JOHNSON
v.
SECRETARY DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS (HILLSBOROUGH COUNTY)
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The court held that a federal habeas corpus action under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 is premature if the petitioner has not first exhausted available state court remedies.
Demetrius D. Johnson applied for a writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2241, challenging the computation of his prison sentence and arguing he was…
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Johnson applies under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 for the writ of habeas corpus and challenges the computation of his term of imprisonment, specifically, his continued imprisonment after he allegedly completed serving his sentence.1 This action proceeds under Johnson’s amended application, the response, and Johnson’s reply. (Docs. 3, 9, and 14) The respondent’s exhibits (Doc. 15) show that Johnson filed this action prematurely. Johnson was sentenced to three concurrent terms of imprisonment for fifty-four months with credit for pre-trial detention. The amount of pre-trial detention differed for each conviction, from 562 days for the earliest charged offense to 8 days for the latest charged offense. Johnson argues that, because he was
judgment; Johnson challenges only the computation of his time in prison. Although jurisdiction resides in the federal courts, Johnson cannot proceed in federal court before presenting his claim to the state courts — a process called exhaustion of state court remedies — as explained in Braden v. 30th Judicial Circuit of Kentucky, 410 U.S. 484, 490 (1973) (internal quotation omitted):
The exhaustion doctrine is a judicially crafted instrument which reflects a careful balance between important interests of federalism and the need to preserve the writ of habeas corpus as a swift and imperative remedy in all cases of illegal restraint or confinement.
Unlike Section 2254, which explicitly requires exhaustion, Section 2241 contains no statutory exhaustion requirement.2 Nevertheless, a party seeking relief under Section 2241 must present a claim to the state court before seeking relief on the claim in federal court. Moore v. DeYoung, 515 F. 2d 437, 442 (3rd Cir. 1975), explains that “although there is a distinction in the statutory language of §§ 2254 and 2241, there is no distinction insofar as the exhaustion requirement is concerned.” Accord Thomas v. Crosby, 371 F. 3d 782, 812 (11th Cir. 2004) (“Among the most fundamental common
STEVEND.MERRYDAY [...]
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Authorities Cited
- Braden v. 30TH Jud. Cir. Court OF Ky., 410 U.S. 484 (U.S. 1973)
- Thomas v. Crosby, 371 F.3d 782 (11th Cir. 2004)
- Moore v. DeYOUNG, 515 F.2d 437 (3d Cir. 1975)