RODNEY ROSEBORO, A/K/A DENNIS SMITH, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE

Fla. 2d DCA | 1988-07-13
No. 86-2463
DANAHY, A.C.J., and PARKER, J., concur.
528 So. 2d 499 Florida District Court of Appeal, Second District (1988) Positive Treatment
Cited by 20 cases

AI-generated. These summaries, headnotes, and key points are machine-generated and may contain errors or omissions. Always verify against the full opinion text below. Not legal advice.

Synopsis

Rodney Roseboro appealed his probation revocation after being found guilty of violating the terms of his probation by providing false information to his probation officer. The court affirmed the revocation, holding that his willful misrepresentation of his identity and criminal history constituted a substantial violation justifying revocation.


Holding

The court affirmed that the appellant's conduct constituted a substantial violation of probation. The state must prove by greater weight of the evidence that a probationer's actions were willful and substantial to revoke probation, and the evidence here showed willful misrepresentation of name, family members' names, and prior criminal record, which constitutes a substantial violation.


Headnotes

[1] A probationer's willful misrepresentation of their name, family members' names, and prior criminal record constitutes a substantial violation of probation conditions.

[2] To revoke probation, the state must prove by the greater weight of the evidence that the probationer's actions were willful and substantial.

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Key Quotes

“in order to revoke probation the state must prove by the greater weight of the evidence that the probationer's actions were "willful and substantial."”

Establishes the legal standard for probation revocation that the court applied

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Facts & Procedural History

Roseboro was placed on two-year probation after pleading guilty to second-degree grand theft. Approximately one month later, he was charged with viola…

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Opinion of the Court
SCHOONOVER, Judge.

SCHOONOVER, Judge.

The appellant, Rodney Roseboro, a/k/a Dennis Smith, challenges the judgment and sentence imposed upon him after he was found guilty of violating his probation. We affirm.

The appellant, under the name of Dennis Smith, was originally placed on two years probation after pleading guilty to the offense of second degree grand theft in violation of section 812.014(2)(b), Florida Statutes (1985). Approximately one month later, he was charged with violating his probation.

At the subsequent probation revocation hearing, the appellant’s probation officer, Lisa White, testified that after the appellant had been advised of all of the terms and conditions of his probation, he violated condition eight by answering her inquiries untruthfully. As to condition eight, the appellant’s true name was Rodney Rose-boro, but he had advised Ms. White that his name was Dennis Smith and gave her other false information concerning the names of his family members. Ms. White also testified that the appellant informed her that he had never been arrested or in trouble as an adult. The state next called the appellant’s parole officer as a witness. At that point, the appellant stipulated that he had been on parole for another crime when his probation officer executed the violation of probation affidavit. The appellant, testifying on his own behalf, admitted that his true name was Rodney Roseboro, and said that he had used the name Dennis Smith as an alias when he had been arrested in the past. He denied ever lying to his probation officer. At the conclusion of the hearing, the trial court found the appellant guilty of violating the terms and conditions of his probation, revoked his probation, and imposed a guidelines sentence of five years in prison. This timely appeal followed.

The appellant does not challenge the trial court's finding that he violated the conditions of his probation. Rather, he contends that the violations were technical, trivial, and not substantial. We agree that in order to revoke probation the state must prove by the greater weight of the evidence that the probationer's actions were “willful and substantial.” Molina v. State, 520 So. 2d 320 (Fla. 2d DCA 1988); Drayton v. State, 490 So. 2d 229 (Fla. 2d DCA 1986); Wheeler v. State, 344 So. 2d 630 (Fla. 2d DCA 1977). In this case, however, there was sufficient evidence presented to the trial court to show that the appellant willfully misrepresented his name, the names of his family members, and his prior criminal record. We find that such conduct constituted a “substantial” violation of condition eight of the appellant’s probation. Cf. Jones v. State, 479 So. 2d 285 (Fla. 2d DCA 1985) (failure to file written reports and failure to follow probation officer’s instructions may be considered substantial violations). See also, Roth v. State, 406 So. 2d 121 (Fla. 2d DCA 1981). The trial court, therefore, did not abuse its discretion in revoking the appellant’s probation.

Affirmed.

DANAHY, A.C.J., and PARKER, J., concur.


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Citator

Cited By

  • Garcia v. State, 701 So. 2d 607 (Fla. 2d DCA 1997)
    …v. State, 529 So. 2d 726 (Fla. 2d DCA 1988). The State has the burden of proving by the greater weight of the evidence that the probationer’s actions amounted to a willful and substantial violation of a condition of probation. See Roseboro v. State, 528 So. 2d 499 (Fla. 2d DCA 1988). Although hearsay is admissible in evidence at a probation revocation hearing, a revocation of probation may not be based solely upon hearsay evidence. See Kipp v. State, 657 So. 2d 931 (Fla. 2d DCA 1995); McCrary v. State, 464 So…
  • Gammon v. State, 778 So. 2d 390 (Fla. 2d DCA 2001)
    …admission that he had gone to North Carolina, this evidence was sufficient to create a strong inference that he had moved without permission. Because probation violations need be proven by only a preponderance of the evidence, see Roseboro v. State, 528 So. 2d 499 (Fla. 2d DCA 1988), the evidence was sufficient for the court to find a violation of condition 3. We note in closing that the revocation order cites four violations of condition 5 as a basis for revocation. At the hearing the trial judge stated tha…
  • Rowan v. State, 696 So. 2d 842 (Fla. 2d DCA 1997)
    …ate, 529 So. 2d 726, 727 (Fla. 2d DCA 1988). The state has the burden of proving by the greater weight of the evidence that the probationer’s actions amounted to a willful and substantial violation of a condition of probation. See Roseboro v. State, 528 So. 2d 499 (Fla. 2d DCA 1988). Although hearsay is admissible in evidence at a probation revocation hearing, a revocation of probation may not be based solely upon hearsay evidence. See Kipp v. State, 657 So. 2d 931 (Fla. 2d DCA 1995). In Brown v. State, 659…

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