FELICIA LOREN ELSTON

v.

FLORIDA DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN AND FAMILIES ET AL.

Before the Court is pro se Plaintiff Felicia Loren Elston's Emergency Motion for Temporary Restraining Order. (Doc. 2). For the below reasons, the Court denies the motion and dismisses the case with prejudice.

The Court struggles to pin down exactly what this case is about. But it can deduce enough. Allegedly, Defendant Florida Department of Children and Families (“DCF”)[fn 1] obtained and executed an ex parte order (as part of an ongoing state proceeding) without probable cause, and it used this order to enter Plaintiff's home and remove seven of her children. DCF never served Plaintiff with the order before or after its execution. Since then, DCF continues to deprive Plaintiff custody of (or perhaps visitation with) her children in violation of certain court orders,[fn²] and it denied Plaintiff counsel.[fn³] And at one point, Plaintiff tried to show someone's attorney exculpatory evidence, but the attorney refused to review it. (Docs. 1–4).

Plaintiff brings claims for Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment violations under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and a claim titled “Retaliation and Interference with Familial Association." She seeks declaratory and injunctive relief. Specifically, she asks that the Court: declare that Defendants' actions violated her constitutional rights, enjoin Defendants from enforcing or relying upon orders entered without service or valid jurisdiction, require Defendants to comply immediately with existing visitation provisions, enjoin Defendants from using any evidence or derivative actions obtained from the unlawful entry into her home, and appoint her counsel. (Doc. 1 at 7–8).[fn⁴]

Plaintiff moves for a temporary restraining order asking the Court to enter an order prohibiting DCF and its agents from enforcing or relying upon any state-court order entered without valid service or jurisdiction; requiring DCF to comply with the visitation provisions contained in the existing shelter

To receive injunctive relief, the movant must show “(1) a substantial likelihood of success on the merits; (2) that irreparable injury will be suffered if the relief is not granted; (3) that the threatened injury outweighs the harm the relief would inflict on the nonmovant; and (4) that the entry of the relief would serve the public interest.” Schiavo ex. Rel Schindler v. Schiavo, 403 F. 3d 1223, 1225–26 (11th Cir. 2005). Because Plaintiff does not show a substantial likelihood of success on the merits, her request for injunctive relief fails. See Bloedorn v. Grube, 631 F. 3d 1218, 1229 (11th Cir. 2011) (noting that if a movant “is unable to show a substantial likelihood of success on the merits, we need not consider the other requirements").

Plaintiff's argument that she is likely to succeed on the merits is entirely conclusory. For instance, she states in one filing: “Plaintiff is likely to succeed because Defendants acted without lawful service, conducted warrantless searches beyond scope, and deprived Plaintiff of family integrity without due process." (Doc. 2 at 4) (internal citations omitted). In another filing, she asserts she is likely to succeed because “DCF entered Plaintiff's home under an ex parte ‘Order to Grant Access' issued without notice or exigent

There is a larger issue that compels dismissal of Plaintiff's case: Younger abstention.[fn⁶] The Younger abstention doctrine “requires a federal court to abstain where a plaintiff's federal claims could be adjudicated in a pending state judicial proceeding.” Leonard v. Ala. State Bd. of Pharmacy, 61 F. 4th 902, 907 (11th Cir. 2023) (citation omitted). If a federal lawsuit overlaps with state proceedings, the federal court considers three factors when determining whether to interfere: (1) if the state proceeding is “ongoing”; (2) if

Younger bars the Court's consideration of Plaintiff's case. Although she tries to couch her claims as constitutional violations to ensure this Court maintains jurisdiction, she is asking this Court to wade into an ongoing state domestic proceeding by enjoining certain state-court orders and compelling compliance with others. She even mentions that a hearing in her state-court case is set for November 10, so it is evident the proceeding is ongoing. (Doc. 2). Given the state-court proceeding is ongoing, domestic matters implicate an important state interest, and the state court provides her an adequate opportunity to raise her “constitutional” concerns, Younger abstention is warranted. See Narciso v. Walker, 811 F. App'x 600, 601 (11th Cir. 2020) (affirming Younger abstention applied to § 1983 case arising from child custody dispute in which the plaintiff asked the court to strike state court orders as unconstitutional).

