SANTIAGO

v.

LIZENBEE

I. Status

Plaintiff Benito Santiago, an inmate of the Florida Department of Corrections (FDOC), initiated this action by filing a pro se Civil Rights Complaint (Doc. 1; Complaint) under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Santiago names two Defendants: (1) Officer Dalton Lizenbee and (2) Sergeant Jarrod Jackson. Id. at 2. He asserts claims of excessive force and deliberate indifference to his serious medical needs. Id. at 4. As relief, he requests compensatory and punitive damages. Id. at 7. This matter is before the Court on Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 10; Motion). Santiago filed a response to the Motion (Doc. 11; Response). The Motion is ripe for review. II. Santiago’s Allegations¹ Santiago alleges that on November 26, 2022, Defendant Lizenbee slammed Santiago’s hands in the cell door flap and applied pressure with an intent to cause Santiago bodily harm. Complaint at 4. According to Santiago, after Lizenbee used this excessive force, he refused to report Santiago’s injuries to medical and left him unattended in his cell for hours. Id. Santiago contends the incident caused his hands to become swollen and during the master roster head count, he tried to tell Defendant Jackson he had a medical emergency. Id. Santiago alleges Jackson refused to call medical or assist Santiago in getting treatment and instead covered up Lizenbee’s actions. According to Santiago,

Defendants’ actions violated his rights under the Eighth Amendment. Id. at 3. He requests $50,000 in punitive damages and $50,000 in “actual damages” against each Defendant. Id. at 7.

III. Motion to Dismiss Standard

In ruling on a motion to dismiss, the Court must accept the factual allegations set forth in the complaint as true. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009); Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 534 U.S. 506, 508 n.1 (2002); see

550 U.S. at 570. “A claim has facial plausibility when the pleaded factual content allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556).

A “plaintiff’s obligation to provide the grounds of his entitlement to relief requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do[.]” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 (internal quotations omitted); see also Jackson, 372 F. 3d at 1262 (explaining that

“conclusory allegations, unwarranted deductions of facts or legal conclusions masquerading as facts will not prevent dismissal”) (quotations, citation, and original alteration omitted). Indeed, “the tenet that a court must accept as true all of the allegations contained in a complaint is inapplicable to legal conclusions[,]” which simply “are not entitled to [an] assumption of truth.”

Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678, 680. Thus, in ruling on a motion to dismiss, the Court must determine whether the complaint contains “sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face[.]’” Id. at 678 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570). And, while “[p]ro se pleadings are held to a less stringent standard than pleadings drafted by attorneys and will, therefore, be liberally construed,” Tannenbaum v. United States, 148 F. 3d 1262, 1263 (11th Cir. 1998), “‘this leniency does not give a court license to serve as de facto counsel for a party or to rewrite an otherwise deficient pleading in order to sustain an action.’” Campbell v. Air Jamaica Ltd., 760 F. 3d 1165, 1168- 69 (11th Cir. 2014) (quoting GJR Invs., Inc. v. Cnty. of Escambia, 132 F. 3d 1359, 1369 (11th Cir. 1998), overruled in part on other grounds as recognized in Randall, 610 F. 3d at 709).

IV. Discussion

Defendants raise two arguments in their Motion. First, they argue that Santiago’s Eighth Amendment claim against Defendant Jackson should be dismissed because Santiago did not exhaust his administrative remedies.²

Motion at 4-10. In his Response, Santiago acknowledges he did not exhaust his

(1) Prospective relief. – (A) Prospective relief in any civil action with respect to prison conditions shall extend no further than necessary to correct the violation of the Federal right of a particular plaintiff or plaintiffs. The court shall not grant or approve any prospective relief unless the court finds that such relief is narrowly drawn, extends no further than necessary to correct the violation of the Federal right, and is the least intrusive means necessary to correct the violation of the Federal right. The court shall give substantial weight to any adverse impact on public safety or the operation of a criminal justice system caused by the relief.

18 U.S.C.A. § 3626(a)(1)(A). Defendants are correct that punitive damages are considered “prospective relief” under § 3626. See Johnson v. Breeden, 280 F. 3d 1308, 1325 (11th Cir. 2002) (holding “punitive damages are prospective relief”), abrogated on other grounds by Kingsley v. Hendrickson, 576 U.S. 389, 395 (2015)). But their argument that punitive damages, as “prospective relief” under § 3626, are precluded in all prisoner civil actions is wholly misplaced. Indeed, they cite Johnson as their primary support for this notion, but Johnson did not hold that punitive damages were unavailable under § 3626 for § 1983 cases. Instead, in Johnson, the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals clarified, in the context of a § 1983 civil rights case, that § 3626(a)(1)(A) merely provides the framework for awarding punitive damages. Id. at 1325. It explained “a punitive damages award must be no larger than reasonably necessary to deter the kind of violations of the federal right that occurred in the case . . . [and] that such awards should be imposed against no more defendants than necessary to serve that deterrent function and that they are the least intrusive way of doing so.” Id. While the Court is unaware of an Eleventh Circuit case that has addressed Defendants’ specific argument here, the Court cannot disregard the

Eleventh Circuit’s long-standing recognition that punitive damages are available in prisoner civil rights actions. Indeed, the Eleventh Circuit has held that 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(e) permits claims for punitive damages for § 1983 claims without a physical injury requirement. Hoever v. Marks, 993 F. 3d 1353, 1364 (11th Cir. 2021).3 And it has held “[p]unitive damages are appropriate in § 1983 cases ‘where a defendant’s conduct is motivated by evil intent or involves callous or reckless indifference to federally protected rights.” Barnett v. MacArthur, 715 F. App’x 894, 905 (11th Cir. 2017).4 Also, the Eleventh Circuit

Civil Pattern Jury Instructions on § 1983 damages include an instruction on awarding punitive damages. See Eleventh Circuit Pattern Jury Instruction, Civil Cases, Civil Rights – 42 U.S.C. § 1983 Claims – Damages § 5.13. The Court also finds persuasive other district court decisions explicitly finding that § 3626(a)(1)(A) does not preclude an award of punitive damages in

United States District Judge

Jax-7 C: Benito Santiago, #M83000 Counsel of record