TARA M. BURGE

v.

RICK WELLS, OFFICIAL CAPACITY AS SHERIFF OF MANATEE COUNTY, FLORIDA

This matter comes before the Court upon consideration of Defendant Sheriff Rick Wells’s Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. # 33), filed on September²⁴, 2025. Plaintiff Tara M. Burge responded on October³⁰, 2025. (Doc. # 42). Sheriff Wells replied on November¹³, 2025. (Doc. # 48). For the reasons that follow, the Motion is granted.

I. Background

A. Parties and MCSO Policies

Sheriff Rick Wells is the chief law enforcement officer of Manatee County, Florida. (Doc. # 34 at ¶ 3). Sheriff Wells first took office on January³, 2017. (Id.).

Ms. Burge is a former deputy sheriff who was employed with the Manatee County Sheriff&#x²⁷;s Office (“MCSO”) from August 2013 until she resigned effective December⁷, 2022. (Doc. #

Ms. Burge was hired as a corrections academy recruit under former Sheriff Brad Steube. (Doc. # 35 at 49:15-23; Doc. # 35-4 at 1-2). Eventually, under Sheriff Wells, Ms. Burge became a road patrol deputy in 2017. (Doc. # 35 at 55:15-56:18). In April 2022, Ms. Burge became a detective within the MCSO’s Child Protective Investigations Division. (Id. at 58:25-60:21; Doc. # 35-4 at 14; Doc. # 45-1 at ¶ 5).

At the time of her hire, Ms. Burge agreed to “fully comply with all of the rules and regulations of” the MCSO and to "conduct [her] private affairs SO as not to bring embarrassment or discredit to [her]self or the” MCSO. (Doc. 35 at 63:1-19, 65:7-17; Doc. # 35-5). Ms. Burge understood that non-compliance with these conditions could result in termination. (Doc. # 35-5). Ms. Burge maintains that she did not “violate[] any conditions or engage[] in conduct that violated any rules or regulations of MCSO.” (Doc. # 45-1 at 16).

General order (“GO”) 1013 is the MCSO’s discipline order and was part of Ms. Burge′s new-hire orientation. (Doc. # 35 at 63:20-64:24; Doc. # 35-6). It sets forth the standards of

Under “neglect of duty” offenses, GO 1013 precludes (1) the unauthorized access of any National Crime Information Center or Florida Crime Information Center (“NCIC/FCIC”) system, including Driver and Vehicle Information Database (D.A.V.I.D.) or Electronic License and Vehicle Information System (E.L.V.I.S.), (2) disclosure of such information to unauthorized individuals, or (3) violation of FCIC/NCIC rules, regulations, or procedures. (Doc. # 34 at ¶ 5; Doc. # 34-1 at § 12.3.38). Engaging in such conduct is a policy violation that results in discipline up to termination. (Doc. 34-1 at § 12.3.38).

The CSAB is comprised of two members selected by the Sheriff, two members selected by the employee filing the appeal, and a fifth “chairperson” selected by the remaining four members. (Doc. # 34 at ¶ 6; Doc. # 34-1 at § 17.7.1). The CSAB resolves the appeal after a de novo hearing wherein the employee may introduce evidence, question/cross-examine witnesses, and make closing arguments. (Doc. # 34 at ¶ 6; Doc. # 34-1 at § 17.12). The CSAB’s decision is final and binding on both the employee and the Sheriff. (Doc. # 34 at ¶ 6; Doc. # 34-1 at 39, § 17.12.18). However, the CSAB’s decision is subject to further appeal to a state circuit court in accordance with Florida Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.030. Fla. R. App. P. 9.030(c)(3).

Since 2004, three employees have had their discipline reduced via the career service process, including one overturned termination. (Doc. # 34 at ¶ 17). Ms. Burge

B. Complaint against Ms. Burge and Investigation

On November¹⁵, 2022, Manatee County resident Tiffany Porcelli contacted the MCSO of her own accord and complained

The same day as Ms. Porcelli&#x²⁷;s complaint, the MCSO responded to a domestic disturbance call at Ms. Porcelli&#x²⁷;s residence. (Doc. # 36-1 at 6). Among other things, Ms. Porcelli repeated her allegations to responding deputies who then relayed the information to the MCSO’s Professional Standards Unit. (Id.).

The MCSO subsequently opened an internal investigation into Ms. Porcelli&#x²⁷;s complaint. (Doc. # 34 at ¶¶ 8-9; Doc. # 36 at ¶ 4). Ms. Burge acknowledges the MCSO was obligated to investigate Ms. Porcelli&#x²⁷;s allegations and is not challenging the initiation of the investigation as part of her claims. (Doc. # 35 at 44:21-45:3). Ms. Burge, however, avers that Ms. Porcelli&#x²⁷;s claims were false. (Doc. # 45-1 at ¶ 14).