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Plaintiff is well aware of Younger's implication in this case because she argues an exception to Younger applies. As Plaintiff observes in her motion, a federal court should refuse to abstain if “there is no adequate alternative state forum where the constitutional issues can be raised.” Leonard, 61 F. 4th at 908. Plaintiff insists this exception applies because, in the state-court proceeding, her filings were stricken, she was not appointed counsel, and she was denied an opportunity to present exculpatory evidence.[fn⁷] (Doc. 3 at 3–4).

Additionally, Plaintiff moves for leave to file a supplemental declaration and evidence in support of her request for a temporary restraining order. (Doc. 9). She contends that the following facts demonstrate the Court should hear her case: she has never been served with numerous documents concerning the shelter petition; the shelter order and court minutes are contradictory on the issue of email service; three different court-appointed lawyers refused her request to file motions on six occasions; and a guardian ad litem discouraged Plaintiff from filing pro se notices. (Doc. 10). In Plaintiff's view, these facts show that state court procedures deny her due process and no adequate remedy exists within the state system—“strengthen[ing] her argument against

When determining whether an adequate alternative state forum exists, "what matters is whether the plaintiff is procedurally prevented from raising [her] constitutional claims in the state courts, from which a certiorari petition can be filed seeking review on the merits in the United States Supreme Court.” Leonard, 61 F. 4th at 909 (emphasis original). To make this showing, “plaintiffs should provide evidence of state laws, rules, or procedures that would allow a district court to evaluate whether the plaintiff's federal claims will effectively be shut out from the judicial system and cut off from effective review in the courts." Id. Plaintiff makes no such showing. And without “unambiguous authority to the contrary," a federal court “should assume that state procedures will afford an adequate remedy[.]" 31 Foster Child. v. Bush, 329 F. 3d 1255, 1279 (11th Cir. 2003) (internal citation and quotations omitted).

In sum, Plaintiff's complaint challenges an ongoing state domestic relations proceeding and, more specifically, DCF's conduct pursuant to court orders from such proceeding. Federal courts have routinely abstained from such claims. See Narciso, 811 F. App'x at 601; Liedel v. Juv. Court of Madison Cty., 891 F. 2d 1542, 1546 (11th Cir. 1990) (“Thus, under Younger . . . federal district courts may not interfere with ongoing child custody proceedings."); Ingram v. Hayes, 866 F. 2d 368, 369 (11th Cir. 1988) (“The federal judiciary has

Accordingly, it is now ORDERED: 1. Plaintiff's Emergency Motion for Temporary Restraining Order (Doc. 2) is DENIED. 2. Plaintiff's complaint (Doc. 1) is DISMISSED with prejudice. 3. The Clerk is DIRECTED to deny all pending motions as moot, terminate any deadlines, and close the case.

DONE and ORDERED in Fort Myers, Florida on October 28, 2025.

Sheri Polster Chappell

SHERI POLSTER CHAPPELL

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Copies: All Parties of Record

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[fn 1]: Although there are several Defendants in this action (most of which are Doe defendants), Plaintiff only names DCF throughout her entire complaint.

[fn²]: Plaintiff does not provide these orders, explain the basis of these orders, or explain how DCF violated them. [fn³]: It is unclear why DCF would need to provide Plaintiff with counsel. [fn⁴]: Adding to the confusing nature of her case, Plaintiff appears to file multiple motions for temporary restraining order (Docs. 2, 3), both of which raise different arguments and include details not mentioned in the complaint. She also provides affidavits that include more facts absent from the complaint. (Docs. 4, 5).

[fn 5]: Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971). [fn⁶]: “Younger may be raised sua sponte." Successful v. Hall Cnty., Georgia, No. 2:25-CV-00218- SCJ, 2025 WL 2336112, at *3 (N.D. Ga. Aug.⁴, 2025).

[fn⁷]: Notably, her complaint faults DCF for denying her counsel and depriving her of the ability to introduce exculpatory evidence. But here, she seems to pin the blame on the state court. This inconsistency further confounds her claims.

[fn 8]: For what it is worth, Younger's applicability further demonstrates Plaintiff's failure to show a substantial likelihood of success on the merits for her temporary restraining order. See Morancy v. Salomon, No. 24-12505, 2025 WL 1341957, at *4 (11th Cir. May 8, 2025) (holding district court did not abuse its discretion in finding the plaintiff failed to show a substantial likelihood of success on the merits because Younger barred consideration of his claims).