WILLIAMS

v.

PROFESSIONAL MARKETING MANAGEMENT, INC.

Pro se Plaintiff Brittany Williams, a pretrial detainee at the Pinellas County Jail, initiated this action by filing a civil rights complaint under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, (Doc. 1), and a memorandum of law in support of her claims, (Doc. 2). She alleges that in May 2018, she fell behind on rent for her apartment, which was managed by Professional Marketing Management, Inc. (“PMM”). (Doc. 2 at 3). Two months later, Ms. Williams “attempted to pay three months of rent,” but PMM “refused to accept [the] payments.” (Id.) In August 2018, PMM evicted her from the apartment. (Id. at 5). Based on these allegations, Ms. Williams asserts the following claims against PMM: an Eighth Amendment claim for “cruel and unusual punishment,” a Fourteenth Amendment claim for “race discrimination,” and a claim under the “Federal Fair Housing Act.” (Doc. 1 at 3). As relief, Ms. Williams seeks $25 million in damages. (Id. at 5). Having reviewed the complaint under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B),¹ the Court concludes that this action must be dismissed. Ms. Williams’s federal constitutional claims arise under § 1983. “To state a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege the violation of a right secured by the Constitution and laws of the United States, and must show that the alleged deprivation was committed by a person acting under color of state law.” West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988) (emphasis added). “[T]he under-color-of-state-law element of § 1983 excludes from its reach merely private conduct, no matter how discriminatory or wrongful.” Am. Mfrs. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Sullivan, 526 U.S. 40, 50 (1999). Ms. Williams alleges no facts showing that PMM, a private landlord, acted under color of state law. Contrary to Ms. Williams’s assertion, (Doc. 1 at 4), a landlord does not become a state actor simply by initiating eviction proceedings against a tenant, see Stroud v. Farr Rentals, LLC, No. 2:19-cv-95-CDP, 2020 WL 1433644, at *4 (E.D. Mo. Mar. 24, 2020) (“[T]here is no state action in an eviction action by a private landlord.”).

Even if Ms. Williams could allege that PMM acted under color of state law, the § 1983 claims would still be dismissed as untimely. In cases arising under § 1983, a court may sua sponte consider a statute-of-limitations defense if that defense is apparent from the face of the complaint. Clark v. Ga. Pardons and Parole Bd., 915 F. 2d 636, 640 n.2 (11th Cir. 1990). Where Florida is the forum state, § 1983 plaintiffs have four years to file

The Fair Housing Act claim is also untimely. The statute of limitations for claims brought under the Fair Housing Act is two years. See 42 U.S.C. § 3613(a)(1)(A) (“An aggrieved person may commence a civil action in an appropriate United States district court or State court not later than 2 years after the occurrence or the termination of an alleged discriminatory housing practice . . . .”). The limitations period “begins to run when facts supportive of the cause of action are or should be apparent to a reasonably prudent person similarly situated.” Wood v. Briarwinds Condo. Ass’n Bd. of Directors, 369 F. App’x¹, 4 (11th Cir. 2010). Here, the allegedly discriminatory acts took place in the summer of 2018—well over two years before the complaint was filed. Again, Ms. Williams offers no basis to toll the statute of limitations. The Fair Housing Act claim must therefore be dismissed. Accordingly, it is ORDERED that Ms. Williams’s civil rights complaint (Doc. 1) is DISMISSED for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. The Clerk is directed to enter judgment against Ms. Williams, terminate any pending motions as moot, and close this case. DONE and ORDERED in Tampa, Florida, on June 7, 2023. litho,

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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