The MCSO’s investigation confirmed Ms. Burge exchanged over²,500 messages, mostly through Facebook, and ten-plus hours of phone calls/video chats with Mr. Bradshaw over an

The correspondence between Ms. Burge and Mr. Bradshaw included topics such as (1) Ms. Burge&#x²⁷;s desire to meet the mother of Mr. Bradshaw&#x²⁷;s children and develop a relationship with his children; (2) Ms. Burge becoming the godmother of one of Mr. Bradshaw&#x²⁷;s children and (3) Ms. Burge encouraging Mr. Bradshaw to leave Ms. Porcelli, referring to Ms. Porcelli as a “terrible person,” and other things. (Doc. # 36-5 at 2- 9). Ms. Burge avers that the “purpose of these communications was entirely focused on assisting [Mr. Bradshaw’s] family.” (Doc. # 45-1 at ¶ 18). Her “intent was to preserve the family unit and ensure the children&#x²⁷;s stability.” (Id.).

Yet, at times, the Facebook communications between Ms. Burge and Mr. Bradshaw appear romantic in nature. After Mr. Bradshaw expressed a desire to “make love” to Ms. Burge, Ms. Burge stated: “There is enough chemistry between us and love and support for each other, that we both know [sex] would be magical! Easily!!” (Doc. # 36-6 at 37). On another occasion,

Ms. Burge avers that these communications are taken out of context. According to her, [t]he few playful responses on [her] part, were limited, context-dependent, and intended only to defuse and reject unwanted romantic advances without escalating conflict or hurting feelings.” (Doc. # 45-1 at ¶ 19). Ms. Burge&#x²⁷;s “interactions [with Mr. Bradshaw] have always been consistent with [her] ongoing efforts to maintain the family unit and provide guidance to [Mr.] Bradshaw regarding his children and responsibilities.” (Id.). She insists that Mr. Bradshaw’s statement that she had her tongue in his mouth was a reference “to a dream he had, not an actual event.” (Id. at ¶ 20).

The MCSO also discovered six separate occasions where Ms. Burge accessed law enforcement databases to query specific information about Mr. Bradshaw, Ms. Porcelli, and the mother of Mr. Bradshaw’s children. The MCSO investigators aver these queries were made with no ascertainable law enforcement purpose and conclude Ms. Burge “engaged in a pattern of FCIC/NCIC misuse.” (Doc. # 36 at ¶ 10; Doc. # 36- 1 at 7-13, 35-38). The investigation report states that “at the times [Ms.] Burge performed the queries, no related calls for service involving the queried individual was taking place.” (Doc. # 36-1 at 37). “[A]t one time, [Ms.] Burge was not working when the queries were conducted.” (Id.).

Ms. Burge disputes that she misused databases, averring that “[e]ach query had a legitimate explanation and lawful purpose.” (Doc. # 45-1 at ¶ 22). “[N]one [of the queries] violated Criminal Justice Information Services [] policy or the [Florida Administrative Code (`FAC′)].” (Id.). Mr. Bradshaw “had asked [her] to check whether his driver&#x²⁷;s license was suspended and whether his license plates were properly assigned to his vehicles.” (Id.). According to Ms. Burge, she “never acted with ‘bad intent,&#x²⁷; and none of the criteria for misconduct under FAC R. 11B-27.0011(4)(a-e) apply.” (Id.).

On December⁵, 2022, Ms. Burge, represented by Bill Lawless with the Fraternal Order of Police, appeared for her interview with MCSO investigators. (Doc. # 37 at 14:3-23). Upon arrival, MCSO Professional Standards Captain Brian Schnering met with Mr. Lawless individually to discuss the process, the allegations against Ms. Burge, and the evidence that had been gathered to date. (Doc. # 34 at ¶ 11; Doc. # 37 at 15:4-16:7). Mr. Lawless testified that, during this discussion, Capt. Scherning advised Mr. Lawless that if the allegations were sustained, “termination was on the table.”

After Capt. Schnering and Mr. Lawless&#x²⁷;s meeting, Ms. Burge and Mr. Lawless were afforded the opportunity to review the complete investigative file. (Doc. # 37 at 18:2-10). After reviewing the file and based on his review of the evidence, Mr. Lawless advised Ms. Burge: “Well, I&#x²⁷;m not going to sugarcoat anything for you, but this looks kind of bad.” (Doc. 35 at 142:15-16; Doc. # 37 at 18:11-22). Ms. Burge was confused by Mr. Lawless&#x²⁷;s opinion. (Doc. # 45-1 at ¶ 24). “After [they] looked at the investigative file, [Ms. Burge] was happy and confident that [she] was going to be back at work the following day” because “it was clear and obvious that [her] ‘relationship’ with [Mr.] Bradshaw was wholly in support of his relationship with [the mother of his children]” and that Ms. Burge “had not provided [Mr.] Bradshaw or anyone else with anyone&#x²⁷;s information, but their own, upon their request.” (Id.). Mr. “Lawless explained that when he was in

