LAGUILLE-BRUGMAN

v.

UNITED STATES

This matter is before the Court upon review of the file. On August 8, 2022, the Court entered an order dismissing Plaintiff’s Complaint for lack of standing. Doc. 26. On October 31, 2022, Plaintiff filed an Amended Complaint on behalf of the estate and the other decedent’s survivors, as well as herself. Doc. 27. Because Plaintiff cannot represent the interests of the estate of her deceased husband and the survivors pro se, the Amended Complaint is due to be stricken and the Court issues this Order to Show Cause.

DISCUSSION

Plaintiff, Roselyne Laguille-Brugman, filed this medical negligence action against the Government arising out of the alleged wrongful death of her husband, Cort Brugman, who died after receiving medical treatment at the James A. Haley Veterans Hospital. Because Plaintiff brought the action in her own name, rather than through the personal representative of her deceased husband’s estate, the Court directed Plaintiff to substitute the proper plaintiff—the Personal Representative of the Estate of Cort Brugman—and to file an Amended Complaint. Plaintiff was cautioned that courts in this Circuit have held that an individual may not represent

an estate pro se.¹ See Doc. 26 at 4 n.1. Federal court appearances are governed by 28 U.S.C. § 1654 which permits parties “[i]n all courts of the United States ... [to] plead and conduct their own causes personally or by counsel as, by the rules of such courts, respectively, are permitted to manage and conduct causes therein.” 28 U.S.C. § 1654. “The right to self-

representation has been limited to the right to represent one’s self and does not extend to representing someone else or an entity.” Eason v. Williams, No. 5:00-CV- 0969-VEH, 2008 WL 11423965, at *5 (N.D. Ala. Sept. 5, 2008). In the Amended Complaint, Plaintiff seeks to represent an entity (the estate)

and someone else (the other survivors). Relevant here, the Eleventh Circuit considered the question of whether a personal representative could represent an estate pro se in Reshard v. Britt, 819 F. 2d 1573 (11th Cir. 1987). In Reshard, the plaintiffs appealed the district court’s decision disqualifying them, under 28 U.S.C. § 1654, from representing an estate pro se. A three-judge panel of the Eleventh Circuit

reversed the district court’s decision, and the Eleventh Circuit later reviewed the case en banc. See Reshard v. Britt, 819 F. 2d 1573 (11th Cir.), rehearing granted and opinion vacated by 831 F. 2d 222 (11th Cir. 1987); Reshard v. Britt, 839 F. 2d 1499 (11th Cir. 1988). Ultimately, the equally divided en banc court affirmed, by operation of law,

F. 2d 115, 116 (5th Cir. 1978), the reasoning of the decision is sound. See Eason, 2008 WL 11423965, at *6 (collecting cases); see also McCants v. Village of Broadview, No. 93 C 3657, 1994 WL 117478, at *2 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 28, 1994) (“An estate by its very nature cannot represent itself and, therefore, must be represented by a licensed

attorney, regardless of the relation between the administrator and the decedent. To permit an unlicensed lay administrator to appear pro se would be to permit the unauthorized practice of law.”). In her Amended Complaint (Doc. 27), Laguille-Brugman represents that she has now been appointed as Personal Representative of her husband’s estate by

Circuit Judge Pam Vergara. The Court notes that Letters of Administration appointing Laguille-Brugman personal representative were not attached to the Amended Complaint. Moreover, Laguille-Brugman represents that she is bringing the action on behalf of the estate and the decedent’s survivors, as well as on behalf of her own personal interest. Id. at 2. When the beneficiaries of an estate include

persons other than the personal representative, federal courts have rejected a personal representative’s efforts to bring the action pro se. See Eason, 2008 WL 11423965, at *6 (citing Iannaccone v. Law, 142 F. 3d 553, 559 (2d Cir. 1998) (prohibiting pro se representation of an estate because the personal representative was litigating claims not personal to him); Pridgen v. Andresen, 113 F. 3d at 393 (“We now hold that an administratrix or executrix of an estate may not proceed pro se when the estate has beneficiaries or creditors other than the litigant.”); Witherspoon v. Jeffords Agency, Inc., No. Civ. A. 4:02-1831-12, 2003 WL 24029475 (D.S.C. Mar. 31, 2003) (dismissing

action where pro se representative of an estate failed to obtain counsel); Beyer v. N.C. Div. of Mental Health, No. 1:01CV50-T, 2001 WL 1319506 (W.D.N.C. Oct. 16, 2001) (“The legal interests of an ‘estate,’ as a matter of both federal and state law, cannot be pursued by an administrator proceeding pro se.”); Billups v. West, No. 95 CIV.

1146(KMW) HB, 1998 WL 341939, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. June 26, 1998) (“Furthermore, if James submits evidence of, and wishes to proceed as, the representative of Billups’ estate, she must retain counsel to represent the estate; she cannot proceed pro se.”)). The Court is persuaded that the same reasoning applies in this case such that Laguille-Brugman may not represent the estate and the interests of the other

survivors pro se. Plaintiff will be required to retain counsel.² Accordingly, it is ORDERED: 1. Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint (Doc. 27) filed pro se is STRICKEN. 2. Plaintiff is ORDERED to show cause by a written response filed within FOURTEEN (14) days as to why this action should not be dismissed without

prejudice as Plaintiff may not prosecute this action pro se on behalf of the Estate of Cort Brugman and the other survivors.

C hakorn el Gada No TOA pl uel Charlene Edwards Honeywell United States District Judge

Copies furnished to: Counsel of Record Unrepresented Parties