RALPH JACKSON, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
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The court held that the trial court did not err in assessing public defender costs after the defendant waived a hearing, but other costs were improperly assessed without statutory authority and notice.
The defendant was convicted of grand theft and appealed the imposition of costs. He argued the trial court improperly placed the burden on him to seek…
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SCHEB, Judge.
Ralph Jackson, the defendant, was convicted of second degree grand theft. On appeal he raises three points, only one which we find meritorious.
Jackson argues that the imposition of costs on him was improper. At the sentencing, the trial judge said that she was “going to assess an amount for a public defender’s lien ... or I will set a hearing.” After conferring with Jackson, the defense counsel announced that Jackson felt that the amount set for the public defender was fair and reasonable and he would waive a formal hearing. Jackson argues that the trial court placed on him the burden of seeking a hearing to question or object to the imposition of costs. We think the record indicates that no such burden was imposed. Rather, we find that Jackson expressly waived his right to a hearing on the public defender’s lien. Therefore, we find no error in the court’s assessment of the costs for the public defender’s services.
In assessing the other costs, however, the trial judge failed to cite statutory authority pursuant to which the costs were imposed. Jenkins v. State, 444 So. 2d 947 (Fla.1984). The state did not give Jackson notice of the assessments, and there was no stipulation by Jackson as to their correctness. Therefore, we direct that the assessments be stricken without prejudice to the state seeking reassessment of costs after proper statutory notice to Jackson.
Accordingly, we affirm Jackson’s conviction and sentence and the $250 assessment for the public defender’s services. We remand to the trial court to strike the remaining costs.
CAMPBELL, C.J., and LEHAN, J., concur.
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Citator
Cited By
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Watts v. State, 973 So. 2d 1271 (Fla. 2d DCA 2008)…sts of $218.75. Further, the record reflects that before imposing the costs the trial court offered to have a hearing on the issue. Because Watts stipulated to the costs and waived a further hearing, we affirm as to this issue. See Jackson v. State, 529 So. 2d 320, 320 (Fla. 2d DCA 1988); Mitchell v. State, 678 So. 2d 1362, 1365 (Fla. 1st DCA 1996). Accordingly, we affirm Watts’ convictions and sentences except as to the fíne and costs that are stricken as stated above. On remand, the trial court may reimpos…
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Streams v. State, 690 So. 2d 736 (Fla. 4th DCA 1997)…t that any assessments of costs had been made. Since the record does not specify the statutory authority for imposing the costs, we strike the costs imposed on Appellant. Sutton v. State, 635 So. 2d 1032, 1033 (Fla. 2d DCA 1994); Jackson v. State, 529 So. 2d 320, 321 (Fla. 2d DCA 1988). On remand, however, the State may seek reassessment of such costs. Sutton, 635 So. 2d at 1033. The statutorily mandated court costs may be sought by providing the proper statutory authority to support the cost assessment. Id…
Authorities Cited
- Jenkins v. State, 444 So. 2d 947 (Fla. 1984)