Initially, Mr. Lawless advised Ms. Burge not to proceed with the interview. (Id. at ¶¶ 24-25; Doc. # 37 at 21:9-20). Before she engaged in the interview with MCSO investigators, Ms. Burge and Mr. Lawless returned to Capt. Schnering’s office. (Doc. # 45-1 at ¶ 25). “When [they] arrived in [Capt.] Schnering’s office, he had [Ms. Burgeʹs] vacation accruals written down on a post it note.” (Id.). Capt. Schnering told Ms. Burge, who was “hysterical,” that “if [she] ‘forced&#x²⁷; them to fire [her], [Ms. Burge] would be considered not leaving in good standing, and [she] would lose [her] retirement and vacation accruals.” (Id.). But “if [she] resigned, [her] retirement would not be affected, [Capt. Schnering] would not fight an unemployment claim, and [Ms. Burge] could keep [her] vacation accruals.” (Id.). Ms. Burge told Capt. Schnering that “the only reason they were terminating [her] was because [Mr.] Bradshaw is [B]lack, and if he had been a white man, whose family [she] was trying to help, whose little boy [she]

After leaving Capt. Schnering&#x²⁷;s office, Ms. Burge underwent the interview with investigators. During the interview, Ms. Burge explained that she first met Mr. Bradshaw when he was an inmate, and she worked as a correctional officer. (Doc. # 35 at 95:15-22; Doc. # 35-10 at 6:20-25). Ms. Burge said that “obviously [she] knew [Mr. Bradshaw] was a felon this whole entire time” and “he&#x²⁷;s always obviously been in love with [her].” (Doc. # 35-10 at 6:27-28, 8:1-2). Ms. Burge admitted she met with Mr. Bradshaw on several occasions, both on and off duty. (Doc. # 35-10 at 8:17-9:23). Ms. Burge explained their on-duty meetings, saying “I was just sitting there doing nothing.” (Id. at 9:8-10).

Ms. Burge emphasizes that her comments during the interview were not an admission of misconduct. (Doc. # 45-1 at ¶¶ 26-28). According to Ms. Burge, the “full context of [their] communications prove that [she] maintained professional boundaries and never engaged in a romantic or inappropriate relationship, but rather attempted to support and mentor [Mr.] Bradshaw in turning his life around, for the sake of [the mother of Mr. Bradshaw’s children] and his children.” (Id. at ¶ 26). As for their on-duty meetings, Ms.

Ms. Burge conceded that she and Mr. Bradshaw also exchanged phone calls and text messages. (Doc. # 35-10 at 9:25-10:1, 10:23-30). She avers that “most of [her and Mr. Bradshaw&#x²⁷;s] communications involved coordination of the pickup or drop-off of his child, or group conversations and video calls that included [the mother of the child] and/or their son.” (Doc. # 45-1 at ¶ 28). Mr. Bradshaw did not retain copies of the text messages. (Doc. # 36 at ¶ 7; Doc. # 36-1 at 17; Doc. # 36-4 at 5:9-34). Lt. Main declared that Ms. Burge declined to give the MCSO investigators access to her cell phone to download her text messages with Mr. Bradshaw. (Doc. # 36 at ¶ 7; Doc. # 36-1 at 17). Ms. Burge acknowledges that she “declined” a “forensic data extraction of [her] cell phone.” (Doc. # 45-1 at ¶ 28). But Ms. Burge avers that she “gave authorization and offered full access to review any

Less than an hour into the interview and before the MCSO had the opportunity to question Ms. Burge about her use of law enforcement databases, a pause in the interview was requested by Mr. Lawless. (Doc. # 35-10 at 29:39-30:9; Doc. 36 at ¶ 14). Ms. Burge declares that, during this break, Mr. Lawless told her “that [she] had already expressed everything [she] told him [she] wanted to say, and [the MCSO&#x²⁷;s] decision to terminate was final.” (Doc. # 45-1 at ¶ 30). Then, Ms. Burge (through Mr. Lawless) requested to terminate the interview. (Doc. # 35-10 at 31:4; Doc. # 36 at ¶ 14; Doc. # 37 at 23:18-24:14). According to Ms. Burge, “[t]he interview ended based on the futility of continuing a process whose outcome had already been determined, not from any lack of cooperation on [her] part.” (Doc. # 45-1 at ¶ 30).

After pausing the interview, Mr. Lawless met with Capt. Schnering to request that the interview be postponed. (Doc. 37 at 24:3-19). Mr. Lawless testified the purpose of the pause was to allow Ms. Burge, who was “so emotional,” to calm down and have time “to consider all her options.” (Id.). Ms.

According to Mr. Lawless, Capt. Schnering gave Ms. Burge until the following day at noon to decide. (Doc. # 37 at 24:20-23). Mr. Lawless understood the options for Ms. Burge would be to either resign with a leave payout and the MCSO’s promise not to oppose any claim for unemployment or continue with the interview and risk the outcome of the investigation’s conclusion. (Id. at 27:18-28:3). Mr. Lawless considered this pause an acceptable solution. (Id. at 24:24-25:1). Ms. Burge did not consider this pause for her to decide acceptable. Ms. Burge&#x²⁷;s choice between the two options “was not freely made, it was rushed, [she] was without counsel, [she] was distraught, and it was presented in a manner that conveyed resignation as the only path to preserve the retirement benefits [she] had earned over nearly a decade of service.” (Doc. # 45-1 at ¶ 32).

