SHEIKH AHMED, APPELLANT,
v.
LANE PONTIAC-BUICK, INC., ETC., ET AL., APPELLEES
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Ahmed settled his civil theft and other claims against Lane Pontiac-Buick and Allstate Insurance by accepting offers of judgment that did not mention attorney fees. The court held that by accepting a settlement offer, Ahmed was not the prevailing party on any count and therefore could not recover statutory attorney fees despite some counts providing for such fees.
A plaintiff who accepts a settlement offer of judgment that concludes all claims cannot later recover attorney fees, even if some underlying counts provided for statutory attorney fees, because the settlement prevents any party from being the prevailing party on those counts.
[1] A settlement agreement, by its nature, concludes all claims unless the agreement specifies otherwise.
[2] Acceptance of an offer of judgment that does not specifically mention attorney fees does not entitle a party to seek statutory attorney fees post-settlement.
Previewing 2 of 5 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“the organic right of parties to contract a settlement, which by definition concludes all claims unless the contract of settlement specifies otherwise. No legislation or procedural rule can impair such a contract.”
Establishes the fundamental principle that settlements conclude all claims and cannot be impaired by statute or rule
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAhmed filed a multi-count complaint against Lane Pontiac-Buick and Allstate Insurance. He accepted offers of judgment from both defendants for $1,001.…
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COBB, Judge.
Ahmed filed a multi-count complaint against Lane Pontiac-Buick, Inc. and Allstate Insurance Company. Of the three counts against Lane, only the count for civil theft sought attorney fees, pursuant to section 812.014, Florida Statutes (1985). Only one of the two counts against Allstate sought the recovery of statutory attorney fees.
Ahmed accepted offers of judgment from both Lane and Allstate, neither of which specifically provided for attorney fees. Ahmed subsequently filed motions for attorney fees against both defendants, contending that the fees were not encompassed within the offer of judgment. Ahmed claimed he was entitled to fees since he was the prevailing party and at least one count against each defendant provided for the award of fees. The trial court disagreed and denied Ahmed’s motions, noting that there had been no court ruling as to the validity of the causes of action against either defendant under which the plaintiff sought statutory attorney fees. Therefore, the court, relying on Encompass Incorporated v. Alford, 444 So. 2d 1085 (Fla. 1st DCA), petition for review denied, 453 So. 2d 43 (Fla.1984), found that it could not be said that Ahmed was the prevailing party on those counts.
In Encompass, a settlement offer disposed of a mechanic's lien foreclosure and a claim for breach of contract. There was no mention of attorney fees in the offer of judgment. The First District found that the acceptance of the offer resulted in a standard money judgment, not an enforcement of the lien. Therefore, utilizing a strict construction approach to an attorney fee statute in derogation of the common law, the court found that the plaintiff should not be regarded as the prevailing party on the mechanic’s lien action and thus, was not entitled to fees.
The trial court’s denial of attorney fees sought via a post-settlement motion was affirmed in George v. Northcraft, 476 So. 2d 758 (Fla. 5th DCA 1985). In George, this court held that the right to an award of attorney fees pursuant to a contractual provision was encompassed in an offer of judgment made pursuant to Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.442 even though the offer neither mentioned them specifically nor reserved the right to seek them later. We believe the analysis utilized in George is applicable to the instant case even though the fee at issue here is predicated upon statute rather than contract. The crux of the matter is not the basis for the attorney fee claim, or a determination of the “prevailing party,” but rather the organic right of parties to contract a settlement, which by definition concludes all claims unless the contract of settlement specifies otherwise. No legislation or procedural rule can impair such a contract. U.S. Const., art. I, § 10.
In short, we agree with the determination of the trial court. When Ahmed’s claims against Lane and Allstate were settled, there was no prevailing party. That is the purpose of a settlement — to prevent the adverse party from prevailing. The obvious purpose of the settlement offers was just that: to terminate the cases and all the claims they entailed, for the specified sum of $1,001.00 (with accrued costs) against each defendant. Not for $1001.00 now and some unspecified amount of attorney fees at a later date.1
AFFIRMED.
SHARP, CJ., and COWART, J., concur. . We certify this case is in direct conflict with Parliament Ins. Co. v. That Girl in Miami, Inc., 377 So. 2d 1011 (Fla. 3d DCA 1979).
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Unicare Health Facilities, Inc. v. Mort, 553 So. 2d 159 (Fla. 1989)…BARKETT, Justice. We have for review Mort v. Unicare Health Facilities, Inc., 537 So. 2d 203 (Fla. 1st DCA 1989), in which the court certified conflict with Ahmed v. Lane Pontiac-Buick, Inc., 527 So. 2d 930 (Fla. 5th DCA 1988). We have jurisdiction. Art. V, § 3(b)(4), Fla. Const. The issue in this case is whether acceptance of an offer of judgment, which was silent as to attorney’s fees, terminated the litigation and bound the parties to the terms of…
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Mort v. Unicare Health Facilities, Inc., 537 So. 2d 203 (Fla. 1st DCA 1989)…esced to liability for attorney’s fees which, like costs, are determined by the court independently of the merits. Id; Accord Parliament Ins. Co. v. That Girl In Miami, 377 So. 2d 1011 (Fla. 3d DCA 1979);4 But see, Ahmed v. Lane Pontiac-Buick, Inc., 527 So. 2d 930 (Fla. 5th DCA 1988) (the purpose of a settlement is to prevent the adverse party from prevailing and to terminate the case for a specified sum now and not for some unspecified amount of attorney’s fees later).5 Recently, this court in Godbey v. Wal…1 / 2
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Int'l Image Makers, Inc. v. Ronald Levitt Assocs., Inc., 547 So. 2d 265 (Fla. 3d DCA 1989)…e only authorized the judgment against the Utah corporation. The motion to dissolve was denied and a final judgment in garnishment entered from which International Image Makers, Inc. appeals. [*266] Appellant cites Ahmed v. Lane Pontiac-Buick, Inc., 527 So. 2d 930 (Fla. 5th DCA 1988) for the proposition that the trial court could not impair the settlement as agreed to by the parties. The Ahmed decision, however, has no application to the resolution of the present controversy. Here, there was never a defense r…
Previewing 3 of 4 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Encompass Inc. v. Alford, 444 So. 2d 1085 (Fla. 1st DCA 1984)
- Parliament Ins. Co. v. That Girl IN Miami, Inc., 377 So. 2d 1011 (Fla. 3d DCA 1979)
- Bernstein v. Bernstein, 377 So. 2d 1011 (Fla. 3d DCA 1979)
- George v. Northcraft, 476 So. 2d 758 (Fla. 5th DCA 1985)