MCNEILL
v.
MARRIOTT INTERNATIONAL, INC.
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In this employment or tort dispute, the District Court granted Marriott International's motion to set aside a clerk's default, finding good cause under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 55(c) and applying the strong federal policy favoring resolution of cases on the merits.
The Court found good cause to set aside the clerk's default and directed the Clerk of Court to vacate it. Marriott was ordered to respond to the complaint within thirty days of the Order.
[1] A court may set aside a clerk's default upon a showing of good cause.
[2] There is a strong policy in favor of resolving cases on the merits, and defaults are viewed with disfavor.
Previewing 2 of 4 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“the strong policy in favor of resolving cases on the merits and that defaults are viewed with disfavor”
Establishes the guiding principle for setting aside defaults under Rule 55(c)
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceA default was entered against Defendant Marriott International, Inc. by the Clerk of Court (Doc. No. 14). Marriott filed a motion to quash service of …
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Before the Court is Defendant Marriott International, Inc.'s Motion to Quash Service of Process, Set Aside Clerk's Default, and Incorporated Memorandum of Law. Doc. No. 16. Plaintiff has responded. Doc. No. 18. And since filing the Motion, Defendant has withdrawn its request to quash service and proceeds only on its motion to set aside the Clerk's default. Doc. No. 20.
Upon consideration, and based on the parties' filings, Doc. Nos. 16, 18, 20 [fn 1], the Court finds good cause to set aside the Clerk's default. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 55(c);
Perez v. Wells Fargo N.A., 774 F. 3d 1329, 1339, 1342 (11th Cir. 2014) (noting strong policy in favor of resolving cases on the merits and that defaults are viewed with disfavor); Compania Interamericana Export-Import, S.A. v. Compania Dominicana de Aviacion, 88 F. 3d 948, 951 (11th Cir. 1996) (“good cause” is a liberal standard).
Accordingly, Defendant's Motion (Doc. No. 16) is GRANTED in part, to the extent that the Clerk of Court is DIRECTED to VACATE the default entered against Defendant (Doc. No. 14). Defendant shall respond to the complaint within thirty (30) days of this Order. See Doc. No. 20. Defendant's Motion (Doc. No. 16) is DENIED in all other respects. This Order does not speak to any forthcoming motions to amend/amendments to the complaint by Plaintiff. See Doc. No. 20.
DONE and ORDERED in Orlando, Florida on February 24, 2025.
Leslie Hoffman Price
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
Copies furnished to: Counsel of Record Unrepresented Parties
this matter may proceed on the merits." Doc. No. 20.
[fn 1]: According to the Motion, Plaintiff opposed only the request to quash service and not the request to set aside the Clerk's default. Doc. No. 16, at 6. The Court also notes Plaintiff's representations that it was “unfortunate the parties were unable to stipulate . . . to ... setting aside the default,” and that Plaintiff “is ready to begin litigation of her claims." Doc. No. 18. Defendant, for its part, has now agreed to respond to the complaint “so that
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Authorities Cited
- Enora Perez v. Wells Fargo N.A., 774 F.3d 1329 (11th Cir. 2014)
- Compania Interamericana Export-Import, S.A. v. Compania Dominicana de Aviacion, 88 F.3d 948 (11th Cir. 1996)