When Ms. Burge did not contact Capt. Scherning by noon the following day, Capt. Schnering called Mr. Lawless for an update. (Doc. # 37 at 28:22-29:16). Capt. Schnering was professional during the call and simply asked Mr. Lawless about Ms. Burge’s intentions. (Id.). After speaking with Capt. Scherning, Mr. Lawless called Ms. Burge and encouraged her to contact Capt. Schnering with her decision. (Id. at 29:2-31:13). Ms. Burge subsequently informed Capt. Schnering of her decision to resign. (Id.; Doc. # 37-3).

Regarding the investigation and end of her employment, Ms. Burge avers that she was treated worse than two

Regarding alleged race discrimination, Ms. Burge points to Ms. Johnson, who is Black and who Ms. Burge asserts “wasn&#x²⁷;t fired, for being in a serious, live-in, intimate, real relationship with a convicted felon” and “conducting a

C. The MCSO's Referral of Ms. Burge to FDLE

When a law enforcement officer separates from a law enforcement agency, the employing agency must notify the Florida Department of Law Enforcement (“FDLE”) via an affidavit of separation that details the facts and reasons for the separation. Fla. Stat. § 943.139(1)-(2); (Doc. # 34 at ¶ 17). FDLE’s affidavit of separation is executed under oath. Fla. Stat. § 943.139(2).

Misuse of law enforcement databases is a moral character violation under the Florida Administrative Code if certain conditions are met. See 11B-27.0011(14), Fla. Admin. Code. Specifically, the access of the electronic database must be “for an illegitimate or personal purpose with bad intent.” Id. “Bad intent may be evidenced by,” among other things, “[a] pattern of misuse that demonstrates improper accesses or violations” or “[t]he existence of a current or past non-

The MCSO completed the affidavit of separation designating Ms. Burge’s separation as “Voluntary separation or retirement while being investigated for . . . violation of moral character standards defined in Rule 11B-27.0011.” (Doc. 34 at ¶ 18; Doc. # 35-14). Because she insists she did not commit a moral character violation of any kind, Ms. Burge avers that it was inappropriate for the MCSO to have used this designation on the form. (Doc. # 45-1 at ¶ 35). The MCSO subsequently sent a copy of Ms. Burge′s investigative file to FDLE on or about December²⁰, 2022. (Doc. # 34 at ¶ 21; Doc. 34-2 at 2-3).

In December 2024, Ms. Burge filed this lawsuit alleging that FDLE had cleared her of any wrongdoing. (Doc. # 1 at ¶¶ 36-38). In January 2025, Capt. Schnering contacted FDLE and requested a copy of their investigative file. (Doc. # 34 at ¶ 20; Doc. # 34-2 at 3). In response, FDLE advised the MCSO in an email that it had no record of receiving Ms. Burge’s

Nevertheless, in March 2025, FDLE found probable cause to file an administrative complaint against Ms. Burge. (Doc. 34 at ¶ 22-23). The administrative complaint regarded the same six occasions where Ms. Burge accessed law enforcement databases as noted in the MCSO’s internal investigation. (Id. at 23; Doc. # 34-4). Subsequently, the administrative complaint against Ms. Burge was dismissed because the FDLE investigation into Ms. Burge was not completed within the mandatory six months after receipt of the file from the MCSO. (Doc. # 43-3 at 189). Although FDLE received all case materials in December 2022, “for reasons undetermined, the assigned case specialist did not open the case at that time and therefore, the case was never prepared for presentation at a probable cause hearing” and “it is thought that [Ms. Burge&#x²⁷;s] case was completely deleted by someone within FDLE.”

D. Procedural History

As mentioned before, Ms. Burge initiated this action against Sheriff Wells in December 2024. (Doc. # 1). She asserts three claims: (1) sex discrimination in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (Count I); (2) race discrimination in violation of⁴² U.S.C. § 1983 (Count II); and (3) retaliation in violation of⁴² U.S.C. § 1983 (Count III). (Id.). Sheriff Wells filed his answer (Doc. # 13), and the case proceeded through discovery.

Sheriff Wells now moves for summary judgment on all Ms. Burge&#x²⁷;s claims. (Doc. # 33). The Motion is fully briefed (Doc. 42, 44, 48), and ripe for review.

II. Legal Standard

Summary judgment is appropriate “if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). A factual dispute alone is not enough to defeat a properly pled motion for summary judgment; only the existence of a genuine issue of material fact will preclude a grant of summary judgment. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247-48 (1986).

“When a moving party has discharged its burden, the nonmoving party must then ‘go beyond the pleadings,&#x²⁷; and by its own affidavits, or by &#x²⁷;depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file,&#x²⁷; designate specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.” Jeffery v. Sarasota White Sox, Inc., 64 F. 3d 590, 593-94 (11th Cir. 1995) (quoting Celotex, 477 U.S. at 324).

