DAVID KOBRIN, ET AL., APPELLANTS,
v.
DAVID LEAHY, SUPERVISOR DADE COUNTY BOARD OF ELECTIONS, APPELLEE
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The court held that a ballot proposition was fatally defective and misleading because it failed to clearly disclose that it would eliminate an independent Fire and Rescue Service District governing body while simultaneously holding an election for that same board, creating voter confusion about the measure's true effect.
The court held that the ballot proposition was fatally defective and misleading because it failed to clearly and unambiguously set forth the substance and chief purpose of the measure in violation of Florida Statutes section 101.161(1) and the Metropolitan Dade County Home Rule Charter Article 7, Section 7.01(4)(b). The studied omission of any reference to the elimination of the board and the failure to dispel the confusion arising from holding the election simultaneously rendered the language inadequate.
[1] A ballot proposition is fatally defective when its language is misleading and fails to dispel confusion arising from inconsistent, simultaneously conducted elections.
[2] Ballot language must clearly and unambiguously set forth the substance and chief purpose of a public measure.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“the language of the proposition is both misleading, see Askew v. Firestone, 421 So. 2d 151 (Fla.1982), and contrary to the requirements of section 101.161(1), Florida Statutes (1987), that a ballot question set forth "the substance of ... [the] public measure ... in clear and unambiguous language ... [which contains] the chief purpose of the measure"”
Establishes the legal standard for ballot language and the violation found here
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceA proposition was placed on the ballot in Dade County that would amend the home rule charter to make the Board of County Commissioners the governing b…
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PER CURIAM.
This case challenges the placement upon the ballot of a proposition which indubitably has the effect of eliminating the existence of a government entity, the governing body of the county Fire and Rescue Service District, at the same election at which the voters elect persons to that very board. The language of the proposition,1 however, makes no specific reference to the totally inconsistent, but simultaneously conducted election, nor even to the elimination of the board itself. We must conclude that the apparently studied omission of such a reference2 and the consequent and just as obvious failure to dispel the confusion which must inevitably arise from this set of circumstances3 renders the language as framed fatally defective. In the context of the bewildering and conflicting decision-making facing the voters, the language of the proposition is both misleading, see Askew v. Firestone, 421 So. 2d 151 (Fla.1982), and contrary to the requirements of section 101.161(1), Florida Statutes (1987), that a ballot question set forth “the substance of ... [the] public measure ... in clear and unambiguous language ... [which contains] the chief purpose of the measure” and to Article 7, Section 7.01(4)(b) of the Metropolitan Dade County Home Rule Charter that ballot language provide “a clear understanding of the proposal.” See Smathers v. Smith, 338 So. 2d 825 (Fla.1976).
Since we find no merit in the county’s alternative argument for affirmance that the appellants are guilty of laches, the judgment below is reversed and the cause remanded with directions to forbid the tabulation of votes on the proposition in question.
Reversed.4
SCHWARTZ, C.J., and HENDRY, J., concur. .
CHANGE OF GOVERNING BODY OF METRO-DADE FIRE RESCUE SERVICE DISTRICT
SHALL THE DADE COUNTY HOME RULE CHARTER BE AMENDED TO PROVIDE THAT THE BOARD OF COUNTY COMMISSIONERS SHALL BE THE GOVERNING BODY OF THE METRO-DADE FIRE AND RESCUE SERVICE DISTRICT ESTABLISHED BY ORDINANCE NO. 80-86?
YES_
NO _
. It would have been a simple matter to supplement the proposition to provide that “the independent governing body of the fire and rescue service district is abolished and the Board of County Commissioners shall be the governing body_” Why this was not done must be a matter of speculation.
. We do not decide whether placing the two items on the same ballot would be ipso facto improper, regardless of the wording of the ballot proposition.
. Rehearing is dispensed with.
[*394] NESBITT, J.
(dissenting):
I respectfully dissent.
The substance of the referendum ballot at issue specifically provides “that the Board of Dade County Commissioners shall be the governing body of the Metro-Dade Fire Rescue Service District.” These words unambiguously set out the chief purpose of the proposal as required by section 101.161(1), Florida Statutes (1987). A second ballot authorizes the electorate to select representatives by districts to the Fire Rescue Service board. The separate positioning of these ballots in addition to the clear and unambiguous wording of each should not mislead an informed voter of average intelligence as to the consequences of his vote. See Hill v. Milander, 72 So. 2d 796, 798 (Fla.1954). I would affirm the order permitting tabulation of the referendum ballot.
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Wadhams v. Bd. OF Cnty. Comm'rs OF Sarasota Cnty., 567 So. 2d 414 (Fla. 1990)…as nothing on the ballot to inform the voter of the change to be accomplished by the amendment, which is the very reason why section 101.161(1) requires an explanatory statement.” 501 So. 2d at 124 (Grimes, J., dissenting). See also Kobrin v. Leahy, 528 So. 2d 392 (Fla. 3d DCA) [*417] (placement on ballot of proposition to provide that the board of county commissioners shall be the governing board of the fire and rescue service district, but making no mention of the elimination of the existing governing body…
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Reubin Askew v. Firestone, 421 So. 2d 151 (Fla. 1982)
- Hill v. Milander, 72 So. 2d 796 (Fla. 1954)
- Smathers v. Chesterfield Smith, 338 So. 2d 825 (Fla. 1976)