ROBERT M. CASE, D.P.M., APPELLANT,
v.
ETHEL F. BENTLEY, APPELLEE
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In this medical malpractice case, the court reverses a trial court's order granting a new trial after a jury verdict favored the defendant. The appellate court holds that the trial court improperly reevaluated witness credibility, which is primarily a jury function, and did not comply with the legal standard governing motions for new trial based on verdicts against the manifest weight of evidence.
The trial court erred in granting the motion for new trial because it went beyond the permissible extent of considering witness credibility by improperly reevaluating the validity of the defendant's expert testimony. When reasonable men could differ on the verdict, a trial court may not grant a new trial based on manifest weight unless it makes an independent determination that the jury was influenced by matters outside the record; reevaluating credibility is primarily a jury function.
[1] A trial court may not grant a motion for a new trial based on the verdict being against the manifest weight of the evidence unless it makes an independent determination t…
[2] Appellate review of an order granting a new trial for a verdict against the manifest weight of the evidence is whether reasonable persons could differ as to the propriety…
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“a trial court may not grant a motion for new trial if reasonable men can differ as to whether the verdict was against the manifest weight of the evidence, unless the trial court properly makes an independent determination that the jury was influenced by considerations outside the record”
Establishes the legal standard governing when trial courts may grant motions for new trial based on manifest weight of evidence
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceA medical malpractice case proceeded to trial where the jury found in favor of the defendant doctor. The plaintiff's expert testified with strong conv…
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PER CURIAM.
In this medical malpractice case defendant appeals from the trial court’s order granting a new trial after the jury had found in defendant’s favor. We reverse.
We conclude that the order did not comply with the requirement that a trial court may not grant a motion for new trial if reasonable men can differ as to whether the verdict was against the manifest weight of the evidence, unless the trial court properly makes an independent determination that the jury was influenced by considerations outside the record. Fitzgerald v. Molle-Teeters, 520 So. 2d 645, 648 (Fla. 2d DCA 1988).
We do not conclude that Smith v. Brown, 525 So. 2d 868 (Fla.1988), calls for a different result. Smith, quoting from Baptist Memorial Hospital, Inc. v. Bell, 384 So. 2d 145 (Fla.1980), phrases the standard of appellate review of orders granting motions for new trial on the basis that a verdict was against the manifest weight of the evidence as being that “[i]f reasonable men could differ as to the propriety of the action taken by the trial court, then the action is not unreasonable and there can be no finding of an abuse of discretion.” As explained in Fitzgerald, that standard is essentially the same as the standard referred to in the preceding paragraph.
The Smith opinion also contains the proposition that a trial court, in granting a motion for new trial, is not entirely precluded from reevaluating the credibility of witnesses. In that regard Smith says, “[T]he trial judge must necessarily consider the credibility of the witnesses along with the weight of all of the other evidence.” 525 So. 2d at 870. While the underlying basis for our conclusion in this case that the trial court erred in granting the motion for new trial under the standard of appellate review was that the trial court improperly reevaluated the credibility, or validity, of the testimony of the expert witness for defendant, that basis is, in our view, not inconsistent with Smith. As Smith also says, “[I]t is a jury function to evaluate the credibility of any given witness.” (Emphasis added.) We conclude that the trial court’s order in this case went beyond the foregoing permissible extent under Smith. For example, included in the order are findings that “[t]he plaintiff’s expert testified with strong conviction as to the breaches of the standard of care ... and the causation of the [condition of plaintiff alleged to have resulted from defendant’s malpractice]. Defendant’s expert testified with equal conviction to the contrary” and “the Court could have found liability as a matter of law but for the opinions of the defendant’s expert witness.” Reversed and remanded for reinstatement of the jury verdict and for other proceedings consistent with this opinion.
RYDER, A.C.J., and LEHAN and FRANK, JJ., concur.
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Oakes v. Pittsburgh Corning Corp., 546 So. 2d 427 (Fla. 3d DCA 1989)…Laskey v. Smith, 239 So. 2d 13 (Fla.1970); Hodge v. Jacksonville Terminal Co., 234 So. 2d 645 (Fla.1970), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 904, 91 S.Ct. 142, 27 L.Ed.2d 141 (1970); Deveaux v. McCrory Corp., 535 So. 2d 349 (Fla. 3d DCA 1988); Case v. Bentley, 527 So. 2d 939 (Fla. 2d DCA 1988); Evering v. Smithwick, 526 So. 2d 185 (Fla. 3d DCA 1988). See generally Rety, 546 So. 2d at 418.3 2. The trial court purported to base its order also on the jury finding that twenty per cent comparative negligence was too low. It…
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Montgomery Ward & Co., Inc. v. Pope, 532 So. 2d 722 (Fla. 3d DCA 1988)…weight of the evidence.” I would therefore reverse the order under review and reinstate the verdict. .That this'is true is graphically demonstrated by the fact that, within six weeks after Smith was decided, the second district in Case v. Bentley, 527 So. 2d 939 (Fla.2d DCA 1988), upon a meticulous, perhaps overly so, dissection of its language, was able to come to what seems to be a completely opposite result. . I freely acknowledge that, in an opinion authored by myself, we have specifically denied trial…
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Phar-Mor OF Fla., Inc. v. Steuernagel, 550 So. 2d 548 (Fla. 2d DCA 1989)…hat the trial judge abused his discretion in finding that the manifest weight of the evidence below was such that a jury of reasonable persons could not have found for appellants. Therefore, under the standard set by Smith v. Brown; Case v. Bentley, 527 So. 2d 939 (Fla. 2d DCA), rev. denied, 534 So. 2d 398 (Fla.1988); Fitzgerald v. Molle-Teeters, 520 So. 2d 645 (Fla. 2d DCA), rev. denied, 529 So. 2d 694 (Fla. 1988); McNair v. Davis, 518 So. 2d 416 (Fla. 2d DCA 1988); and Crown Cork & Seal Co., Inc. v. Vroom,…
Previewing 3 of 4 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Baptist Mem'l Hosp., Inc. v. Bell, 384 So. 2d 145 (Fla. 1980)
- THE FLA. BAR RE AMENDMENT TO RULES REGULATING THE FLA. BAR (RULE 1-4.3, 525 So. 2d 868 (Fla. 1988)
- Smith v. Brown, 525 So. 2d 868 (Fla. 1988)
- Fitzgerald v. Molle-Teeters, 520 So. 2d 645 (Fla. 2d DCA 1988)