If there is a conflict between the parties&#x²⁷; allegations or evidence, the non-moving party&#x²⁷;s evidence is presumed to be true, and all reasonable inferences must be drawn in the

III. Analysis

Sheriff Wells seeks summary judgment on all claims. He raises numerous arguments for why the claims fail. The Court addresses them in turn.

A. Ms. Burge′s Declaration

As a preliminary matter, the main record evidence Ms. Burge relies on in opposition to summary judgment is her own 28-page declaration. (Doc. # 45-1).

Under Rule 56(c)(4), “[a]n affidavit or declaration used to support or oppose a motion must be made on personal knowledge, set out facts that would be admissible in evidence, and show that the affiant or declarant is competent to testify

The Court agrees with Sheriff Wells that Ms. Burge’s declaration is replete with speculation, conclusory assertions, legal argument, and inadmissible hearsay. (Doc. 48 at 1). For example, although she has no personal experience with the CSAB appeals process, Ms. Burge asserts in conclusory fashion that “the CSAB does not provide any genuine protection or independent review for employees facing

Where Ms. Burge has attempted to refute one of Sheriff Wells&#x²⁷;s statements of material fact with a legal conclusion, conclusory statement, or statement for which Ms. Burge does not have personal knowledge, the Court will disregard Ms. Burge&#x²⁷;s statement on that point and treat Sheriff Wells’s statement of material fact as undisputed on that point. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e) (“If a party fails to properly support an assertion of fact or fails to properly address another party&#x²⁷;s assertion of fact as required by Rule 56(c), the court may: (2) consider the fact undisputed for purposes of the motion.”).

B. Section 1983 Claims and Final Policymaker

Ms. Burge&#x²⁷;s Section 1983 race discrimination and retaliation claims fail. First, Sheriff Wells is correct that

A suit against a municipal officer in his official capacity is effectively a suit against the government entity that the officer represents. Cook ex rel. Estate of Tessier v. Sheriff of Monroe Cty., 402 F. 3d 1092, 1115 (11th Cir. 2005). Thus, Ms. Burge′s suit is against Manatee County itself and therefore attempts to hold Manatee County liable for Sheriff Wells&#x²⁷;s actions. A municipality, such as Manatee County, cannot be liable under § 1983 on a theory of respondeat superior. Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs. of New York, 436 U.S. 658, 691 (1978).

“An official is not a final policymaker where his decisions are subject to ‘meaningful administrative review.&#x²⁷;” Id. at 992 (quoting Scala v. City of Winter Park, 116 F. 3d

So too here. The Court agrees with Sheriff Wells that his “termination decisions for permanent status employees

Furthermore, after the CSAB rules, the CSAB’s decision is then further reviewable by a Florida circuit court under Rule 9.030(c)(3). See Fla. R. App. P. 9.030(c)(3). The Court does not accept Ms. Burge&#x²⁷;s conclusory assertion, made without any sign of personal knowledge, that the “theoretical right to further appeal under Rule 9.030 offers no realistic avenue of relief for employees.” (Doc. # 45-1 at ¶ 12). There is no evidence that an appeal to the circuit court would not provide meaningful review.

True, “a plaintiff can attempt to demonstrate that the reviewing body&#x²⁷;s administrative review is not meaningful, such that the official should be considered the final policymaker.” Lopez, 770 F. App’x at 992 (citing Quinn, 330 F. 3d at 1326; Scala, 116 F. 3d at 1402). “To succeed in such an argument, the plaintiff needs to show that the reviewing body has defective procedures, merely ‘rubber stamps&#x²⁷; the official&#x²⁷;s decision, or ratifies the official’s decision and

Ms. Burge has not carried that burden. She admits that three employees have either had discipline reduced or a termination overturned through the CSAB process since 2004 but points out that the CSAB has not ruled in favor of an appealing employee during Sheriff Wells’s tenure. (Doc. # 45- 1 at ¶ 12). But a low reversal rate does not establish that the CSAB process is a sham. See Maschmeier v. Scott, 269 F. App&#x²⁷;x 941, 944 (11th Cir. 2008) (“Given the minority of cases in which the employee is seeking a reversal of his or her termination, one overturned termination in fifteen years is not sufficient to show that the Board is a mere &#x²⁷;rubber stamp.&#x²⁷;”). And while it is distasteful that MCSO members “brag” when the CSAB rules in its favor (Doc. # 45-1 at ¶ 10), that is not proof that the CSAB’S procedures are defective or that it merely rubberstamps Sheriff Wells’s decisions. Ms. Burge has not provided any “actual evidence that the Career Service Board process was in any way defective, rigged in favor of the Sheriff, or used to ratify an improper motive.” Dixon v. Gibson, No. 6:18-cv-1376-GAP- DCI, 2020 WL 10090796, at *5 (M.D. Fla. Mar.¹¹, 2020), aff’d sub nom. Dixon v. Hansell, 844 F. App’x 198 (11th Cir. 2021).

