WELLS

v.

TRANSUNION, LLC

THIS CAUSE is before the undersigned on pro se Plaintiff’s Application to Proceed in District Court Without Prepaying Fees or Costs (Long Form) (“Motion”) (Doc. 7). For the reasons stated herein, the undersigned recommends that the Motion be DENIED and that the case be DISMISSED without prejudice.

I. Background

On March 7, 2023, the undersigned entered an Order taking the Motion under advisement. (Doc. 5.) The Order stated: “On or before March 28, 2023, Plaintiff shall file an amended complaint and a new motion in compliance with this Order and all applicable rules and law.” (Id. at 6.) Plaintiff filed her Amended Complaint (“AC”) (Doc. 6) and a new motion on March 28, 2023. However, the AC does not cure the deficiencies noted in the prior Order. II. Standard Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(1), the Court may allow a plaintiff to proceed without prepayment of fees or costs where the plaintiff has demonstrated through the filing of an affidavit that she is “unable to pay such fees or give security therefor.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(1). Even assuming that the Motion sufficiently demonstrates that

Plaintiff meets the financial criteria and is therefore entitled to proceed in forma pauperis, when such a motion is filed, the Court is also obligated to review the case pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2) and to dismiss the case if it determines that the action “(i) is frivolous or malicious; (ii) fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted; or (iii) seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). To avoid a dismissal, the “complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citing Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). “Labels and conclusions” or “a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action” that amount to “naked assertions” will not do. Id. Rather, “[a] claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. Though detailed factual allegations are not required to satisfy this standard, Rule 8(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure demands “more than an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation.” Id. The well-pled allegations must nudge the claim “across the line from conceivable to plausible.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570. While pleadings submitted by a pro se plaintiff “are held to a less stringent standard than pleadings drafted by attorneys and will, therefore, be liberally construed,” Tannenbaum v. U.S., 148 F. 3d 1262, 1263 (11th Cir. 1998) (per curiam), “[a] [pro se] complaint that fails to articulate claims with sufficient clarity to allow the defendant to frame a responsive pleading constitutes a ‘shotgun pleading.’ . . . prohibited by Rule 8(a)(2).” Lampkin-Asam v. Volusia Cty. Sch. Bd., 261 F. App’x 274, 277 (11th Cir. 2008).1 As such, pro se complaints that are “disjointed, repetitive, disorganized and barely comprehensible” may even be dismissed. Id. at 276.

III. Analysis

Even liberally construed, Plaintiff’s AC does not meet the above requirements and is otherwise deficient for several reasons, including that it is still a shotgun pleading and still fails to otherwise meet the pleading standard required by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a). (See Doc. 6.) Preliminarily, the AC is an impermissible “shotgun pleading” at least because it contains “multiple counts where each count adopts the allegations of all preceding counts, causing each successive count to carry all that came before and the last count to be a combination of the entire complaint.” See Weiland v. Palm Beach Cty. Sheriff’s

Office, 792 F. 3d 1313, 1321 & n.11 (11th Cir. 2015) (collecting cases).

“written and signed notices to Plaintiff of Defendant’s right to sell Plaintiff’s automobile as collateral to financial obligation and claim any deficiency.” (Doc. 6 at 3.) However, Plaintiff alleges no plausible facts in support of her conclusion that the sale was not “commercially reasonable.” Moreover, to the extent that Plaintiff plausibly alleges that she received significantly insufficient notice prior to the sale,

she fails to allege any action that she would or could have taken had she received proper notice.² See Fla. Stat. § 537.012. Thus, Plaintiff fails to state a claim for relief. In sum, the AC fails to allege sufficient non-conclusory facts to allow for a reasonable inference that Defendants are liable for any of the matters alleged.

Therefore, the undersigned recommends that the Motion be denied and that the AC be dismissed without prejudice. Accordingly, it is respectfully RECOMMENDED that: 1. The Motion (Doc. 7) be DENIED.

2. The case be DISMISSED without prejudice.

fo-X B. =a

JOZL B. TOOMEY

United States Magistrate Judge

Copies to: The Honorable Harvey E. Schlesinger Senior United States District Judge Pro se Plaintiff