THE FLORIDA BAR, COMPLAINANT,
v.
DENNIS S. GOLD, RESPONDENT
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The Florida Bar disciplined attorney Dennis Gold for misconduct in handling a fee dispute with a client, specifically for obtaining a judgment against the client despite an alleged agreement to hold the action in abeyance. The Florida Supreme Court affirmed the referee's findings and imposed costs of $1,721.82 against Gold.
Gold violated Disciplinary Rule 1-102(A)(6) regarding conduct reflecting on his fitness to practice law and is subject to a public reprimand. The assessed costs of $1,721.82 should not be reduced merely because Gold was found not guilty of actual misrepresentation; the costs are properly imposed against the respondent.
[1] A lawyer may be found guilty of conduct reflecting on fitness to practice law for exercising virtually no control over the means of collection used by a secretary to whom…
[2] A lawyer's delegation of full authority for billing and collections to a secretary, coupled with conditioning future pay raises on collection success, may support a findi…
Previewing 2 of 6 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“the referee found no clear and convincing evidence that respondent had actual knowledge of the agreement to hold the lawsuit in abeyance and, thus, was not guilty of actual misrepresentation.”
Establishes that despite the secretary's agreement, Gold was not found guilty of actual misrepresentation, though he was found guilty of the broader charge of conduct reflecting on his fitness to practice law.
Previewing 1 of 3 key quotes on this case — the court’s exact language, pinpointed for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceGold represented a client in a 1985 dissolution of marriage case and charged $768.50. In August 1986, he filed a small claims action for an unpaid bal…
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PER CURIAM.
This disciplinary proceeding is before us on a complaint of The Florida Bar and the report of the referee. The action stems from respondent’s actions in obtaining a judgment on a fee dispute during 1986 and was brought under the former integration rule and Code of Professional Responsibility. Respondent does not contest the referee’s recommendations of guilt and punishment, but does challenge the referee’s approval of the costs involved in the pro- ceedmgs. We have jurisdiction. Art. V, § 15, Fla. Const. Respondent represented a client in a dissolution of marriage action in 1985 for which services he charged $768.50.
On August 4, 1986, he filed a small claims action for an unpaid balance of $456. A hearing on the claim was scheduled for September 11, 1986. The client immediately contacted respondent’s office to propose a payment plan but was unable to talk with respondent.
However, respondent’s secretary, who had been delegated full responsibility for billing and collection, agreed to hold the small claims action in abeyance if a partial payment was made. The client was led to believe that respondent approved the agreement, which was confirmed by letter. Respondent, purportedly ignorant of the secretary’s commitment, appeared at the September 11 hearing and obtained a judgment against the client. In doing so, respondent apparently failed to observe that the client had paid $125 on the account since the filing of the claim in August. The client did not appear at the hearing but, after learning of the judgment, contacted respondent to determine why he had violated the agreement to hold the action in abeyance. No explanation was given and respondent did not attempt to have the judgment set aside.
The referee found that respondent delegated full authority to his secretary in billings and collections, that he exercised virtually no control over the means of collection, and that he conditioned future pay raises for his secretary on her success in collection.
However, although the evidence was in conflict, the referee found no clear and convincing evidence that respondent had actual knowledge of the agreement to hold the lawsuit in abeyance and, thus, was not guilty of actual misrepresentation. The referee recommended that respondent be found guilty of violating Disciplinary Rule 1-102(A)(6), conduct reflecting on his fitness to practice law, and that he be publicly reprimanded. Neither party challenges the referee’s recommendations, which we adopt. Publication of this opinion constitutes a public reprimand of respondent.
In its statement of costs, the Bar itemized costs totalling $1,721.82. Respondent challenged various costs on the grounds they were unnecessary, excessive, or were not properly authenticated, and also argues that they should be reduced because the referee found he was not guilty on the charge of misrepresentation. In support, respondent cites The Florida Bar v. Davis, 419 So. 2d 325 (Fla.1982), where we held that the referee has discretion to reduce the assessed costs based on findings of not guilty on part of the charges. Respondent apparently believes he has been partially vindicated by these proceedings or that the Bar carelessly incurred excessive costs in investigating and prosecuting this complaint. The referee rejected these arguments, as do we. Investigation of the charge of misrepresentation was encompassed within the investigation of respondent’s conduct and caused no additional expense. It was respondent’s misbehavior which injured the client and caused the complaint. We see nothing in the record to suggest that the costs incurred were unnecessary, excessive, or not properly authenticated. In these cases, the choice is between imposing the costs of discipline on those who misbehave or on the members of the Bar who have not misbehaved. We see no reason to excuse respondent.
The costs of these proceedings are taxed against the respondent and judgment is entered in the amount of $1,721.82, for which sum let execution issue.
It is so ordered.
MCDONALD, C.J., and OVERTON, EHRLICH, SHAW, BARKETT, GRIMES and KOGAN, JJ., concur.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Cited By
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THE Florida BAR v. Miele, 605 So. 2d 866 (Fla. 1992)…of discretion. Where the choice is between imposing costs on a bar member who has misbehaved and imposing them on the rest of the members who have not misbehaved, it is only fair to tax the costs against the misbehaving member. The Fla. Bar v. Gold, 526 So. 2d 51 (Fla.1988). We approve the referee’s report and adopt his recommendations. By this opinion Joseph R. Miele is publicly reprimanded. Judgment for costs in the amount of $1,462.24 is hereby entered against Miele, for which sum let execution issue. I…
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The Florida BAR v. Alters, 260 So. 3d 72 (Fla. 2018)…rt, as a matter of policy, may levy against a respondent the costs incurred by the Bar in prosecuting the misconduct he or she has committed. Lechtner , 666 So. 2d at 894 ; see Fla. Bar v. Miele , 605 So. 2d 866, 868 (Fla. 1992) ; Fla. Bar v. Gold , 526 So. 2d 51, 52 (Fla. 1988). The referee in this case recommended that the Bar be awarded only its administrative costs of $1250, and that Alters be awarded his costs in the amount of $143,913.35, despite recommending that Alters be found guilty of having viol…
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THE Florida BAR v. Lechtner, 666 So. 2d 892 (Fla. 1996)…who has violated the Rules of Discipline is a policy decision. The choice is between imposing the costs of discipline on those who have violated our Rules of Professional Conduct or on the membership of the Bar who have not. See Florida Bar v. Gold, 526 So. 2d 51 (Fla.1988). In these situations, it is only fair to tax those costs against the member who has violated the rules. See Florida Bar v. Miele, 605 So. 2d 866 (Fla.1992). This Court has the final discretionary authority to assess costs. See Florida Bar…
Previewing 3 of 4 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- THE Florida BAR v. Davis, 419 So. 2d 325 (Fla. 1982)
- THE Florida BAR v. Mayo, 419 So. 2d 325 (Fla. 1982)