WAYNE HART AND DEMETRIAS MCCUTCHEN, APPELLANTS,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
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Two defendants appealed their arson convictions after dismissing court-appointed counsel and proceeding pro se. The court reversed McCutchen's conviction for inadequate Faretta inquiry into his waiver of counsel, but affirmed Hart's conviction, finding the trial court's questioning sufficiently established his knowing and intelligent waiver.
The trial court failed to make an adequate Faretta inquiry regarding McCutchen's waiver, as it did not ensure he was literate, competent, and understanding, and that he was voluntarily exercising his informed free will. However, the court's questioning of Hart regarding his educational background and trial experience was sufficient to establish a knowing and intelligent waiver.
[1] A trial court must conduct a Faretta inquiry to ensure a defendant's waiver of the right to counsel is intelligent and voluntary.
[2] A Faretta inquiry requires the court to determine if a defendant is literate, competent, and understanding when waiving the right to counsel.
Previewing 2 of 5 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“the trial court failed to make an adequate inquiry regarding whether McCutchen was "literate, competent and understanding, and that he was voluntarily exercising his informed free will."”
Establishes the legal standard for a Faretta inquiry and applies it to find the trial court's inquiry regarding McCutchen inadequate.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceWayne McCutchen and Demetrias Hart were convicted of arson. Both filed pretrial motions to dismiss their court-appointed counsel. The trial court deni…
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ERVIN, Judge.
Wayne McCutchen and Demetrias Hart appeal their convictions for arson. Both appellants dismissed their court-appointed counsel and now object to the inquiries made by the court prior to allowing the defendants to represent themselves. After determining that the trial court failed to make a Faretta inquiry {see Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 95 S.Ct. 2525, 45 L.Ed.2d 562 (1975)) as to whether appellant McCutchen made an intelligent waiver of his right to counsel, we reverse his conviction and remand the cause for new trial. We affirm, however, the conviction of appellant Hart, concluding that the inquiry made by the trial court regarding his waiver of counsel was adequate.
McCutchen and Hart requested that their court-appointed attorneys be dismissed via pro se pretrial motions. The lower court denied the motion of Hart after the latter had advised the court that he did not have sufficient knowledge of the law to represent himself. The court granted the motion of McCutchen, following its warnings to him of his right as an indigent to be represented by private counsel, have a public defender appointed or to represent himself, as well as cautioning him that he would be handicapped in preparing his defense if he represented himself. The defendant reiterated his desire to represent himself and the court dismissed his counsel.
In our view the trial court failed to make an adequate inquiry regarding whether McCutchen was “literate, competent and understanding, and that he was voluntarily exercising his informed free will.” Muhammad v. State, 494 So. 2d 969, 974 (Fla. 1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1101, 107 S.Ct. 1332, 94 L.Ed.2d 183 (1987), quoting Faretta, 422 U.S. at 835, 95 S.Ct. at 2541, 45 L.Ed.2d at 581. As there was no detailed inquiry by the trial court to ensure that the defendant knowingly and intelligently relinquished his right to counsel, as mandated by Faretta and Rule 3.111(d), Florida Rules of Criminal Procedure, the conviction and sentence of McCutchen is reversed and his case is remanded for a new trial. See Smith v. State, 512 So. 2d 291 (Fla. 1st DCA 1987).
Following jury selection, Hart renewed his motion to dismiss counsel. After prompting by the state attorney, the court inquired regarding the defendant’s educational background, as well as his experience in trial cases and criminal procedure. We conclude that this questioning by the trial court was sufficient to meet the requirement of a Faretta inquiry, as “[t]he record affirmatively shows that defendant was literate, competent, and understanding, that he voluntarily exercised his free will and that the court made it explicitly clear that it thought defendant was making a mistake in refusing to accept the appointment of counsel.” Jones v. State, 449 So. 2d 253, 257 (Fla.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 893, 105 S.Ct. 269, 83 L.Ed.2d 205 (1984).1
AFFIRMED in part, REVERSED in part and REMANDED for further consistent proceedings.
JOANOS and NIMMONS, JJ., concur. . Although the court did not then explicitly advise appellant that it thought it would be a mistake to dismiss counsel, the court had earlier advised appellant of the advantages of accepting appointed counsel when considering the defendant’s pretrial motion to dismiss counsel.
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Arizona Perkins v. State, 585 So. 2d 390 (Fla. 1st DCA 1991)…er the defendant made an intelligent waiver of his right to counsel and whether he was “literate, competent and understanding, and that he was voluntarily exercising his informed free will.” Faretta, 422 U.S. at 835, 95 S.Ct. at 2541; Hart v. State, 529 So. 2d 811, 812 (Fla. 1st DCA 1988). See also Johnston v. State, 497 So. 2d 863 (Fla.1986) (in determining whether a defendant has knowingly and intelligently waived his right to counsel, a trial court should inquire into, among other things: defendant’s age,…
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Smith v. State, 546 So. 2d 61 (Fla. 1st DCA 1989)…al situation, he replied: “That’s one of the details we’re going to have to work out.” When he later áppeared on February 17,1988, and was asked if he was financially able to hire his own lawyer, he replied: “If I could find one.” In Hart v. State, 529 So. 2d 811 (Fla. 1st DCA 1988), applying Faretta and Muhammad v. State, 494 So. 2d 969 (Fla.1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1101, 107 S.Ct. 1332, 94 L.Ed.2d 183 (1987), we observed that before a defendant is permitted to waive counsel, the trial judge must make…
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Wilson v. State, 573 So. 2d 417 (Fla. 5th DCA 1991)…ent counsel or an adequate inquiry and determination that the appellant is qualified to represent himself. Neither was done during the first proceeding. Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 95 S.Ct. 2525, 45 L.Ed.2d 562 (1975); Hart v. State, [*418] 529 So. 2d 811 (Fla. 1st DCA 1988); Brevard County Bd. of County Comm’s v. State, 516 So. 2d 968 (Fla. 5th DCA 1987), rev. den., 528 So. 2d 1183 (Fla.1988); Daniels v. State, 449 So. 2d 950 (Fla. 2d DCA 1984); Smith v. State, 444 So. 2d 542 (Fla. 1st DCA 1984); Wi…
Previewing 3 of 4 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806 (U.S. 1975)
- Jones v. State, 449 So. 2d 253 (Fla. 1984)
- Askari Abdullah Muhammad v. State, 494 So. 2d 969 (Fla. 1986)
- Henkel v. United States, 479 U.S. 1101 (U.S. 1987)
- Williford v. United States, 469 U.S. 893 (U.S. 1984)
- Parker v. Illinois, 479 U.S. 1101 (U.S. 1987)
- Smith v. State, 512 So. 2d 291 (Fla. 1st DCA 1987)