JOSEPH LUIS LEVIN
v.
WARDEN, COLUMBIA CORRECTIONAL INSTITUTION – ANNEX
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A state prisoner cannot circumvent the requirement to obtain appellate court authorization for a second or successive habeas petition by filing under 28 U.S.C. § 2241.
[1] A state prisoner cannot circumvent the prohibition on filing second or successive habeas petitions under 28 U.S.C. …
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Insignares v. Secʼy, Fla. Dep't of Corr., 755 F.3d 1273, 1278 (11th Cir. 2014)
Petitioner, a state prisoner, filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2241, challenging a resentencing that increased his proba…
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Petitioner, an inmate of the Florida penal system, initiated this case by filing a document titled “Petition for a Writ of Habeas Corpus Under 28 U.S.C. § 2241" (Doc. 1), alleging he is being illegally detained. He moves to proceed in forma pauperis (Doc. 2). In his Petition, Petitioner explains that he originally was sentenced in 2015, but on September 26, 2023, the state court resentenced him, increasing his probationary period. See Doc. 1 at 2, 4. He acknowledges he previously challenged his judgment of conviction through a habeas corpus action under § 2254 but says his “resentencing constitutes a new factual predicate," making relief under § 2254 “inadequate or ineffective to test the legality of his detention.” Id. at 3–5 (citing § 2255's “saving clause” as discussed in Wofford v. Scott, 177 F. 3d 1236 (11th Cir. 1999)).
As an initial matter, the Court notes that Petitioner's reliance on § 2255's "saving clause" is misplaced. See 28 U.S.C. § 2255(e). "The saving clause provides a federal prisoner relief . . . when his remedy by motion [under § 2255] is inadequate or ineffective . . . ." McCarthan v. Dir. of Goodwill Indus.- Suncoast, Inc., 851 F. 3d 1076, 1085 (11th Cir. 2017) (emphasis added) (internal quotation marks omitted).
Petitioner is a state prisoner in custody pursuant to the judgment of a state court. As such, he is subject to the restrictions governing petitions filed under § 2254. See Medberry v. Crosby, 351 F. 3d 1049, 1062 (11th Cir. 2003). Among those restrictions is a bar against filing a second or successive habeas petition without first obtaining authorization from the appellate court. See 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(3)(A) (requiring a petitioner to “move in the appropriate court of appeals for an order authorizing the district court to consider” the filing of “a second or successive application” under § 2254). See also Insignares v. Secʼy, Fla. Dep't of Corr., 755 F. 3d 1273, 1278 (11th Cir. 2014) (finding that "[s]ubject to [certain] exceptions[,] . . . a district judge lacks jurisdiction to decide a second or successive petition filed without [the Eleventh Circuit's] authorization”).
Petitioner may not circumvent the restrictions governing the filing of second or successive habeas petitions by filing his Petition under § 2241 because a state prisoner who files a habeas petition under § 2241 challenging
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his state court judgment of conviction “is subject to the bar on second and successive petitions contained in § 2244(b).” Johnson v. Warden, Ga. Diagnostic & Classification Prison, 805 F. 3d 1317, 1323 (11th Cir. 2015) ("[The] requirement [set forth in § 2244(b)(3)(A)] cannot be evaded by characterizing the petition as one filed under § 2241 instead of § 2254."). See also Medberry, 351 F. 3d at 1060 (explaining that both §§ 2241 and 2254 “govern a single post-conviction remedy, with the § 2254 requirements applying to petitions brought by a state prisoner in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court").
Petitioner does not allege or demonstrate that he has obtained the required authorization from the Eleventh Circuit to proceed on a second or successive habeas petition. See § 2244(b)(3)(A). Indeed, a review of the Eleventh Circuit docket shows that, on November 3, 2025, that court dismissed in part and denied in part Petitioner's motion for leave to file a successive petition for habeas corpus. See In re Levin, No. 25-13632 (11th Cir.). To the extent Petitioner implies his petition is not second or successive because the state court resentenced him and entered a new judgment, this Court has already considered and rejected this argument. See Case. No. 3:24-cv-1282- MMH-LLL (Doc. 3).
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Accordingly, it is
ORDERED:
1. This case is DISMISSED without prejudice.
2. The Clerk shall enter judgment dismissing this case without prejudice, terminate any pending motions, and close the file.
DONE AND ORDERED in Jacksonville, Florida, on December 11, 2025.
JORDAN E. PRATT
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
Jax-6 c: Joseph Luis Levin
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Authorities Cited
- McCarthan v. Dir. OF Goodwill Industries-Suncoast, Inc., 851 F.3d 1076 (11th Cir. 2017)
- Medberry v. Crosby, 351 F.3d 1049 (11th Cir. 2003)
- Mitchel A. Insignares v. Sec'y, Fla. Dep't OF Corr., 755 F.3d 1273 (11th Cir. 2014)
- Wofford v. Scott, 177 F.3d 1236 (11th Cir. 1999)