases. We review the order of dismissal using the abuse of discretion standard. See State v. Ray, 525 So. 2d 1033, 1034 (Fla. 2d DCA 1988); State v. L.E., 754 So. 2d 60, 61 (Fla. 3d DCA 2000). It is well established that dismissal is an extreme sanction that “should be imposed only when less severe sanctions would not accomplish the desired result.” Ray, 525 So…
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State v. A.J., 558 So. 2d 197 (Fla. 2d DCA 1990)…hat the assistant state attorney managed to provide the discovery the day after it was requested. Since the assistant public defender stated on the record that she could be prepared if this was done, we find the dismissal improper. See State v. Ray, 525 So. 2d 1033 (Fla. 2d DCA 1988). Reversed and remanded for further proceedings. PARKER, A.C.J., and PATTERSON and ALTENBERND, JJ, concur.…
Authorities Cited
- State v. Perez, 383 So. 2d 923 (Fla. 2d DCA 1980)
- PAN Am. Bank OF Orlando v. Anne J. Yanow, 372 So. 2d 1126 (Fla. 4th DCA 1979)
- State v. O. C. "Sonny" King, 372 So. 2d 1126 (Fla. 2d DCA 1979)