SAUL BOYMAN AND BOCADEV CORP., INC., APPELLANTS,
v.
STUART HATTERAS, INC., APPELLEE

Fla. 4th DCA | 1988-06-08
No. 87-1181
DELL and WALDEN, JJ., concur.
527 So. 2d 853 Florida District Court of Appeal, Fourth District (1988) Positive Treatment
Cited by 2 cases

AI-generated. These summaries, headnotes, and key points are machine-generated and may contain errors or omissions. Always verify against the full opinion text below. Not legal advice.

Synopsis

A Florida appellate court reversed a jury verdict awarding $12,619.17 to a yacht dealer in a boat sale dispute, finding the award completely without evidentiary support. The court held that the seller, not buyer, must bear the cost of ocean freight delivery under an F.O.B. destination contract, and remanded for a new trial on damages.


Holding

The jury verdict was reversed as completely without evidentiary support in the record. Under Florida law, an F.O.B. destination clause (F.O.B. Stuart) obligates the seller, not the buyer, to pay for ocean freight delivery costs incurred before the boat reaches its destination.


Headnotes

[1] The term "F.O.B. …

[2] An appellate court may reverse a jury award when there is no reasonable record justification for the amount awarded.

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Key Quotes

“Surely, "F.O.B. Stuart" brings about exactly the contrary result and calls for the seller to pay for the ocean freight delivery charge incurred prior to the boat reaching its destination in Stuart.”

Establishes the court's interpretation of F.O.B. destination clauses, placing freight responsibility on seller not buyer.

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Facts & Procedural History

A yacht sales dealer sued a potential boat buyer over a failed boat sale. The sales contract specified delivery on an F.O.B. (Free on Board) Stuart, F…

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Opinion of the Court
LETTS, Judge.

LETTS, Judge.

A jury verdict awarded $12,619.17 in favor of a yacht sales dealer over a boat sale gone sour. The potential boat-buyer appeals, claiming the amount of the award was “completely without support in the evidence.” We agree and reverse.

We have scoured the briefs, examined the record and revisited the oral argument made before this court. Despite doing so, we are unable to piece together how the jury could have possibly come up with this particular award. For example, the yacht dealer speculates that part of the award may have emanated from a $5,524 item charged by it for “ocean freight delivery.” This item, so the yacht dealer argues, would be appropriate because the sales contract provided for the boat to be delivered “F.O.B. Stuart Florida.” According to the yacht dealer, these quoted words of art, placed the responsibility on the buyer to pay for the cost of “ocean freight delivery” from the place of manufacture in North Carolina to Stuart, Florida, the destination. This is not our understanding of the law. Surely, “F.O.B. Stuart” brings about exactly the contrary result and calls for the seller to pay for the ocean freight delivery charge incurred prior to the boat reaching its destination in Stuart. § 672.319, Fla.Stat. (1985). See also Pestana v. Karinol Corporation, 367 So. 2d 1096,1099 (Fla. 3d DCA 1979). It would be error, as a matter of law, to leave such a determination for the jury to decide.

We agree with the yacht dealer that it is not the prerogative of an appellate court to substitute its judgment for that of a jury. Shaw v. Shaw, 334 So. 2d 13 (Fla. 1976), but there are limits. There is no reasonable record justification for this award, see Al’s Motor Company v. Jackson Marine Sales, Inc., 432 So. 2d 736 (Fla. 4th DCA 1983), and so we must reverse it.

We affirm the remaining point on appeal and remand this cause for retrial solely on the issue of damages. In so doing, we suggest that more detailed pretrial practice be employed to narrow the issues. In any facet of this controversy where a pretrial stipulation cannot be obtained, an interrogatory verdict might prove helpful. This matter cries out for settlement lest the attorneys’ fees overtake the financial outcome.

REVERSED AND REMANDED.

DELL and WALDEN, JJ., concur.


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Citator

Cited By

  • Page Avjet Corp. v. Cosgrove Aircraft Serv., Inc., 546 So. 2d 16 (Fla. 3d DCA 1989)
    …We reverse. Our review of the record discloses no adequate basis for the trial court’s award. Where record support for the trial court’s award is absent, the appellate court must reverse the trial court’s decision. Boyman v. Stuart Hatteras, Inc., 527 So. 2d 853 (Fla. 4th DCA 1988); Al’s Motor Co. v. Jackson Marine Sales, Inc., 432 So. 2d 736 (Fla. 4th DCA 1983). After analyzing the multiple theories advanced in the trial court, we are unable to discern a premise for Cosgrove’s recovery. Cosgrove repeatedl…

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