LAYNE L. LIGHTSEY, CARY D. LIGHTSEY, J.A. MILES, JR., EARL W. THOMAS, AND DAVID B. DICKENSON, PETITIONERS,
v.
THE HONORABLE VOLIE A. WILLIAMS, JR., AS CIRCUIT JUDGE OF THE NINTH JUDICIAL CIRCUIT, AND THE BOARD OF TRUSTEES OF THE INTERNAL IMPROVEMENT TRUST FUND, STATE OF FLORIDA, RESPONDENTS
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Property owners bordering Lake Kissimmee sought prohibition or certiorari relief against a circuit judge's denial of their motion to abate or stay trespass actions filed against them in Osceola County, arguing that identical or substantially similar actions were already pending in Polk County. The Florida appellate court granted the petition, holding that the trial court abused its discretion by failing to abate or stay the later-filed actions in accordance with established precedent requiring that jurisdiction lie in the circuit where service of process is first perfected.
The trial court departed from the essential requirements of law and abused its discretion in denying the motion to abate or stay. Under the rule established in Mabie v. Garden Street Management Corporation, jurisdiction lies in the circuit where service of process is first perfected; where two actions involve the same parties and the same or substantially the same causes of action, abatement is appropriate. The Board's consolidation of the Lightseys' action with those of other petitioners cannot avoid this rule, and even if it destroyed party identity, a stay would remain available.
[1] When two actions between the same parties are pending in different circuits, jurisdiction lies in the circuit where service of process is first perfected.
[2] Abatement is appropriate where two actions are pending simultaneously which involve the same parties and the same or substantially the same causes of action.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“When two actions between the same parties are pending in different circuits, jurisdiction lies in the circuit where service of process is first perfected.”
Establishes the governing rule that determines which circuit has jurisdiction and implicitly requires abatement or stay in the later-filed circuit.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligencePetitioners owned property bordering Lake Kissimmee. The Lightseys filed a declaratory judgment action in Polk County to determine property boundaries…
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DANIEL, Judge.
Petitioners are owners of property bordering on Lake Kissimmee. Two of the petitioners, the Lightseys, filed a declaratory judgment action in the Tenth Judicial Circuit in and for Polk County to determine the boundary of their property in relation to the lake, the west shore of which also constitutes the boundary between Polk and Osceola Counties.1 Respondent, Board of Trustees of the Internal Improvement Trust Fund, filed a counterclaim in the case alleging that the Lightseys were trespassing as a result of their actions in allegedly depositing fill on sovereign land below the ordinary high water mark of Lake Kissim-mee. Some months later, the Board filed similar trespass actions against three other property owners whose land borders on Lake Kissimmee, but these actions were filed in the Ninth Judicial Circuit in and for Osceola County. The Board also filed an action for trespass against the Lightseys in the Ninth Circuit, directed to a separate parcel of land owned by them, but making otherwise identical allegations. The four actions filed in Osceola County were consolidated.
Petitioners filed a motion to dismiss the Osceola County actions for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, and a motion to abate or stay the cases pending resolution of the Polk County action. Respondent, the Hon. Volie A. Williams, Jr., denied both motions, which resulted in the filing of a petition for writ of prohibition or certiorari in this court.
In Mabie v. Garden Street Management Corporation, 397 So. 2d 920, 921 (Fla.1981), the court held that “When two actions between the same parties are pending in different circuits, jurisdiction lies in the circuit where service of process is first perfected.” See also Suggs v. Cowart, 437 So. 2d 238 (Fla. 5th DCA 1983). There is no question that service of process was first perfected in the Polk County action, nor is there any question that the Polk County Circuit Court has jurisdiction.2 As noted in Thomas v. English, 448 So. 2d 623 (Fla. 4th DCA 1984), abatement is appropriate where two actions are pending simultaneously which involve the same parties and the same or substantially the same causes of action. See also Koehlke Components, Inc. v. South East Connectors, Inc., 456 So. 2d 554 (Fla. 3d DCA 1984). There is no doubt as to the identity of parties and issues in the Polk and Osceola County ac tions involving the Lightseys. Accordingly, the trial court departed from the essential requirements of law in denying petitioners’ motion to abate or stay.
Respondent Board’s argument that the consolidation of the Lightseys’ action with those of the other petitioners destroys the identity of parties necessary to require abatement, even if true, would not prohibit the court from granting a stay as to the consolidated actions. Clearly, the rules set forth in Mabie and Thomas, which are intended to prohibit a race to judgment, cannot be avoided by such maneuvers. Accordingly, we find that the failure to abate or stay the consolidated cases constitutes an abuse of discretion and a departure from the essential requirements of law. The petition for writ of certiorari is granted and the order denying the motion to abate or stay is quashed.
The mandate is issued concurrently herewith and, due to time constraints occasioned by the trial in this matter having been scheduled to commence two business days from issuance of this opinion, no motion for rehearing will be entertained.
WRIT ISSUED.
DAUKSCH and COWART, JJ., concur. . Sections 7.49 and 7.53, Florida Statutes (1987).
. Section 47.071, Florida Statutes (1987).
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Britamco Underwriters, Inc. v. Cent. Jersey Invs., Inc., 632 So. 2d 138 (Fla. 4th DCA 1994)…nvolving the same parties and the same or substantially same cause of action. See Thomas v. English, 448 So. 2d 623 (Fla. 4th DCA 1984); International Surplus Lines [*140] Ins. Co. v. Markham, 580 So. 2d 251 (Fla. 2d DCA 1991); Lightsey v. Williams, 526 So. 2d 764 (Fla. 5th DCA 1988). Clearly, the insurer is not a party to the underlying wrongful death action and the insurer is not bound by the factual determinations made in the underlying liability lawsuit to which they are not a party, since the interests o…
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Int'l Surplus Lines Ins. Co. v. Markham, 580 So. 2d 251 (Fla. 2d DCA 1991)…of a subsequent action is proper upon a showing that a prior action involving the same parties and the same or substantially similar causes of action is pending in the same court or another court of comparable jurisdiction. See Lightsey v. Williams, 526 So. 2d 764 (Fla. 5th DCA 1988); Koehlke Components, Inc. v. South East Connectors, Inc., 456 So. 2d 554 (Fla. 3d DCA 1984); Bartlett v. Bennett, 360 So. 2d 1144 (Fla. 2d DCA 1978). This standard has not been met in the present case. Although ISLIC and the firm…
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Rewjb GAS Invs. v. Land O'Sun Realty, Ltd., 645 So. 2d 1055 (Fla. 4th DCA 1994)…the stay, under the particular facts at bar, the trial court abused its discretion and departed from the essential requirements of the law which could result in irreparable harm that could not be repaired by plenary appeal. See Lightsey v. Williams, 526 So. 2d 764 (Fla. 5th DCA 1988) (failure to abate or stay trespass proceedings pending earlier-filed declaratory judgment action in another county which involved the same parties and the same or substantially the same causes of action constitutes an abuse of di…1 / 2
Previewing 3 of 17 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Lefferts L. Mabie, Jr. v. Garden St. Mgmt. Corp., 397 So. 2d 920 (Fla. 1981)
- Koehlke Components, Inc. v. S. E. Connectors, Inc., 456 So. 2d 554 (Fla. 3d DCA 1984)
- Venuti v. State, 437 So. 2d 238 (Fla. 5th DCA 1983)
- Suggs v. Cowart, 437 So. 2d 238 (Fla. 5th DCA 1983)
- Thomas v. English, 448 So. 2d 623 (Fla. 4th DCA 1984)