STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLANT,
v.
WILLIAM ROBERT GREEN, APPELLEE
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The State appealed a trial court's sua sponte dismissal of an information charging Green with aggravated battery and aggravated assault after he completed a Family Violence Diversion Program. The appellate court reversed, holding that the trial court exceeded its authority because Green was ineligible for pretrial intervention due to the second-degree felony charge, and prosecutorial decisions regarding diversion programs are not subject to judicial review.
The trial court exceeded its authority in dismissing the information because Green was ineligible for pretrial intervention due to the second-degree felony charge, and pretrial diversion decisions are purely prosecutorial matters not subject to judicial review. The State's appeal was timely because the order's rendition date was properly measured from the separate written order filed with the clerk, not the earlier stamped order.
[1] A notice of appeal is timely filed when it is filed within the prescribed time period from the rendition of a separate written order, even if a prior oral pronouncement o…
[2] Rendition of an order, for the purpose of triggering appellate time limits, is defined by the filing of a signed, written order with the clerk of the court.
Previewing 2 of 5 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“Defendants charged with second-degree felonies are not eligible for pretrial intervention under section 944.-025(2).”
Establishes that Green was ineligible for the diversion program due to the aggravated battery charge.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceGreen was arrested in February 1978 for aggravated assault after allegedly attacking his wife and attempting to stab a neighbor. He enrolled in the Fa…
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THREADGILL, Judge.
The state appeals the order dismissing an information charging William Robert Green with aggravated battery and aggravated assault. Because we find the court exceeded its authority in ordering the dismissal, we reverse.
Green was arrested in February 1978, for aggravated assault after an incident in which he allegedly attacked his wife and attempted to stab a neighbor who came to her aid. He enrolled in the Family Violence Diversion Program, a form of pretrial intervention. Green failed, however, to complete the program and was terminated from the program. The state subsequently filed an information based on the February incident, charging Green with one count of aggravated assault, a third-degree felony, and one count of aggravated battery, a second-degree felony. The record reflects that Green then completed the intervention program.
After being informed that Green had successfully completed the program, the court sua sponte dismissed the case. The state moved for rehearing.
At argument on the motion for rehearing, the court orally denied the motion and, at some point, stamped the filed written motion “denied”, and signed and dated it. There is no indication that the parties were ever informed that the motion had been denied in this manner. Nor does the record reflect when this stamped order was filed with the circuit court. A separate written order denying the motion for rehearing was filed with the clerk of court nearly two weeks after the motion was stamped denied by the court. The state filed notice of appeal within the applicable time limits from the date of the separate written order. The appellee contends that the state did not appeal within the time limits set forth in Rule 9.140, Florida Rules of Appellate Procedure, providing that “the state shall file the notice ... with the clerk of the lower tribunal within 15 days of rendition of the order to be reviewed.” Rule 9.020(g) defines rendition of an order as the filing of a signed, written order with the clerk. The Committee Notes to the rule state that the rule was intended to encourage the entry of written orders in every case.
We realize that it is common in some circuits to merely stamp short form orders on the face of a motion, and do not condemn this practice except where it is necessary to set a point from which critical time periods may be measured. See Committee Notes to Rule 9.020(g), FIa.R.App.P. When substantial rights are at issue, however, we feel it a better practice that such critical time periods run from the time the order is made part of the public record by filing with the clerk. We note that the office of the clerk has instruments to mark the face of documents with the exact date and time of filing. We find that the court’s oral pronouncement and stamped order does not satisfy the rule, and therefore that the state’s appeal within fifteen days from rendition of the separate written order was timely filed.
The state argues that the court exceeded its authority in dismissing the information. We agree. In addition to the third-degree felony listed on the arrest report, Green was charged in the information with aggravated battery which is a second-degree felony. Defendants charged with second-degree felonies are not eligible for pretrial intervention under section 944.-025(2). Furthermore, the statute provides under subsection (4) that “resumption of pending criminal proceedings shall be undertaken at any time ... the state attorney finds such individual is not fulfilling his obligations under this plan....” The record reflects that although Green enrolled in the intervention program after his arrest, he was terminated prior to the information being filed for failure to complete the program. We also note that it is well established that decisions concerning pretrial diversion programs are purely prosecutorial in nature and are not subject to judicial review. Cleveland v. State, 417 So. 2d 653 (Fla.1982).
We reverse the order dismissing the information and remand for further proceedings.
Reversed and remanded.
SCHOONOVER, A.C.J., and PARKER, JJ., concur.
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State v. Sullivan, 640 So. 2d 77 (Fla. 2d DCA 1994)…purposes of rendition under rule 9.020(g). State v. Moore, 563 So. 2d 115, 116 (Fla. 2d DCA 1990). In this ease, we again find that the trial court’s oral pronouncement and stamped order do not satisfy the requirements of rendition. State v. Green, 527 So. 2d 941, 942 (Fla. 2d DCA 1988). As noted, we have already provided an opportunity to correct this jurisdictional deficiency, and it was not corrected. Accordingly, we have no other alternative but to dismiss this appeal.1 See Moore. In closing, we again…
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Parnell v. State, 642 So. 2d 1092 (Fla. 2d DCA 1994)…d not comply with rule 3.850(g). Appellate courts have previously discouraged the use of rubber stamps to rule upon such motions. Smith v. State, 582 So. 2d 796 (Fla. 5th DCA 1991); State v. Moore, 563 So. 2d 115 (Fla. 2d DCA 1990); State v. Green, 527 So. 2d 941 (Fla. 2d DCA 1988). An order is rendered when it is reduced to writing, signed, and filed with the clerk of the trial court. A rubber-stamped order on a document that has already been filed is, at best, confusing. When the document does not receive…
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State v. Moore, 563 So. 2d 115 (Fla. 2d DCA 1990)…ot appealable until it is rendered, and rendition does not occur until the order is reduced to writing, signed, and filed with the clerk of the lower court. Billie v. State, 478 So. 2d 34 (Fla. 2d DCA 1985); Fla.R.App.P. 9.020(g). In State v. Green, 527 So. 2d 941 (Fla. 2d DCA 1988), this court found that the oral pronouncement of the trial court denying a motion for rehearing and the stamped order denying rehearing did not satisfy the rendition rule. Based on that finding, this court held that the notice of…
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Ophelia Johnson Cleveland v. State, 417 So. 2d 653 (Fla. 1982)