TURNER
v.
COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY
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The court granted the plaintiff's motion for attorney's fees under 42 U.S.C. § 406(b), awarding $13,175.50.
Plaintiff sought judicial review of a denial of disability benefits, which the court reversed and remanded. After remand, past-due benefits were award…
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Before the Court is the Plaintiff’s motion for attorney’s fees pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 406(b). (Doc. 36).2 For the reasons discussed below, the Plaintiff’s motion is granted.
I.
The Plaintiff initiated this action in January 2020 seeking judicial review of the Commissioner’s decision denying her application for Disability Insurance Benefits and
Judgment for the Plaintiff the same day. (Doc. 33). Roughly three months later, the Plaintiff sought and obtained $3,886.60 in attorney’s fees under the Equal Access to Justice Act (EAJA). (Docs. 34, 35). As a result of the subsequent proceedings on remand, the Plaintiff was granted past-due benefits. (Doc. 36-1). According to the letter authorizing this relief, the SSA withheld $13,175.50 of this past-due amount for a possible future award of attorney’s fees. Id. at 2. This figure equates to twenty-five percent of the Plaintiff’s past-due benefits, which is the statutory limit for such fee awards. See 42 U.S.C. § 406(b). By way of the instant motion, the Plaintiff now asks that the Court enter an order pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 406(b) approving fees in the amount of $13,175.50 for the services her attorney rendered in this action. (Doc. 36). This sum does not conflict with the Plaintiff’s fee agreement, as that agreement provides for a contingency fee of twenty-five percent of her past-due benefits. Id.; (Doc. 36-2). According to the Plaintiff, her counsel is aware of his obligation to reduce the $13,175.50 sum by the amount of the previous EAJA award of $3,886.60 in the event the Court grants her motion. (Doc. 36 at 8). The Commissioner does not object to the requested fee amount. (Doc. 38 at 1).
II.
Section 406(b) of Title 42, United States Code, governs the authorization of attorney’s fees in Social Security actions where, as here, a district court remands the matter to the Commissioner for further proceedings, and the Commissioner later grants the claimant past-due benefits. Bergen v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 454 F. 3d 1273, 1276–78 (11th Cir. 2006) (per curiam).3 Under such a scenario, the claimant may return to the district court—as the Plaintiff has done here—and ask for fees not exceeding twenty-five percent of the past-due benefits awarded. 42 U.S.C. § 406(b)(1)(A); Culbertson v. Berryhill, 586 U.S. ___, 139 S. Ct. 517, 522 (2019). The fee amount sought, however, must be reasonable. See Gisbrecht v. Barnhart, 535 U.S. 789, 808 (2002); Jackson v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 601 F. 3d 1268, 1271 (11th Cir. 2010). To ensure this is the case, section 406(b) mandates that a court conduct an independent review of a counsel’s fee arrangement with his client. Gisbrecht, 535 U.S. at 807. As part of its oversight role, a court may direct that an attorney supply “a record of the hours spent representing the claimant and a statement of the lawyer’s normal hourly billing charge for noncontingent-fee cases.” Id. at 808. A court may also require that the approved fee amount be offset by any previous fee award or by any fees due to counsel under a contingency fee arrangement. Id.; Jackson, 601 F. 3d at 1274.
36-3). This sum encompasses all the work the Plaintiff’s lawyer performed before the Court and is consistent with the Plaintiff’s contingency fee agreement, as the soughtafter figure equates to twenty-five percent of the total past-due benefits granted to the Plaintiff. (Docs. 36, 36-2, 36-3). In light of these facts, as well as the nature of the legal services rendered, the positive results achieved, and the Commissioner’s lack of opposition to the Plaintiff’s motion, the Court finds that the proposed fee amount is reasonable.
III.
Based upon the foregoing, it is hereby ORDERED:
1. The Plaintiff’s motion for attorney’s fees (Doc. 36) is granted, and the Plaintiff shall be awarded fees in the amount of $13,175.50 pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 406(b). This sum shall be paid to the Plaintiff’s lawyer from the past-due benefits currently being withheld by the Commissioner. 2. Upon receipt of these funds, Plaintiff's counsel shall promptly refund to the Plaintiff the previously authorized EAJA fee award of $3,886.60.
3. This action shall be closed and shall remain closed.
SO ORDERED in Tampa, Florida, this 29th day of September 2023.
One P Ant
HONORABLE CHRISTOPHER P. TUITE
United States Magistrate Judge Copies to: Counsel of record
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Authorities Cited
- Gisbrecht v. Barnhart, 535 U.S. 789 (U.S. 2002)
- Pervis L. Jackson v. Comm'r OF Soc. Sec., 601 F.3d 1268 (11th Cir. 2010)
- Bergen v. Comm'r OF Soc. Sec., 454 F.3d 1273 (11th Cir. 2006)
- Culbertson v. Berryhill, 139 S. Ct. 517 (U.S. 2019)