JEAN-PHILIPPE

v.

SECRETARY, FLORIDA DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS (DUVAL COUNTY)

I. Status

Petitioner Lesly Jean-Philippe, an inmate of the Florida penal system, initiated this action by filing a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (Petition; Doc. 1).1 He proceeds on a Second Amended Petition (Doc. 7) with attachments (Docs. 7-1 through 7-2). In the Second Amended Petition, Jean-Philippe challenges a 2011 state court (Duval County, Florida) judgment of conviction for first-degree murder and aggravated battery. He raises three grounds for relief. See Second Amended Petition at 8-23. Respondents have submitted a memorandum, arguing that the action is

Docs. 9-1 through 9-10. Jean-Philippe filed a brief in reply.² See Reply (Doc. 12). This action is ripe for review.

II. One-Year Limitations Period

The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA) imposes a one-year statute of limitations on petitions for writ of habeas corpus. Specifically, 28 U.S.C. § 2244 provides: (d)(1) A 1-year period of limitation shall apply to an application for a writ of habeas corpus by a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court. The limitation period shall run from the latest of—

(A) the date on which the judgment became final by the conclusion of direct review or the expiration of the time for seeking such review;

(B) the date on which the impediment to filing an application created by State action in violation of the Constitution or laws of the United States is removed, if the applicant was prevented from filing

(C) the date on which the constitutional right asserted was initially recognized by the Supreme Court, if the right has been newly recognized by the Supreme Court and made retroactively applicable to cases on collateral review; or

(D) the date on which the factual predicate of the claim or claims presented could have been discovered through the exercise of due diligence.

(2) The time during which a properly filed application for State post-conviction or other collateral review with respect to the pertinent judgment or claim is pending shall not be counted toward any period of limitation under this subsection.

28 U.S.C. § 2244(d).

III. The Mailbox Rule

Respondents contend that Jean-Philippe has not complied with the oneyear limitations period set forth in § 2244(d). See Response at 1. According to Respondents, Jean-Philippe’s Petition was not filed until July 14, 2020, when it was “receive[d]” by the Court. See Response at 5-6. However, Jean-Philippe argues that, pursuant to the mailbox rule, he timely filed the Petition on June 8, 2020, the day he signed it.³ Reply at 2. Because the Petition’s filing date is determinative of the timeliness analysis, the Court will first determine whether the mailbox rule applies in this case. Because a prisoner proceeding pro se has no control over the mailing of a pleading, courts deem a pleading filed at the time the prisoner delivers it to prison officials for mailing. See Houston v. Lack, 487 U.S. 266, 270-72 (1988).

“Under the mailbox rule, the burden is on prison authorities to prove the date a prisoner delivered his documents to be mailed.” Washington v. United States, 243 F. 3d 1299, 1301 (11th Cir. 2001). And absent evidence to the contrary (such as prison logs or other records), a pleading is deemed delivered to prison authorities for mailing on the day the prisoner signed it. Id. In accordance with the mailbox rule, Rule 3(d) of the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases provides: A paper filed by an inmate confined in an institution is timely if deposited in the institution’s internal mailing system on or before the last day for filing. If an institution has a system designed for legal mail, the inmate must use that system to receive the benefit of this rule. Timely filing may be shown by a declaration in compliance with 28 U.S.C. § 1746 or by a notarized statement, either of which must set forth the date of deposit and state that first-class postage has been prepaid.

8, 2020, next to his signature. Petition at 22, 24. Although the Petition was docketed in this case on July 14, 2020, Jean-Philippe initially filed the Petition as an exhibit to a “Motion to Enlarge Time to Re-file 2254 Petition” (Motion to Enlarge) in Case No. 3:18-cv-404-MMH-JBT.⁴ The Motion to

the Court granted Jean-Philippe’s Motion to Enlarge only to the extent that it directed the Clerk to open a new habeas case and file the Petition in that case. Case No. 3:18-cv-404-MMH-JBT, Doc. 30 at 1.5 The Clerk then filed the Petition in this action. As such, the facts support a finding that Jean-Philippe handed the Petition to prison authorities on June 8, 2020, the date he signed the Petition. Although Respondents contend that Jean-Philippe is not entitled to the benefit of the mailbox rule because he failed to use the Hamilton CI legal mail system, their argument is unavailing. In the Motion to Enlarge, Jean-Philippe certified that he deposited his pleadings consistent with the mailbox rule.

