CORAL SPRINGS ROOFING COMPANY, INC., APPELLANT,
v.
MR. G.S. CAMPAGNA, APPELLEE
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Coral Springs Roofing Company appealed a circuit court order awarding attorney's fees to G.S. Campagna. The Florida District Court of Appeal held that the circuit court departed from the essential requirements of law by awarding fees without statutory or contractual authorization, and quashed the fee award.
The circuit court departed from the essential requirements of law in awarding attorney's fees. Attorney's fees are not taxable and may be granted only when specifically authorized by statute or contract. The contract entitled only Coral to attorney's fees, Campagna relied on no statute, and general principles of equity do not authorize such fees. Additionally, under section 57.105, fees cannot be awarded to an appellant who lost in the lower tribunal because the appellee's position necessarily contained justiciable issues.
[1] Attorney's fees are generally not taxable and are only awarded when specifically authorized by statute or contract.
[2] A party seeking attorney's fees based on general principles of equity is not entitled to such fees.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“The general rule is that attorney's fees are not taxable and will be granted only when specifically authorized by statute or contract.”
Establishes the fundamental legal principle governing attorney's fee awards
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceCoral Springs Roofing Company and G.S. Campagna were parties to a contract. Coral was successful in county court, and Campagna appealed to the circuit…
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PER CURIAM.
This is a Fastrack appeal from an order rendered on December 23, 1987. The circuit court, sitting in its appellate capacity, awarded attorney’s fees to G.S. Campagna, appellant below. .Coral Springs Roofing Company, Inc. (Coral) appellee below, filed an appeal to this court. As certiorari is the proper remedy, we elect to treat this appeal as a petition for writ of certiorari pursuant to rule 9.040(c), Florida Rules of Appellate Procedure. The issue on certiorari review is whether the circuit court departed from the essential requirements of law in awarding attorney’s fees. We find that it did. The general rule is that attorney’s fees are not taxable and will be granted only when specifically authorized by statute or contract. Citizens Federal Savings & Loan Association of St. Lucie County v. Loeb Rhoades, Hornblower & Co., 473 So. 2d 679 (Fla. 4th DCA 1984).
Campagna filed a motion in the circuit court seeking attorney’s fees based on general principles of equity. This does not entitle him to attorney’s fees. Furthermore, the contract between the parties entitles Coral, but not Campagna, to attorney’s fees in collection efforts. This leaves the question of whether any statutes entitle Campagna to recover fees. No statute was relied on by Campagna in his request for fees, or by the circuit court in awarding them. Coral correctly states that the only possible statutory basis to support the award could be found in section 57.105, Florida Statutes (1987). This section authorizes awards of attorney’s fees to the prevailing party in any civil action in which the court finds that there was a complete absence of a justiciable issue of either law or fact raised by the losing party. Essentially, to award such fees, the court must find that the losing party’s position was frivolous. McNee v. Biz, 473 So. 2d 5 (Fla. 4th DCA 1985).
However, where a party wins a judgment or ruling in the lower tribunal and it is appealed, and where that party is unsuccessful on appeal, the appellate court could not award section 57.105 fees to the successful appellant. That is because, as a matter of law, the appellee’s position contained a justiciable issue of law or fact. The judgment of the trial court carries with it a presumption of correctness. Applegate v. Barnett Bank of Tallahassee, 377 So. 2d 1150 (Fla.1979). Defense of that judgment also by necessity involves the advancement of justiciable issues. See Enoch Associates, Inc. v. Moult Investments, Ltd., 404 So. 2d 798 (Fla. 3d DCA 1981).
Here, Coral was successful in the county court, and on appeal to the circuit court, it merely sought to uphold the county court’s ruling. As such, it cannot be found that Campagna was entitled to recover attorney’s fees after being successful on appeal to the county court. The defense of that county court ruling could not be labeled frivolous under section 57.105.
Thus, the circuit court departed from the essential requirements of law when it awarded attorney’s fees.
Accordingly, we grant certiorari and quash the award of attorney’s fees.
HERSEY, C.J., and DOWNEY and LETTS, JJ., concur.
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Boca Burger, Inc. v. Forum, 912 So. 2d 561 (Fla. 2005)…v. Salter, 710 So. 2d 1039, 1041 (Fla. 2d DCA 1998) (holding that because the judgment of a trial court carries a presumption of correctness, defense of that judgment necessarily presents a justiciable issue); Coral Springs Roofing Co. v. Campagna, 528 So. 2d 557, 558 (Fla. 4th DCA 1988) (same); McNee v. Biz, 473 So. 2d 5, 6 (Fla. 4th DCA 1985) (holding that the appellate court could not award fees under section 57.105 against an appellee that did not cross-appeal the trial court’s order because, as a matter…
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Carnival Leisure Indus. Ltd. v. Arviv, 655 So. 2d 177 (Fla. 3d DCA 1995)…e successful appellant. That is because, as a matter of law, the appellee’s position contained a jus-ticiable issue of law or fact. The judgment of the trial court carries with it a presumption of correctness. Coral Springs Roofing Co. v. Campagna, 528 So. 2d 557, 558 (Fla. 4th DCA 1988) (citation omitted); cf. Fairview Properties, Inc. v. Pate Constr. Co., 638 So. 2d at 1000 (Denial of attorney’s fees pursuant to section 57.105 was correct where plaintiff “was not the losing party until it did not prevail o…
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Carnival Leisure Indus., Ltd. v. Holzman, 660 So. 2d 410 (Fla. 4th DCA 1995)…at is because, as a matter of law, the appellee’s position contained a justiciable issue of law or fact. The judgment of the trial court carries with it a presumption of correctness, [citations omitted]. Coral Springs Roofing Co., Inc. v. Campagna, 528 So. 2d 557, 558 (Fla. 4th DCA 1988). Furthermore, when Carnival filed the complaint in the instant case, no appellate decision had been rendered squarely addressing the “change in public policy” argument. After the Third District and this court addressed this…
Previewing 3 of 7 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Pitcher v. Schneider (Fla. 5th DCA 2018)
- Albert v. Applegate et ux., 377 So. 2d 1150 (Fla. 1979)
- Citizens Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n OF ST. Lucie Cnty. v. Loeb Rhoades, 473 So. 2d 679 (Fla. 4th DCA 1984)
- Melton v. State, 404 So. 2d 798 (Fla. 3d DCA 1981)
- McNEE v. BIZ, 473 So. 2d 5 (Fla. 4th DCA 1985)
- Enoch Assocs., Inc. v. Moult Invs., Ltd., 404 So. 2d 798 (Fla. 3d DCA 1981)