FRANK S. PORTER, PLAINTIFF IN ERROR,
v.
W. D. VINZANT, CHIEF OF POLICE, DEFENDANT IN ERROR
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The Florida Supreme Court upheld the denial of habeas corpus to Frank Porter, who challenged his conviction under a Jacksonville city ordinance prohibiting cruelty to animals on the ground that the city charter did not authorize such an ordinance. The court held that general welfare powers granted to municipalities fairly encompass the authority to pass animal cruelty ordinances.
The city charter's general powers provisions, which authorize ordinances for the health, convenience, and safety of citizens, fairly include the power to pass an ordinance against cruelty to animals. The judgment and sentence under which Porter was held were therefore valid, and his habeas corpus petition was properly denied.
“Municipal corporations have only such powers as are conferred upon them by express legislation or by necessary implication from those expressly given, and general powers conferred are to be construed with reference to the purposes of the incorporation.”
Establishes the fundamental principle that municipal powers are limited but can be implied from general grants when they serve the incorporation's purposes.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceFrank Porter was convicted in Jacksonville's municipal court of cruelty to animals under a city ordinance and sentenced to imprisonment. He petitioned…
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Whitfield, C. J.
-The plaintiff in error presented to the Circuit Judge for Duval county a petition for a writ of habeas corpus, alleging that he is detained in the cus tody of W. D. Vinzant, as Chief of Police of the city of Jacksonville, Florida, under process issued pursuant to a judgment and sentence of the municipal court of said city, wherein and whereby he was found guilty of a charge of cruelty to animals in violation of an ordinance of said city, and alleging that said judgment and process under Avhich he is held 'by said Chief of Police are void, because the charter of said city does not authorize the passage of such ordinance. The Circuit Judge denied the application for a Avrit of habeas corpus. A Avrit of error Avas granted by a justice of this court.
The plaintiff in error contends that he is illegally deprived of his libeiiy because the sentence of the municipal court under which he is held is void, as the charter of the city of Jacksonville does not authorize the. passage of the ordinance under which he was convicted and sentenced upon the charge of cruelty to animals.
Chapter 3775 acts of 1887, is: “An act to establish the municipality of Jacksonville, provide for its government and prescribe its jurisdiction and poAvers.” In section 4 of the act it is provided that “the mayor and city council shall Avithin the limitations of this act have power by ordinances * * * to make regulations to secure the general health of the inhabitants and to prevent and rernoAes nuisances; * * * to provide for the arrest, imprisonment and punishment of all disorderly persons withiu the city, by day or by night, and for punishment of all' breaches of the peace, noise, disturbance and disorderly asemblies; * * * to pass all ordinances necessary for the health, convenience .and safety of the citizens, and to carry out the full intent and meaning of this-act, and to accomplish the object of this incorporation.” A large number of particular subjects are mentioned in section 4 upon which ordinances may be passed, but cruelty to animals is not one of them.
Counsel for the pláintift' in error argues that the enumeration of the particular subjects upon which ordinances may «be passed excludes others not embraced in the enumeration; and that the general provisions quoted above do not authorize the passage of an ordinance against cruelty to animals because legislative powers delegated to municipal corporations should be strictly construed.
The difficulty of making specific enumeration of all such powers as the legislature may intend to delegate to municipal corporations renders it necessary to confer some power in general terms. The general powers usually given to municipal corporations are designated to confer other powers than those specifically enumerated. Municipal corporations have only such powers as are conferred upon them by express legislation or by necessary implication from those expressly given, and general powers conferred are to be construed with reference to the purposes of the incorporation. Authority to pass ordinances against cruelty to animals is among the powers which may properly be conferred upon municipal corporations, and such authority may be included in powers given in' general terms, where there is nothing in the enumeration of the particular powers conferred to limit the operation of the general welfare clause. Mernaught v. City of Orlando, 41 Fla. 433, 27 South. Rep. 34.
The general powers contained in the Charter act, as above mentioned, fairly include the power to pass an ordinance against cruelty to animals. City of St. Louis v. Schoenbusch, 95 Mo. 618, 8 S. W. Rep. 791; State v. Karstendiek, 49 La. Ann. 1621, 22 South. Rep. 845, S. C. 39 L. R. A. 520.
The order denying the writ of habeas corpus is affirmed.
Shackleford and Carter, JJ., concur. Taylor, P. J., and Hocker and Cockrell, concur in the opinion.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Cited By (12 total)
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Malone v. City of Quincy, 66 Fla. 52 (Fla. 1913)…ss ordinances, reasonable in their character, upon all other matters within the scope of the municipal authority not repugnant to the constitution and laws of the State. Mernaugh v. City of Orlando, 41 Fla. 433, 27 South. Rep. 34; Porter v. Vinzant, 49 Fla. 213, 38 South. Rep. 607. General powers expressed in comprehensive terms are conferred upon municipalities because though particular powers are specifically given, it is. difficult to enumerate all the powers that may be useful and intended for the gen…
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The State of Fla. ex rel. W. H. Ellis v. Tampa Water Works Co., 56 Fla. 858 (Fla. 1908)…f a municipality, and such power may be included in powers given in general terms, where there is nothing in the enumeration of particular powers conferred to limit in this particular the operation of the general powers conferred. Porter v. Vinzant, 49 Fla. 213, 38 South. Rep. 607; Mernaugh v. City of Orlando, 41 Fla. 433, 27 South. Rep. 34. Unless expressly or impliedly restrained by statute a municipal corporation has a discretion in the choice of means and methods far exercising the powers, given to it…
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S. Utils. Co. v. City of Palatka, 86 Fla. 583 (Fla. 1923)…pality, and such power may be included in powers given in general terms, where there is nothing in the enumeration of particular powers con [*603] ferred to limit in .this particular the' operation of the general powers conferred. Porter v. Vinzant, 49 Fla. 213, 38 South. Rep. 607; Mernaugh v. City of Orlando, 41 Fla. 433, 27 South. Rep. 34. Unless expressly or impliedly restrained by statute a municipal corporation has a discretion in the choice of jneans and methods for exercising the powers given to it…
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Mernaugh. v. City of Orlando, 41 Fla. 433 (Fla. 1899)