ALICIA CAMACHO, APPELLANT,
v.
PEOPLES BANK OF LAKELAND, AS PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVE OF THE ESTATE OF JOSE J. ROSADO, APPELLEE

Fla. 2d DCA | 1988-08-10
No. 88-250
CAMPBELL, C.J., and LEHAN, J., concur.
529 So. 2d 360 Florida District Court of Appeal, Second District (1988) Positive Treatment
Cited by 8 cases
Opinion of the Court
HALL, Judge.

HALL, Judge.

The appellant contends that the trial court erred in granting the appellee personal representative an extension of time to refile its objection to the claim of the appellant. We do not. agree.

It is within the broad discretion of the trial court to grant or deny an extension of time, and the exercise of that discretion will usually be upheld unless it is totally unreasonable. In re Estate of Robins, 463 So. 2d 273 (Fla. 2d DCA 1984); Baldwin v. Lewis, 397 So. 2d 985 (Fla. 3d DCA 1981).

Affirmed.

CAMPBELL, C.J., and LEHAN, J., concur.

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    …eir mobile homes) to ad valorem taxes while exempting another class of mobile home owners (those who lease the land beneath their mobile homes) from such taxes. The constitutionality of section 193.075 was first considered in Nordbeck v. Wilkinson, 529 So. 2d 360 (Fla. 2d DCA 1988). There, the court held [P]laintiff first contends that ad valorem taxation of his mobile home was improper in light of article VII, section 1(b) of the 1968 Florida Constitution which provides that “mobile homes, as defined by la…
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