WILLIAMS
v.
ROYAL DUTCH GAS STATION
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Williams sought reconsideration of a dismissal under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g) by arguing she qualified for the imminent-danger exception based on mental illness diagnoses. The district court rejected this argument, holding that allegations of psychological or mental health conditions, without more, cannot satisfy the imminent-danger exception which requires specific, credible allegations of imminent physical harm.
Allegations of mental illness alone are insufficient to meet the imminent-danger exception to § 1915(g). The exception requires specific, credible allegations of imminent danger of serious physical harm, not psychological or emotional injuries. Accordingly, the motion for reconsideration was denied.
“Plaintiff's allegation that she suffers from mental illness, without more, is insufficient to meet the 'imminent-danger' exception to § 1915(g).”
States the core holding that psychological conditions alone cannot satisfy the statutory exception.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligencePlaintiff Williams filed a case against Royal Dutch Gas Station. Her case was dismissed under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g), which requires litigants proceeding…
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Before the Court is Plaintiff's "Motion to Pay" (Doc. 12), which the Court construes as a motion to reconsider the order dismissing this case under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g) (see Doc. 3). Plaintiff argues she meets the “imminent-danger" exception to § 1915(g) because she suffers from depression, PTSD, and "schizobipolar." But Plaintiff's allegation that she suffers from mental illness, without more, is insufficient to meet the "imminent-danger" exception to § 1915(g). See, e.g., Clay v. Martin, 2023 WL 2733387, at *3 (M.D. Ga. Mar. 31, 2023) (“[E]motional or psychological injuries are not physical injuries and therefore cannot satisfy the requirements of § 1915(g).") (citing Sanders v. Melvin, 873 F. 3d 957, 960 (7th Cir. 2017) (prisoner's allegations of "deteriorating mental state” insufficient to satisfy the § 1915(g) exception because "[m]ental deterioration. . .is a psychological rather than a physical problem”); Mathews v. Streeit, 2024 WL 1589499, at *2 (N.D. Fla. Mar. 21, 2024), report and recommendation
1
adopted, 2024 WL 1585932 (N.D. Fla. Apr. 11, 2024) (“The [imminent-danger] exception requires a showing of specific, credible allegations of imminent-danger of serious physical harm.") (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). Accordingly, Plaintiff provides no basis for the Court to reconsider the dismissal under § 1915(g). Plaintiff's "Motion to Pay” (Doc. 12) is therefore DENIED. DONE and ORDERED in Tampa, Florida on June 25, 2024.
Charlene Edwards Honeywell Charlene Edwards Honeywell United States District Judge
Copies to: Plaintiff, pro se 2