NGUIDA

v.

LAKE COUNTY SCHOOL DISTRICT

on behalf of his minor son, J.N., Plaintiff, V.

LAKE COUNTY SCHOOL DISTRICT, et al., Defendants.

Case No: 5:24-cv-714-KKM-PRL ORDER The Magistrate Judge denied Mohamed Nguida's motion to deem service effective and to authorize alternative service on defendants. Order (Doc. 33). Nguida objects and seeks to vacate the order. Obj. (Doc. 34); see also Suppl. Auth. (Doc. 35). Nguida also moves for a "Notice of Judicial Irregularity and Demand for Immediate Reassignment of Rule 72(a) Objection to District Judge." (Doc. 36). Finally, by two separate “emergency motions," Nguida seeks “judicial quarantine" of Magistrate Judge Lammens and requests that he be reassigned from the case. Mot. for Jud. Quar. (Doc. 38); Mot. for Reassign. (Doc. 39). For the below reasons, I overrule the objections and deny the motions.

I. BACKGROUND Nguida filed a complaint alleging that the Lake County School District, Eustis Heights Elementary School, and other involved state entities and officials violated the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA), Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), and the Fifth and Fourteen Amendments by failing to provide his minor son with required educational services and accommodations. See Sec. Am. Compl. (Doc. 16) ¶¶ 1–12. Nguida attempted to serve his Second Amended Complaint on all defendants by certified mail and filed "Proof[s] of service" that list United States Postal Service tracking numbers for each mailed document. See (Docs. 19–26). Nguida then moved to deem service effective as to Eustis Heights, claiming that the school had “actual and constructive notice" of the complaint and “cannot evade service by refusing certified mail." Mot. Serv. (Doc. 27) at 2-3. In the alternative, Nguida requested that the Court authorize service by "[d]elivery to the School District's legal counsel,” "[p]osting at the school's front entrance," or "[e] mail or mail to the School's principal." Id. at 3.

The Magistrate Judge denied Nguida's motion, noting that “the docket reflects irregularities regarding the returns of service in this case," and concluding that "Florida law does not permit service of original process upon a school board by certified mail." Order at 1, 3 (citing Haygood v. Orange Cnty. Pub. Schools, No. 6:16-cv-2105-Orl-37GJK, 2017 WL 4242035, at *4 (M.D. Fla. Sep. 25, 2017). Nguida timely objects and, by separate motion, claims that "[t]he Clerk's Office erroneously rerouted" his objections to the Magistrate Judge. See (Doc. 36) at 2. In two additional motions, Nguida asks that the Magistrate Judge be reassigned because of a pattern of “void orders, procedural weaponization, and defiance" of precedent. Mot. for Reassign. at 1; see also Mot. for Jud. Quar. II. LEGAL STANDARDS A. Objections to Magistrate Judge's Order Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 72(a), a party can object to a magistrate judge's order on a non-dispositive, pre-trial matter. When a party timely objects, the district court must "modify or set aside any part of the order that is clearly erroneous or is contrary to law.” FED. R. CIV. P. 72(a). “A finding is 'clearly erroneous' when although there is evidence to support it, the reviewing court on the entire evidence is left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed." United States v. U.S. Gypsum Co., 333 U.S. 364, 395 (1948). “An order is contrary to law 'when it fails to apply or misapplies relevant statutes, case law or rules of procedure." SEC v. Kramer, 778 F. Supp. 2d 1320, 1327 (M.D. Fla. 2011) (quoting Tompkins v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 92 F. Supp. 2d 70, 74 (N.D.N.Y. 2000)). B. Motions for Reassignment or Recusal Under 28 U.S.C. § 455(a), a “magistrate judge of the United States shall disqualify himself in any proceeding in which his impartiality might reasonably be questioned." Recusal or reassignment is only proper where “an objective, disinterested, lay observer fully informed of the facts underlying the grounds on which recusal was sought would entertain a significant doubt about the judge's impartiality." Parker v. Connors Steel Co., 855 F. 2d 1510, 1524 (11th Cir. 1988). Additionally, "[w]henever a party to any proceeding in a district court makes and files a timely and sufficient affidavit that the judge before whom the matter is pending has a personal bias or prejudice either against him or in favor of any adverse party, such judge shall proceed no further therein, but another judge shall be assigned to hear such proceeding." 28 U.S.C. § 144. “To warrant recusal under § 144, the moving party must allege facts that would convince a reasonable person that bias actually exists." Christo v. Padgett, 223 F. 3d 1324, 1333 (11th Cir. 2000). III. ANALYSIS The Magistrate Judge's determination that Nguida failed to properly serve defendants, including Eustis Heights Elementary School, is neither clearly erroneous nor contrary to law. By citing principally his disagreement with the Magistrate Judge's decisions on this issue and others, Nguida fails to allege facts warranting reassignment.