404-MMH-JBT, Doc. 29-2. Without evidence to the contrary, the Court presumes that Jean-Philippe used the legal mail system. “In explaining why the Government bears the burden of proof, the Supreme Court has noted that prisons ‘have well-developed procedures for recording the date and time at which they receive papers for mailing and [ ] can readily dispute a prisoner’s assertions that he delivered the paper on a different date.’” Jeffries v. United States, 748 F. 3d 1310, 1314 (11th Cir. 2014) (quoting Houston, 487 U.S. at 275) (alteration in original). Beyond citing to other pleadings from Jean-

Philippe that contain the stamp from Hamilton CI, Respondents offer no evidence, such as declarations or prison logs, to contradict his assertions. The information before the Court supports the conclusion that Jean-Philippe handed the Petition to prison authorities on June 8, 2020, if not earlier given the undisputed fact that the Court received it on June 10, 2020. As such, Jean- Philippe is entitled to the benefit of the mailbox rule, and the Court finds the Petition was filed on June 8, 2020.

IV. Timeliness

The following procedural history is relevant to the one-year limitations issue. In 2011, a jury convicted Jean-Philippe of first-degree murder and aggravated battery. Response at 1; Doc. 9-1 at 2. Following the jury’s unanimous recommendation, the circuit court sentenced Jean-Philippe to death. Doc. 9-1 at 2. On June 13, 2013, the Florida Supreme Court affirmed

Jean-Philippe’s conviction and sentence. Id. at 2-28. Jean-Philippe filed with the state court a motion for postconviction relief under Florida Rule Criminal Procedure 3.851, and prior to the state court’s ruling, the parties stipulated that Jean-Philippe would waive all claims raised in his Rule 3.851 Motion concerning the guilt phase of his trial, and would be resentenced to life in prison. Doc. 9-2 at 1. On November 9, 2017, the circuit court resentenced Jean- Philippe to a term of life in prison. Doc. 9-3 at 1-5. Under Florida law, Jean- Philippe had thirty days from the date of rendition of the written order imposing his sentence to file a direct appeal of his new judgment and sentence. See Fla. R. App. P. 9.140(b)(3). Jean-Philippe did not appeal the new judgment and sentence, and therefore, his conviction and sentence became final on Monday, December 11, 2017.6

The one-year limitations period began to run the next day, December 12, 2017, and ran for 324 days until it was tolled on November¹, 2018, when Jean- Philippe filed a motion for postconviction relief pursuant to Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.850. Doc. 9-4 at 1-36. The state court denied relief.

Response at 2. The First District Court of Appeal (First DCA) per curiam affirmed the state court’s denial on March 31, 2020, Doc. 9-5 at 1, and issued the mandate on April 28, 2020, Doc. 9-7 at 1. While represented by counsel, Jean-Philippe filed a pro se motion for rehearing on April 30, 2020. Doc. 9-6 at 7-14. That same day, counsel filed a motion requesting to withdraw and asking the First DCA to grant a thirty-day extension of time for Jean-Philippe to file a pro se motion for rehearing. Id. at 5-6. On May⁵, 2020, the First DCA granted defense counsel’s motion to withdraw but denied all other relief requested in the motion, id. at 15, and on May⁷, 2020, the First DCA struck Jean-Philippe’s motion for rehearing as unauthorized, id. at 16. The running of the one-year limitations period

MARCIA MORALES HOWARD

United States District Judge

Jax-9 8/8 C: Lesly Jean-Philippe, #J44119 Counsel of record