ANTHONY W. MARTIN, A/K/A ANTHONY W. MARTINELLI, APPELLANT,
v.
PETER KUHL, ET AL., APPELLEES
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A former husband pro se appealed the dismissal of a conversion suit against his former wife and her parents regarding personal property allegedly located in Broward County. The court affirmed dismissal of the husband's claims regarding his own property due to res judicata, but reversed the dismissal and remanded to allow the son to pursue a separate conversion claim.
The court affirmed dismissal of the husband's conversion claims regarding his own property because res judicata barred such claims, as he failed to appeal the dissolution judgment that did not address personal property distribution. However, the court reversed the dismissal regarding the son's property and remanded to allow a separate cause of action for conversion of the son's property, finding venue was proper in Broward County.
[1] A party is barred by res judicata from raising issues regarding personal property distribution if they did not appeal the final judgment of dissolution that did not addre…
[2] Res judicata does not apply to claims concerning property allegedly belonging to a third party, such as a child from a previous marriage.
Previewing 2 of 5 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“The husband did not appeal the final judgment of dissolution, and thus is barred by res judicata from raising an issue as to his personal property.”
Establishes that res judicata barred the husband's claims regarding his own property after failing to appeal the dissolution judgment.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceThe former husband brought suit on behalf of himself and his minor son from another marriage against his former wife and her parents, alleging convers…
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PER CURIAM.
The former husband, pro se, on behalf of himself and his minor son (from another marriage), brought suit against his former wife and her parents claiming conversion of various articles of personal property which had been located in a house in Bro-ward County. After a hearing, of which there is no transcript in the record, the trial court dismissed the suit for two reasons: failure to state a cause of action and improper venue. The former husband appealed, also pro se, asking this court to dispose of this case “on the merits brought forth in the record.” At this court’s request, the former wife and her parents filed a brief addressing the venue and failure to state a cause of action issues.
The wife responds that in her petition for dissolution, (not in the record) she denied the existence of any joint property. The husband alleges that his counter-petition raised issues related to his rights in personal property, but the final judgment, according to the wife, (also not in the record), did not address the distribution of any personal property.
The husband did not appeal the final judgment of dissolution, and thus is barred by res judicata from raising an issue as to his personal property. Res judicata, however, would not apply to any conversion of the son’s property.
It also appears that the trial court incorrectly dismissed the cause on the ground of improper venue. The husband alleged that the property had been located in Broward County. A suit can be brought where the cause of action accrued. § 57.011, Fla.Stat. (1985). Since conversion is a continuous act, if the property converted has been taken from one county to another, it may be said to have been committed in either county for purposes of venue, Lilly v. Bronson, 129 Fla. 675, 177 So. 218 (1937); 12 Fla.Jur.2d Conversion and Replevin § 29 (1979). Thus, venue was proper in Broward County.
We, therefore, affirm the order of dismissal as to the husband’s cause of action for his property, but remand with leave to file a separate cause of action for conversion of any property allegedly belonging to the son.
AFFIRMED IN PART, REVERSED IN PART.
LETTS, GLICKSTEIN and WALDEN, JJ., concur.
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Intercapital Funding Corp. v. Gisclair, 683 So. 2d 530 (Fla. 4th DCA 1996)…as well as other counts against the Gisclairs. “Since conversion is a continuous act, if the property converted has been taken from one county to another, it may be said to have been committed in either county for purposes of venue.” Martin v. Kuhl, 528 So. 2d 71, 72 (Fla. 4th DCA 1988). According to one of the affidavits filed, appellants’ accounts receivable were converted into cash in Broward County by John Gisclair. Therefore, Broward County was a proper statutory choice of venue in this case. The trial…
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Authorities Cited
- Lilly v. Bronson, 129 Fla. 675 (Fla. 1937)