Therefore, for purposes of Monell liability, Sheriff Wells was not the final decisionmaker for Ms. Burge’s alleged termination. See Lopez, 770 F. App’x at 993 (“Sheriff Gibson was not the final policymaker with respect to Lopez’s demotion

C. Title VII Claim

That leaves only Count I, Ms. Burge′s Title VII sex discrimination claim. “In order to survive summary judgment, a plaintiff alleging intentional discrimination must present sufficient facts to permit a jury to rule in her favor.” Lewis v. City of Union City, 918 F. 3d 1213, 1220 (11th Cir. 2019). “One way that she can do SO is by satisfying the burdenshifting framework set out in [McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973)].” Id. “When proceeding under McDonnell Douglas, the plaintiff bears the initial burden of establishing a prima facie case of discrimination by showing (1) that she belongs to a protected class, (2) that she was subjected to an adverse employment action, (3) that she was

1. Adverse Employment Action

First, Ms. Burge′s Title VII claim fails because she did not suffer an adverse employment action. [fn¹] Instead, she voluntarily resigned.

“Although ‘employee resignations are presumed to be voluntary,&#x²⁷; a &#x²⁷;constructive discharge&#x²⁷; is involuntary.” Johnson v. Fla. Dep&#x²⁷;t of Corr., 829 F. App’x 889, 893 (11th

The Eleventh Circuit has previously applied Hargray in a case raising both Section 1983 and Title VII claims, Ross, 396 F. App’x at 670, which is perhaps why Defendant focuses

Ms. Burge argues that her resignation was involuntary such that it qualifies as a termination. According to her, “the senior leadership of the Sheriff&#x²⁷;s Office intentionally misrepresented the case against her, telling her that the decision to terminate her had already been made, and that if she [chose] to voluntarily resign, her ability to work in her profession would not be compromised.” (Doc. # 42 at 11).

Not so. Under either Hargray or Morgan, the record does not establish a genuine dispute of material fact as to whether

a

There is not sufficient evidence that Ms. Burge was coerced or deceived into resigning or faced intolerable

Nevertheless, this fact does not render Ms. Burge’s resignation involuntary. Ms. Burge still had the choice to be terminated and then appeal her termination through the MCSO’s CSAB. See Ross, 396 F. App&#x²⁷;x at 670 (holding that a resignation was not coerced where the employee could have asked for more time to consider the choices and to seek attorney help, but did not; understood the nature of the choices; and, although he might have believed he had no choice but to resign, he in fact did have the choice to refuse to resign and later to appeal the termination); Steele, 2020 WL 12597711, at *4 (“Although Plaintiff was faced with an unpleasant choice [of resignation or termination], that, alone, does not render her resignation involuntary.”). To help her consider this choice, Ms. Burge had her representative Mr. Lawless with her for advice, although he was not an attorney. There is no evidence that Ms. Burge requested to speak with an attorney or have an attorney

Ms. Burge debates the likelihood that, if she had declined resignation and was terminated, she would have her termination vacated by the CSAB. As previously discussed, the Board had overturned discipline imposed by sheriffs in the past (even if not that recently). Ms. Burge had the ability to appeal to this Board. Furthermore, if the CSAB ruled against her, Ms. Burge could further appeal the CSAB&#x²⁷;S decision to a state circuit court. Fla. R. App. P. 9.030(c)(3). Again, the Court does not accept Ms. Burge’s conclusory assertion, made without any sign of personal knowledge, that the “theoretical right to further appeal

In short, Ms. Burge’s resignation was voluntary. The totality of the circumstances would not allow a reasonable jury to find that Ms. Burge was coerced or deceived into resigning. Because she resigned, there is no genuine dispute whether Sheriff Wells took an adverse employment action against Ms. Burge. Without an adverse action, Ms. Burge cannot establish her claim against Sheriff Wells.

2. Comparator Evidence

Even if Ms. Burge had established an adverse employment action, her sex discrimination claim would fail for another reason: lack of relevant comparators. “[A] meaningful comparator analysis must be conducted at the prima facie stage of McDonnell Douglas&#x²⁷;s burden-shifting framework, and should not be ‘move[d]&#x²⁷; to the pretext stage. [A] plaintiff asserting an intentional-discrimination claim under McDonnell Douglas must demonstrate that she and her proffered comparators were &#x²⁷;similarly situated in all material respects.&#x²⁷;” Lewis, 918 F. 3d at 1218. “A plaintiff needn&#x²⁷;t prove that she and her comparators are identical save for their race or gender.” Id. at 1227. “Nor is it

A similarly situated comparator, however, ordinarily “will have engaged in the same basic conduct (or misconduct) as the plaintiff”; “will have been subject to the same employment policy, guideline, or rule as the plaintiff”; “will ordinarily (although not invariably) have been under the jurisdiction of the same supervisor as the plaintiff”; and “will share the plaintiff’s employment or disciplinary history.” Id. at 1227-28. “[A] plaintiff and her comparators must be sufficiently similar, in an objective sense, that they &#x²⁷;cannot reasonably be distinguished.&#x²⁷;” Id. at 1228 (citation omitted).