A. Objections to Magistrate Judge's Order Nguida makes three primary arguments attacking the soundness of the Magistrate Judge's order denying his motion to deem service effective. Each fails. First, Nguida incorrectly asserts that the Magistrate Judge "[f]alsely claim[ed] certified mail service is impermissible for school districts." Obj. at 1. To be effective, service must be in "substantial compliance" with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Abele v. City of Brooksville, 273 F. App'x 809, 811 (11th Cir. 2008) (per curiam) (quoting Prewitt Enter., Inc. v. OPEC, 353 F. 3d 916, 925 (11th Cir. 2003)). Rule 4(j)(2) authorizes a plaintiff to serve a state or local government by either "delivering a copy of the summons and of the complaint to its chief executive officer," or "serving a copy of each in the manner prescribed by that state's law for serving a summons or like process on such a defendant." "The definition of 'deliver[y]' under Rule 4(j)(2) [] excludes certified mail." Yaniga v. Fla. Dep't of Transp., No. 8:11-CV-1371-T-23TBM, 2011 WL 6338910, at *1 (M.D. Fla. Dec. 19, 2011). Nor does Florida law permit original service by certified mail. Transp. & Gen. Ins. Co. v. Receiverships of Ins. Exch. of Ams., Inc., 576 So. 2d 1351, 1352 (Fla. 1st DCA 1991) (“There is no statutory authority, or authority under Rule 1.070, Florida Rules of Civil Procedure, for [service] only by certified mail, as was done here."); Yaniga, 2011 WL 6338910, at *1 (explaining that "no statute, either federal or state, permits service upon a state agency by certified mail"); see also § 48.031(1)(a), Fla. Stat. ("Service of original process is made by delivering a copy of it to the person to be served with a copy of the complaint."). Nguida's proffered authorities are either imagined or inapposite. To start, Nguida misstates that § 48.031(1)(a), Florida Statutes permits “serving the process on the public agency by certified mail, restricted delivery, with return receipt signed by the agency." Obj. at 2. The statute says no such thing. Nguida's initial motion also cites Telford v. Orange County Public Schools, 222 So. 3d 580 (Fla. 5th DCA 2017), Mot. Serv. at 2, a case that does not appear to exist. [fn 1] But see Gonzalez v. [fn 1]: Nguida is reminded of his obligations under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11(b)(2) ("By presenting to the court a... written motion, [an] unrepresented party certifies that to the best of the person's knowledge, information, and belief, formed after an inquiry reasonable under the circumstances: the claims, defenses, and other legal contentions are warranted by existing law or by a nonfrivolous argument for extending, modifying, or reversing existing law or for establishing new law."). State, 222 So. 3d 580 (Fla. 4th DCA 2017) (per curiam). Finally, Nguida relies on Shurman v. Atlantic Mortgage & Investment Corp., in which the Florida Supreme Court addressed whether an incarcerated defendant's former residence constituted his "usual place of abode" under § 48.031(1)(a), Florida Statutes. See Mot. Serv. at