SCOCOZZO
v.
RHODEN
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The federal court must abstain from exercising jurisdiction over a pretrial detainee's habeas corpus petition challenging state bond revocation proceedings.
Petitioner, a pretrial detainee, filed a pro se petition for a writ of habeas corpus challenging the revocation of his bond in a pending state crimina…
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Petitioner, Anthony Scocozzo, a pretrial detainee at the Baker County Pretrial Detention Facility, initiated this case by filing a pro se Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus Under 28 U.S.C. § 2241. (Doc. 1). Petitioner is in pretrial custody for a pending state court criminal case in which the state of Florida is prosecuting Petitioner for two counts of aggravated stalking, written threats, and resisting officer without violence in State v. Scocozzo, No. 02-2022-CF- 000069 (Fla. 8th Cir. Ct.).1 Petitioner challenges the revocation of his bond or pretrial release. See Doc. 1. In support of his challenge, he raises four arguments. First, he argues
Under the purview of Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971), the Court must refrain from addressing Petitioner’s claims. Under Younger, a federal court should abstain from exercising jurisdiction when “(1) the proceedings constitute an ongoing state judicial proceeding, (2) the proceedings implicate important state interests, and (3) there is an adequate opportunity in the state proceedings to raise constitutional challenges.” Turner v. Broward Sheriff’s Off.,
542 F. App’x 764, 766 (11th Cir. 2013).2 There are “three narrow exceptions to the abstention doctrine: (1) there is evidence of state proceedings motivated by bad faith; (2) irreparable injury would occur; or (3) there is no adequate alternative state forum where the constitutional issues can be raised.” Johnson v. Florida, 32 F. 4th 1092, 1099 (11th Cir. 2022). “When a petitioner seeks federal habeas relief prior to a pending state criminal trial the petitioner must satisfy the ‘Younger abstention hurdles’ before the federal courts can grant such relief.” Hughes v. Att’y Gen. of Fla., 377 F. 3d 1258, 1262 (11th Cir. 2004) (quoting Kolski v. Watkins, 544 F. 2d 762, 766 (5th Cir. 1977)); see also Wexler v. Lepore, 385 F. 3d 1336, 1339 (11th Cir. 2004) (“[T]he [Younger] doctrine usually applies in cases involving criminal prosecution or the criminal justice system.”). Here, Petitioner has an ongoing state criminal prosecution; thus, the Court must dismiss the Petition unless Petitioner can demonstrate one of the
“three narrow exceptions” to the Younger doctrine. See Lewis v. Broward Cnty. Sheriff's Off., No. 20-14603, 2021 WL 5217718, at *2 (11th Cir. Nov. 9, 2021)
Petitioner wishes to pursue this issue in state court, he should confer with his court-appointed attorney or voice his concerns with the state court at the next scheduled pretrial status hearing. It is, therefore,
ORDERED AND ADJUDGED:
1. This case is DISMISSED without prejudice.
2. The Clerk shall enter judgment dismissing this case without prejudice, terminate any pending motions, and close the file.
DONE AND ORDERED at Jacksonville, Florida, this 15th day of September, 2023.
Cirmotheg Corrig oN Ww TIMOTHY J. CORRIGAN United States District Judge
Jax-7
C: Anthony Scocozzo
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Authorities Cited
- Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (U.S. 1971)
- McNamara v. Gov't Emps. Ins. Co., 30 F.4th 1055 (11th Cir. 2022)
- Hughes v. Attorney General OF Florida, 377 F.3d 1258 (11th Cir. 2004)
- Johnson v. State, 32 F.4th 1092 (11th Cir. 2022)
- Wexler v. Lepore, 385 F.3d 1336 (11th Cir. 2004)
- Kolski v. Garland Watkins, 544 F.2d 762 (5th Cir. 1977)