For her sex discrimination claim, Ms. Burge asserts that Major Tom Porter is a materially similar comparator. (Doc. # 42 at 3, 8-9, 17-18; Doc. # 45-1 at ¶ 8). According to Ms. Burge, Major Porter’s friendship with Mr. Boldin “was similar or worse conduct” than her relationship with Mr. Bradshaw. (Doc. # 42 at 3). She conclusorily avers that Mr. Boldin “was convicted of a 2nd-degree felony for written threats to kill.” (Id. at 8). “Manatee County Central Jail phone records prove that while incarcerated, [Mr.] Boldin was calling comparator [Major] Porter on his personal phone number.” (Id. at 3). But

The first issue with this argument is that Mr. Boldin is not “a convicted felon.” As Capt. Schnering explains in his affidavit, the court “withheld adjudication of guilt in Mr. Boldin&#x²⁷;s case effective January²⁷, 2017.” (Doc. # 34 at ¶ 29). Despite this, MCSO General Order 1013 provides that “Employees shall not associate or have contact with any person whom they know or reasonably should know are convicted felons, or who are under criminal investigation, indictment or sentence for a felony offense, or who are incarcerated in any local, state, or federal correctional facility, or members of documented street gangs, unless such person is a member of the immediate family.” (Doc. # 34-1 at § 12.1.38) (emphasis added). Thus, Ms. Burge has provided evidence that Major Porter did violate § 12.1.38 by associating with Mr. Boldin

Nevertheless, the calls between Mr. Boldin and Major Porter took place in 2016, which is before Sheriff Wells was sheriff. See Lewis, 918 F. 3d at 1227-28 (noting that a similarly situated comparator “will ordinarily (although not invariably) have been under the jurisdiction of the same supervisor as the plaintiff”); Winthrop v. Nocco, No. 8:18- cv-1452-JSM-AEP, 2019 WL 13272283, at *3 (M.D. Fla. Aug.⁸, 2019) (“Winthrop did identify officer Kevin Doll, who she claims was arrested for domestic violence and not terminated, but this occurred in 2008, under a different Sheriff, i.e., a different decisionmaker, which is a material difference and therefore insufficient to create a genuine issue of fact.”).

Furthermore, Ms. Burge does not present any evidence that Major Porter ever used law enforcement databases to look up Mr. Boldin or shared information from those databases with Mr. Boldin. Thus, Mr. Porter&#x²⁷;s alleged misconduct (being friends with Mr. Boldin) is not the same as Ms. Burge&#x²⁷;s alleged misconduct (associating with Mr. Bradshaw and misusing law enforcement databases). See Jenkins v. Nell,²⁶ F. 4th 1243, 1250 (11th Cir. 2022) (“Jackson and Saussy are not proper comparators because there is no evidence that they

Undermining any similarity between Ms. Burge and Major Porter further, “no one has ever made a complaint regarding any alleged association between Major Porter and Mr. Boldin.” (Doc. # 34 at ¶ 30). In sharp contrast, a civilian directly contacted the MCSO&#x²⁷;s Office of Professional Standards to complain about Ms. Burge′s relationship with Mr. Bradshaw, instigating the launch of the investigation against Ms. Burge. That is, Ms. Burge′s alleged violations were brought directly to Sheriff Wells&#x²⁷;s attention through a complaint, whereas Ms. Burge merely asserts that Sheriff Wells should have known that Major Porter was associating with Mr. Boldin based on their social media posts and attendance of public events together. This is not a materially similar situation.

Ms. Burge has not presented any appropriate comparator for her Title VII claim and, therefore, has not established

3. Pretext

Alternatively, even if Ms. Burge had established a prima facie case of discrimination under Title VII, her claim would fail at the pretext stage. [fn⁴]

Sheriff Wells has identified a non-discriminatory reason for the alleged termination of Ms. Burge: the investigation “confirmed [Ms.] Burge had a prolonged association with [Mr.] Bradshaw, despite knowing he was a convicted felon, over the course of approximately¹⁴ months,” and Ms. Burge “had accessed law enforcement databases with no ascertainable law enforcement purpose.” (Doc. # 33 at 22). Thus, Sheriff Wells has met his burden of production. The burden now shifts to Ms. Burge to show that there is a genuine dispute of material fact regarding whether the proffered reason was pretextual.

Here, Ms. Burge has failed to carry her burden. Even assuming that Ms. Burge′s resignation was involuntary, Ms.

During the investigation, Sheriff Wells uncovered troubling messages between Ms. Burge and Mr. Bradshaw. Among the²,500 messages they exchanged were multiple messages suggesting Ms. Burge and Mr. Bradshaw had a romantic relationship. Ms. Burge denies that she had a romantic, sexual, or flirtatious relationship with Mr. Bradshaw (Doc. 45-1 at ¶¶ 17-21), which the Court accepts as true.

