LAWRENCE
v.
RIVER DISTRICT FLORALS, LLC
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This is a stipulated dismissal order in a civil case where the parties jointly agreed to dismiss counts I and II with prejudice and count III without prejudice. The court approved the dismissal pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(a)(1)(A)(ii), which allows voluntary dismissal when all parties have signed a stipulation.
The parties may voluntarily dismiss the action by stipulated agreement signed by all parties. Counts I and II are dismissed with prejudice and count III is dismissed without prejudice effective upon filing, with no further court action required.
[1] A voluntary dismissal of an action is effective upon filing when a stipulation of dismissal is signed by all parties who have appeared, requiring no further court action.
[2] Parties may terminate an action brought under the Fair Labor Standards Act by filing a Rule 41(a)(1)(A)(ii) stipulation of dismissal with prejudice.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(a)(1)(A)(ii) allows a plaintiff to dismiss an action voluntarily if a stipulation of dismissal is signed by all parties who have appeared. The dismissal is effective upon filing and requires no further action by the court.”
Establishes the legal basis for voluntary dismissal by stipulation and its automatic effectiveness
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceThe parties to this case—Lawrence (plaintiff) and River District Florals, LLC, I Dew Events, LLC, Rachel Groman-Dew, and Christopher Dew (defendants)—…
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Before the court is the parties' joint stipulation of dismissal with prejudice. (Doc. 42). Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(a)(1)(A)(ii) allows a plaintiff to dismiss an action voluntarily if a stipulation of dismissal is signed by all parties who have appeared. The dismissal is effective upon filing and requires no further action by the court. See Anago Franchising, Inc. v. Shaz, LLC, 677 F. 3d 1272, 1278 (11th Cir. 2012); see also Casso-Lopez v. Beach Time Rental Suncoast, LLC, 335 F.R.D. 458, 461-62 (M.D. Fla. 2020) (holding parties may terminate an FLSA case by filing either a Rule 41(a)(1)(A)(ii) stipulation of dismissal with prejudice or a Rule 68(a) notice of acceptance of an offer of judgment “and the district court is immediately powerless to interfere"). "Rule 68 applies in actions brought under the Fair Labor Standards Act no less than in any other case,” Vasconcelo v. Miami Auto Max, Inc.,
981 F. 3d 934, 942 (11th Cir. 2020), and there is “no distinction" between the operation of Rule 41(a)(1)(A)(ii) and Rule 68 in an FLSA action. Casso-Lopez, 335 F.R.D. at 462.
The parties stipulate to dismissing counts I and II of the complaint with prejudice and count III without prejudice. The parties further stipulate to a tolling of the statute of limitations for the duration of this action and a period of 30 days after dismissal, and each party is to bear its own costs and attorney's fees. Accordingly, counts I and II are dismissed with prejudice, and count III is dismissed without prejudice. The clerk is directed to enter judgment, terminate any scheduled events, and close the file.
ORDERED on April 23, 2024.
NICHOLAS P. MIZELL United States Magistrate Judge
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Citator
Authorities Cited
- Anago Franchising, Inc. v. Shaz, LLC, 677 F.3d 1272 (11th Cir. 2012)
- Vasconcelo v. Miami Auto Max, Inc., 981 F.3d 934 (11th Cir. 2020)