ROGER JOHNSON, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
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Johnson appeals his forty-year sentence for second-degree murder, arguing it exceeds the statutory maximum and departs from the presumptive guidelines without justification. The Florida appellate court affirms the sentence, holding that it falls within the statutory limits and guidelines range when properly interpreted as a seventeen-year active term followed by conditional suspension.
The sentence is affirmed. The sentence of forty years does not exceed the statutory maximum for second-degree murder (life imprisonment), falls within the presumptive guidelines range of twelve to seventeen years, and the trial judge's stated intent demonstrates the ten-year probationary segment begins only after release from prison, with the suspended portion forfeited upon successful probation completion.
[1] A sentence for first-degree murder is punishable by imprisonment for a term of years not exceeding life imprisonment.
[2] A probationary period may be imposed to commence upon a defendant's release from incarceration, even if the total duration of incarceration, probation, and suspended sent…
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“Johnson was convicted of a felony of the first degree, punishable by imprisonment for a term of years not exceeding life imprisonment. There is no thirty-year statutory maximum for this offense.”
Establishes that the statutory maximum for second-degree murder is life imprisonment, not thirty years as Johnson argued.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceJohnson was convicted of second-degree murder, a felony of the first degree. He received a sentence of forty years, with seventeen years active impris…
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SHARP, Chief Judge.
Johnson appeals his sentence because he contends it exceeds the statutory maximum for his convicted crime (second degree murder),1 and it is a departure from the presumptive guidelines sentence for which no reasons were given. Johnson received a sentence of forty years, but after serving seventeen in the Department of Corrections, the balance of his sentence was suspended, and he was placed on probation for ten years. We affirm.
With regard to the legality of the sentence, Johnson was convicted of a felony of the first degree, punishable by imprisonment for a term of years not exceeding life imprisonment.2 There is no thirty-year statutory maximum for this offense. The term of imprisonment imposed in this case was within the presumptive guidelines sentence range of twelve to seventeen years3 and the total sentence did not exceed the statutory maximum.4
It is clear from the sentencing transcript that the trial judge did not intend to impose a term of seventeen years plus a twenty-three year suspended sentence, plus an additional ten years on probation. The form of the sentence in this case, plus the trial judge’s stated intent at sentencing, distinguishes this case from the sentences considered in Tullis v. State, 528 So. 2d 453 (Fla. 5th DCA 1988) and Carr v. State, 528 So. 2d 406 (Fla. 5th DCA1988). Here it is clear that the ten year probationary segment of Johnson’s sentence begins to run when Johnson is released from prison after serving his seventeen-year term. If he serves his ten years on probation successfully, the balance of the twenty-three year suspended sentence will vanish and be forgiven.
AFFIRM.
DAUKSCH and DANIEL, JJ., concur. . § 782.04(2), Fla.Stat. (1987).
. §§ 782.04(2) & 775.082(3)(b), Fla.Stat. (1987).
. Franklin v. State, 526 So. 2d 159 (Fla. 5th DCA 1988).
.McKinley v. State, 519 So. 2d 1154 (Fla. 5th DCA 1988).
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Sutton v. State, 854 So. 2d 215 (Fla. 5th DCA 2003)…PER CURIAM. AFFIRMED. See Johnson v. State, 529 So. 2d 1250 (Fla. 5th DCA 1988). SAWAYA, C.J., ORFINGER and TORPY, JJ., concur.…
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Loomis v. State, 531 So. 2d 423 (Fla. 5th DCA 1988)…for departure. Since the term of imprisonment was within the pre [*424] sumptive guidelines range and the total sanction did not exceed the statutory maximum for the crime, the sentence did not constitute a departure sentence. See Johnson v. State, 529 So. 2d 1250 (Pla. 5th DCA 1988); McKee v. State, 528 So. 2d 417 (Fla. 5th DCA 1988). The defendant also argues that the judgment erroneously reflects that he was convicted of a first degree felony rather than a second degree felony. The defendant was charged w…
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Morris v. State, 532 So. 2d 1116 (Fla. 5th DCA 1988)…for a period of 8 years. On appeal, the defendant argues that the sentence constitutes a departure sentence which is improper because there were no written reasons for departure. This argument has been rejected by this court. See Johnson v. State, 529 So. 2d 1250 (Fla. 5th DCA 1988); McKee v. State, 528 So. 2d 417 (Fla. 5th DCA 1988). See also Poore v. State 531 So. 2d 161 (Fla.1988). AFFIRMED. SHARP, C.J., and COWART, J., concur. . §§ 810.02(1) and (3); 775.082(3)(c), Fla. Stat.(1987).…
Previewing 3 of 4 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Franklin v. State, 526 So. 2d 159 (Fla. 5th DCA 1988)
- Carr v. State, 528 So. 2d 406 (Fla. 5th DCA 1988)
- McKINLEY v. State, 519 So. 2d 1154 (Fla. 5th DCA 1988)
- Williams v. State, 528 So. 2d 453 (Fla. 5th DCA 1988)