There was certainly enough evidence for Sheriff Wells to believe that a romantic or at least flirtatious relationship existed between Ms. Burge and Mr. Bradshaw. Specifically, the Facebook messages, while also including normal discussions

Additionally, while he acknowledged they had not had sex, Mr. Bradshaw told investigators that he and Ms. Burge had "kissed . . . numerous times” and touched and “rubbed" each other over their clothing in a sexual manner. (Doc. # 36-3 at 7, 9). While Ms. Burge maintains that Mr. Bradshaw’s statements to investigators were “unreliable” and motivated by “personal bias” against her (Doc. # 45-1 at ¶ 20), she

There was also evidence strongly suggesting Ms. Burge had misused law enforcement databases. Again, Ms. Burge argues that her use of law enforcement databases was not a violation, and she had a legitimate law enforcement purpose for each search, even when she was off duty or was out on a call that did not directly involve Mr. Bradshaw or connected to him. (Doc. # 45-1 at ¶¶ 22, 24). She also avers that she did not have “bad intent” in performing searches at Mr. Bradshaw’s request. (Id. at ¶ 22). The Court accepts this as true.

Given the results of the investigation, however, Sheriff Wells was not required to accept that Ms. Burge had done no wrong. The MCSO investigation uncovered six queries in law enforcement databases that investigators considered “potential misuse” and done “with no apparent law enforcement purpose,” leading the MCSO to conclude that Ms. Burge “engaged in a pattern of FCIC/NCIC misuse in which she queried [Mr.] Bradshaw and his paramours for no lawful purpose.” (Doc. # 36-1 at 8-9, 38); see also (Doc. # 43-1 at Ex. 10) (stating

Likewise, although Mr. Bradshaw told investigators that Ms. Burge had never “look[ed] up cases” for him, he said that Ms. Burge had frequently looked up Ms. Porcelli&#x²⁷;s “case plan” for her children and spoke about the information in it with Mr. Bradshaw. (Doc. # 36-3 at 11-12, 16). Mr. Bradshaw also said that he would sometimes ask Ms. Burge to look up his license plate for his car to “see if the plate’s coming back to [him] or not, and Ms. Burge would. (Id. at 11). Likewise,

Given the above, no reasonable jury could conclude that Sheriff Wells’s determination that Ms. Burge was fraternizing with a felon and misusing databases was false, let alone a pretext for discrimination. Ms. Burge&#x²⁷;s insistence that Sheriff Wells inaccurately marked her affidavit of separation as a resignation while under investigation for a moral character violation (Doc. # 45-1 at ¶¶ 24, 34-35) does not rebut that Sheriff Wells believed that Ms. Burge had

Because Ms. Burge has not rebutted Sheriff Wells&#x²⁷;s proffered non-discriminatory reason for the alleged adverse employment action, Sheriff Wells is entitled to summary judgment on the Title VII claim.

Accordingly, it is now

(1) Defendant Sheriff Rick Wells&#x²⁷;s Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. # 33) is GRANTED.

(2) Summary judgment is granted in favor of Sheriff Wells on all counts of the complaint.

(3) The Clerk is directed to enter judgment accordingly and, thereafter, CLOSE the case.

DONE and ORDERED in Chambers in Tampa, Florida, this 10th day of December, 2025.

/s/ Virginia M. Hernandez Covington

VIRGINIA M. HERNANDEZ COVINGTON

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

57

[fn¹]: Ms. Burgeʼs Section 1983 claims would also fail for this alternative reason. She resigned and, thus, was not terminated for racially discriminatory or retaliatory reasons.

[fn²]: The one exception to this rule is where the employer actually lacked good cause to believe that grounds for the termination existed. Id. This exception does not apply. The MCSO received a complaint from Ms. Porcelli about Ms. Burge’s relationship with Mr. Bradshaw, a felon, and about her alleged misuse of law enforcement databases. This complaint gave Sheriff Wells good cause to initiate his investigation. The evidence then uncovered during the investigation, including the romantic messages with Mr. Bradshaw and multiple queries related to Mr. Bradshaw or people associated with him in law enforcement databases, suggested that Ms. Burge had violated MCSO policies and procedures.

[fn³]: Ms. Johnson is also not a comparator similarly situated in all material respects to Ms. Burge for purposes of Ms. Burge’s Section 1983 race discrimination claim. Ms. Johnson is a Black woman who had a romantic relationship with a Black felon. There is no evidence that a member of the public complained to the MCSO about Ms. Johnson, as occurred with Ms. Burge. Also, Ms. Johnson resigned in 2003, over a decade before Sheriff Wells became sheriff. (Doc. # 34 at ¶ 28); see also Winthrop, 2019 WL 13272283, at *3. Finally, while under investigation for her relationship and her misuse of a law enforcement database, Ms. Johnson resigned. Thus, like Ms. Burge, Ms. Johnson did not keep her employment with the MCSO when her relationship with a felon and misuse of databases was investigated.

[fn⁴]: If summary judgment had not already been granted for the Section 1983 race discrimination and retaliation claims on final policymaker grounds, summary judgment would be granted on those claims on pretext grounds. Sheriff Wells had a good faith belief that Ms. Burge had been associating with a felon and misused law enforcement databases. Ms. Burge has not established that this legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason was false and also a pretext for any form of discrimination or retaliation.