NEFF

v.

PASCO COUNTY

Mr. Neff’s claims “arise under the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause.” Grochowski v. Clayton Cnty., Ga., 961 F. 3d 1311, 1318 (11th Cir. 2020). “When analyzing claims under the Due Process Clause, [courts] often refer[] to precedent under the Eighth Amendment’s Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause.” Id. To state a Fourteenth Amendment due process claim, a pretrial detainee must allege “(1) a substantial risk of serious harm; (2) the defendants’ deliberate indifference to that risk; and (3) causation.”

Goodman v. Kimbrough, 718 F. 3d 1325, 1331 (11th Cir. 2013). Mr. Neff fails to adequately allege that he faced “a substantial risk of serious harm.” Id. To plead that element, a plaintiff must point to “conditions that were extreme and posed an unreasonable risk of serious injury to his future health or safety.” Marbury v. Warden, 936 F. 3d 1227, 1233 (11th Cir. 2019). Mr. Neff claims that, while restrained in handcuffs and body chains, he was transported in a van that lacked “safety restraints/seat belts.” (Doc.

1-1 at 2). The Eleventh Circuit has held, however, that transporting inmates in vans without seat belts does not pose a substantial risk of serious harm. See Smith v. Sec’y, Dep’t of Corr., 252 F. App’x 301, 304 (11th Cir. 2007) (“[W]e cannot say that riding in a van equipped with the manufacturer’s car seats, seat belts, and windows is a necessity, such that riding in a van without these characteristics is a deprivation of the minimal measure of life’s necessities or is something that modern society would find intolerable.”).¹ Moreover, Mr. Neff does not allege that the van was being driven recklessly when it crashed into a parked car in the courthouse parking lot. Because Mr. Neff fails to plead facts showing that he faced a substantial risk of serious harm, he has not stated a constitutional violation.

a. If Mr. Neff wishes to amend, he shall file an amended complaint within THIRTY DAYS of the date of this order. b. To amend, Mr. Neff should complete a new civil rights complaint form, titling it “Amended Complaint.” The amended complaint must include all of Mr. Neff’s claims that he wishes to pursue and may not refer back to, or incorporate, the complaint. The amended complaint shall supersede the

complaint. Malowney v. Fed. Collection Deposit Group, 193 F. 3d 1342, 1345 n.1 (11th Cir. 1999). c. The amended complaint shall be subject to initial screening under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A. 2. If Mr. Neff fails to file an amended complaint by the above deadline, or fails to seek an extension of time to do so, this order dismissing the complaint without prejudice will become a final judgment. “[A]n order dismissing a complaint with leave to amend within a specified time becomes a final judgment if the time allowed for amendment expires without the plaintiff [amending his complaint or] seeking an extension. And when the order becomes a final judgment, the district court loses ‘all its prejudgment powers to grant any more extensions’ of time to amend the complaint.” Auto. Alignment & Body Serv., Inc. v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 953 F. 3d 707, 720-71 (11th Cir. 2020) (quoting Hertz Corp. v. Alamo Rent-A-Car, Inc., 16 F. 3d 1126 (11th Cir. 1994)). 3. Mr. Neff must advise the Court of any change of address. He must entitle the paper “Notice to the Court of Change of Address” and must exclude any motions from the notice. Failure to inform the Court of an address change may result in the dismissal of this case without further notice. 4. The Clerk is DIRECTED to mail to Mr. Neff a copy of the standard prisoner civil rights complaint form. DONE and ORDERED in Tampa, Florida, on June 20, 2023. litho,

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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