JOHNSON

v.

ORLANDO REGIONAL RE-ENTRY MANAGER

Johnson applies under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 for the writ of habeas corpus (Doc. 1) and moves for his immediate release “because he completed his federal term of imprisonment and is now being held in the Pinellas County Jail, without any charges or being given any reason why he is in jail. His release date came and went, and he has yet to find out why he is being held in the maximum-security wing of the jail, and nobody will tell him why he is there.” (Doc. 2 at 1) However, on the next page Johnson admits that “he was taken to the county jail” by the United States’ Marshals because “he had an unauthorized cell phone” while he was in a Residential Re-Entry Center under the authority of the United States Bureau of Prisons (“BOP”).¹

556 (1974), establishes five requirements as the process an inmate is due in disciplinary proceedings. First, the inmate must receive an adequate, written notice of the charges. Second, he must receive this written notice at least twenty-four hours before the disciplinary hearing. Third, he must have an opportunity (as limited by safety needs or correctional goals) to call witnesses and present documentary evidence in his defense. Fourth, the fact-finder must issue a written report of both the evidence and the reasons for taking disciplinary action. This written report must show that the disciplinary committee’s findings were based on “some evidence.” Superintendent v. Hill, 472 U.S. 445, 454 (1985). Fifth, where circumstances warrant, an inmate should receive the help of an inmate or staff member. Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. at 570. A federal court’s review of a prison disciplinary proceeding is limited “to determin[ing] whether an inmate receives the procedural protections provided by Wolff and whether ‘some evidence’ exists which supports the hearing officer’s determination.” Young v. Jones, 37 F. 3d 1457, 1460 (11th Cir. 1994). Neither “a disciplinary board’s factual findings [n]or [its] decisions with respect to appropriate punishment are subject to second guessing upon review.” Hill, 472 U.S. at 455. Consequently, this district court’s review is limited to determining whether Johnson received the limited process he was due –– not whether the revocation of earned good conduct credits was an appropriate sanction. Exhaustion:

As a prerequisite to federal review Johnson must first exhaust his administrative remedies. An inmate may challenge the BOP’s computation of sentence through an application for a writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2241. See Santiago-Lugo v. Warden, 785 F. 3d 467, 469–70 (11th Cir. 2015) (exercising jurisdiction over federal prisoner’s section 2241 habeas petition challenging the deprivation of good-time credits following a prison disciplinary proceeding). However, the inmate first must exhaust all available administrative remedies. Although exhaustion of administrative remedies is not a jurisdictional requirement in an action under Section 2241, “that does not mean that courts may disregard a failure to exhaust and grant relief on the merits if the respondent properly asserts the defense.”2 Id. at 475. “The exhaustion requirement is still a requirement; it’s just not a jurisdictional one.” Id.; see also Blevins v. FCI Hazelton Warden, 819 F. App’x 853, 856 (11th Cir. 2020) (“If an inmate fails to exhaust her administrative remedies and the respondent raises the issue in the district court, the district court may not grant relief on the inmate’s petition.”). Woodford v. Ngo, 548 U.S. 81, 90 (2006), explains that “[b]ecause exhaustion requirements are designed to deal with parties who do not want to exhaust,

administrative law creates an incentive for these parties to do what they would otherwise prefer not to do, namely, to give the agency a fair and full opportunity to adjudicate their claims.” The exhaustion requirement both allows the BOP “an opportunity to correct its own mistakes . . . before it is haled into federal court” and discourages “disregard of the agency’s procedures.” Id. at 89 (punctuation omitted).

Exhaustion also promotes efficiency, because “[c]laims generally can be resolved much more quickly and economically in proceedings before an agency than in litigation in federal court.” Id. Furthermore, requiring exhaustion in the prison setting “eliminate[s] unwarranted federal-court interference with the administration of prisons” and allows “corrections officials time and opportunity to address complaints internally before allowing the initiation of a federal case.” Woodford, 548 U.S. at 93. The exhaustion requirement “let[s] the agency develop the necessary factual background

STEVEN D. MERRYDAY

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE