TYRONE DAVIS, A/K/A TYRONE WILLIAMS, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE

Fla. 2d DCA | 1988-07-20
No. 86-1680
SCHOONOVER, A.C.J., and PARKER, J., concur.
528 So. 2d 521 Florida District Court of Appeal, Second District (1988) Negative Treatment
Cited by 28 cases

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Holding

The court held that the trial court erred in sentencing the defendant beyond the statutory maximum for the offenses committed.


Facts & Procedural History

The defendant pleaded nolo contendere to grand theft and burglary of a conveyance and was sentenced as a youthful offender. The sentence imposed excee…

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Opinion of the Court
THREADGILL, Judge.

THREADGILL, Judge.

Tyrone Davis appeals his sentence for grand theft and burglary of a conveyance. We find that the trial court erred in sentencing Davis beyond the maximum authorized by statute and remand for resentencing.

Pursuant to a plea agreement, Davis pled nolo contendere to grand theft and burglary of a conveyance occurring on November 12, 1985 and March 10, 1986 respectively, and was sentenced as a youthful offender to four years imprisonment to be followed by two years community control on each charge to run concurrently. Grand theft and burglary of a conveyance, as charged in the information, are both third-degree felonies punishable by a maximum five years imprisonment. When the trial judge imposed four years imprisonment followed by two years of community control concurrently on each charge, he exceeded the statutory maximum. State v. Milbry, 476 So. 2d 1281 (Fla.1985). See Committee Note to Fla.R.Crim.P. 3.701(d)(12).

Davis argues that the trial judge erred in failing to provide written reasons for departing from the guidelines and for imposing adult sanctions pursuant to section 39.111(6)(d), Fla.Stat. (1985). Because the adjudication was entered pursuant to a plea agreement, however, we find the need for such written reasons has been obviated. See Johnson v. State, 458 So. 2d 850 (Fla. 2d DCA 1984); Green v. State, 460 So. 2d 378 (Fla. 2d DCA 1984). See also State v. Rhoden, 448 So. 2d 1013 (Fla.1984).

We, therefore, affirm the convictions, but remand for resentencing within the statutory maximum sentences.

Remand for resentencing.

SCHOONOVER, A.C.J., and PARKER, J., concur.


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Citator

Cited By (14 total)

  • Judge v. State, 596 So. 2d 73 (Fla. 2d DCA 1991)
    …8 So. 2d 1013 (Fla.1984). Even though this error is fundamental, we have held that it must be raised on direct appeal and cannot be raised as error in a subsequent appeal. Griffin v. State, 519 So. 2d 677 (Fla. 2d DCA 1988); see also Davis v. State, 528 So. 2d 521 (Fla. 2d DCA 1988) (findings are an aspect of the sentencing procedure that can be waived by a plea agreement accepted by the trial court). Likewise, scoresheet errors that are not apparent from the face of the scoresheet may result in an erroneous…
  • Sirmons v. State, 620 So. 2d 1249 (Fla. 1993)
    …a firearm conviction.5 The court [*1251] failed to express in writing the specific findings of fact and reasons for the decision to impose adult sanctions. On appeal, the district court per curiam affirmed Simons’ sentence based on Davis v. State, 528 So. 2d 521 (Fla.2d DCA), review denied, 536 So. 2d 243 (Fla.1988). In Davis, the Second District Court of Appeal held that a negotiated plea agreement obviated the need for the court to make the written findings and reasons for imposing adult sanctions on a ju…
    1 / 2
  • Lang v. State, 566 So. 2d 1354 (Fla. 5th DCA 1990)
    …509 So. 2d at 1351. See also Rathbone v. State, 448 So. 2d 85 (Fla. 2d DCA 1984); Dixon v. State, 451 So. 2d 485 (Fla. 3d DCA), rev. denied, 458 So. 2d 274 (Fla.1984). See Taylor v. State 534 So. 2d 1181 (Fla. 4th DCA 1988). But see Davis v. State, 528 So. 2d 521 (Fla. 2d DCA), rev. denied, 536 So. 2d 243 (Fla.1988). A juvenile can waive his rights under section 39.111 but such a waiver must be manifest either in the plea agreement or on the record. We can find no waiver in the present case. Here the record…

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