JOYCE H. WOOD, APPELLANT,
v.
MATTHEW W. WOOD, APPELLEE
AI-generated. These summaries, headnotes, and key points are machine-generated and may contain errors or omissions. Always verify against the full opinion text below. Not legal advice.
Joyce Wood appeals a divorce judgment that awarded her rehabilitative alimony and control of her IRA to her former husband. The appellate court reversed, holding that permanent alimony was appropriate given her age, health, and inability to work, and that her IRA should remain under her control.
The trial court abused its discretion by awarding rehabilitative alimony instead of permanent alimony, as there was no evidence the wife could be rehabilitated to self-sufficiency. The award based on a percentage of gross income was improper as it did not account for the wife's actual needs or the husband's ability to pay. The wife's IRA should not have been transferred to the husband's control.
[1] A trial court abuses its discretion by awarding rehabilitative alimony when there is no showing that a spouse can be rehabilitated to become self-supporting.
[2] An award of alimony based on a percentage of a party's gross income is improper when not based on the needs of the recipient spouse or the ability to pay of the payor spo…
Previewing 2 of 4 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“There was no showing that Mrs. Wood can be rehabilitated to become self-supporting. Sever v. Sever, 467 So.2d 492 (Fla. 2d DCA 1985). Therefore, it was error to award rehabilitative alimony, rather than permanent alimony.”
Establishes the legal standard that permanent alimony is required when rehabilitation is not possible
Previewing 1 of 3 key quotes on this case — the court’s exact language, pinpointed for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceThe parties were married for 37 years. Joyce Wood, age 57, was a homemaker throughout the marriage and has serious health problems that preclude emplo…
The full statement of facts, procedural history, and disposition for this case are member content.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence© FLexlaw, Inc. — AI-generated enrichments are proprietary. All rights reserved.
Explore caselaw by topic → Browse Defined Benefit Plan cases and more on FLexlaw
PER CURIAM.
Joyce H. Wood appeals from a final judgment of dissolution of marriage. We find that the trial court erred by not awarding permanent alimony and in transferring control of her IRA account to her former husband.
The parties were married for thirty-seven years. The wife is fifty-seven years old. She has had a series of health problems which, according to her physician, will preclude her from ever maintaining gainful employment. During the marriage, the wife was a homemaker, working only briefly outside the home. The parties raised seven children, none of whom are now minors. The wife has virtually no assets in her own name other than an IRA worth approximately $11,000, although the husband and wife jointly owned several marital assets of substantial value.
The husband is sixty years old and is the sole owner and only employee of M.W. Wood and Company, Inc., which engages in bank consultation. His income from this company has varied considerably in recent years, but he testified that he expects approximately $100,000 yearly over the next few years. The husband has established a "defined benefit pension plan” through his company which is now fully funded and requires no further contributions. The pension plan will yield $52,000 per year upon his retirement at age 65. The husband owns substantial assets in his own name and is in good health.
The final judgment awarded the wife rehabilitative alimony consisting of one-half of the husband’s monthly gross income, exclusive of social security taxes, for thirty-six months, or until the husband’s retirement, the death of either party or the wife’s remarriage.
We find that the trial court abused its discretion in failing to award permanent alimony to the wife. There was no showing that Mrs. Wood can be rehabilitated to become self-supporting. Sever v. Sever, 467 So. 2d 492 (Fla. 2d DCA 1985). Therefore, it was error to award rehabilitative alimony, rather than permanent alimony. The trial court also erred in awarding the wife one-half of the gross income of the husband’s business, instead of a specific amount, as this award is not based on either her needs or the husband’s ability to pay. Canakaris v. Canakaris, 382 So. 2d 1197 (Fla.1980).
We also agree with the wife’s contention that the court erred in allowing her IRA account to be managed by the husband. See Neff v. Neff, 386 So. 2d 318, 319-320 (Fla. 2d DCA 1980). On remand, the trial court should strike this provision of the final judgment.
Because it appears from the final judgment that the husband’s pension plan was intended to provide permanent periodic alimony to the wife upon the husband’s retirement, the trial court shall have the authority upon remand to revisit that provision of the final judgment when establishing the amount of permanent periodic alimony. See Dwyer v. Dwyer, 513 So. 2d 1325 (Fla. 2d DCA 1987).
We have considered the wife’s remaining points on appeal and find them to be without merit.
Reversed in part and remanded with directions that the final judgment be modified consistent with this opinion.
SCHOONOVER, A.C.J., and HALL and THREADGILL, JJ., concur.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Cited By
-
Campbell v. State, 543 So. 2d 885 (Fla. 1st DCA 1989)…s order denying the motion, we do so without prejudice to appellant’s right to seek post-conviction relief after disposition of the direct appeal and the return of jurisdiction to the lower court. State v. Meneses, 392 So. 2d at 907; Brown v. State, 528 So. 2d 508 (Fla. 1st DCA 1988); Sumpter v. State, 523 So. 2d 806 (Fla. 3d DCA 1988); Libby v. State, 520 So. 2d 322 (Fla. 2d DCA 1988). BOOTH, WIGGINTON and BARFIELD, JJ., concur.…
Authorities Cited
- Canakaris v. Canakaris, 382 So. 2d 1197 (Fla. 1980)
- Sever v. Sever, 467 So. 2d 492 (Fla. 2d DCA 1985)
- Neff v. Neff, 386 So. 2d 318 (Fla. 2d DCA 1980)
- Dwyer v. Dwyer, 513 So. 2d 1325 (Fla. 2d DCA 1987)