MARTELUS

v.

PEREZ-LUGO

Plaintiff, Lukens Martelus, an inmate of the Florida penal system, initiated this action pro se by filing a complaint for the violation of civil rights (Doc. 1; Compl.). After the Court ordered Plaintiff to show cause why the case should not be dismissed for his failure to pay the filing fee or move to proceed as a pauper, see Order (Doc. 3), Plaintiff paid the filing fee in full, see Docket. Accordingly, Plaintiff’s complaint is before the Court for screening under the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA), which provides that a court must review a complaint by a prisoner against a governmental officer or employee and dismiss the complaint, or any portion of it, if it “is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a), (b). Since the PLRA’s “failure-to-state-a-claim” language mirrors the language of Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, courts apply the same standard in both contexts. Mitchell v. Farcass, 112 F. 3d 1483, 1490 (11th Cir. 1997). See also Alba v. Montford, 517 F. 3d 1249, 1252 (11th Cir. 2008). “To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citing Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). “Labels and conclusions” or “a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action” that amount to “naked assertions” will not suffice. Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555).

Moreover, a complaint must “contain either direct or inferential allegations respecting all the material elements necessary to sustain a recovery under some viable legal theory.” Roe v. Aware Woman Ctr. for Choice, Inc., 253 F. 3d 678, 683 (11th Cir. 2001) (quoting In re Plywood Antitrust Litig.,

655 F. 2d 627, 641 (5th Cir. Unit A Sept. 8, 1981)). In reviewing a complaint, a court must accept the plaintiff’s allegations as true, liberally construing those by a plaintiff proceeding pro se, but need not accept as true legal conclusions. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678.

Plaintiff names three Defendants in his complaint: Chief healthcare provider at Columbia Correctional Institution (CCI), Dr. E. Perez-Lugo; the

Assistant Warden of Programs at CCI, Christina Crews; and the Secretary of the Florida Department of Corrections (FDOC), Ricky Dixon. See Compl. at 2-

3. He alleges each Defendant violated his Eighth Amendment rights in the following ways: Dr. Perez-Lugo refused to refer him to a back specialist for special testing per the recommendation of a spine surgeon; Defendant Crews, who “oversee[s] Dr. Perez[-Lugo],” denied Plaintiff’s grievances without investigating whether Dr. Perez-Lugo’s decision was appropriate; and Defendant Dixon, who “control[s] and oversee[s]” grievance appeals filed with the Office of the Secretary of the FDOC, “grossly overlooked [Plaintiff’s] serious medical condiction [sic].”¹ Id. at 5-6. Plaintiff says that without the special testing, the spine surgeon cannot perform a necessary surgery, and his back condition continues to deteriorate. Id. at 5. As relief, Plaintiff seeks damages. Id. at 7. To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must allege that “a person” acting under the color of state law deprived him of a right secured under the United States Constitution or federal law. 42 U.S.C. § 1983. A claim for deliberate indifference to a serious illness or injury is cognizable under §

U.S. 730, 739 (2002) (identifying the elements of a deliberate indifference claim: “(1) a serious medical need; (2) the defendants’ deliberate indifference to that need; and (3) causation between that indifference and the plaintiff’s injury”).

Even if a plaintiff plausibly alleges a medical provider was deliberately indifferent to his serious medical needs, he must allege more to state a cognizable claim against the medical provider’s supervisor because liability under § 1983 may not be premised on a theory of vicarious liability. Cottone v. Jenne, 326 F. 3d 1352, 1360 (11th Cir. 2003), abrogated in part on other grounds by Randall v. Scott, 610 F. 3d 701 (11th Cir. 2010). A claim against a supervisor may proceed only “when the supervisor personally participates in the alleged constitutional violation or when there is a causal connection between actions of the supervising official and the alleged constitutional deprivation.” Brown v. Crawford, 906 F. 2d 667, 671 (11th Cir. 1990). A causal connection can be established when a supervisor knows a subordinate will act unlawfully or adopts a policy that results in deliberate indifference to an inmate’s constitutional rights. Id. See also Ancata v. Prison Health Servs., Inc., 769 F. 2d 700, 704-06 (11th Cir. 1985) (describing the ways in which a prisoner can allege a prison official, including a supervisor, acted with deliberate indifference to his serious medical needs).

A supervisor also cannot be held liable under § 1983 simply for having received and responded to a prisoner’s grievance. Jones v. Eckloff, No. 2:12-cv- 375-Ftm-29DNF, 2013 WL 6231181, at *4 (M.D. Fla. Dec.², 2013) (“[F]iling a grievance with a supervisory person does not automatically make the supervisor liable for the allegedly unconstitutional conduct brought to light by the grievance, even when the grievance is denied.” (citing Gallagher v. Shelton, 587 F. 3d 1063, 1069 (10th Cir. 2009))). And when prisoners file grievances complaining about medical treatment, non-medical supervisory officials who respond to those grievances “are entitled to rely on medical judgments made by medical professionals responsible for prisoner care.” Williams v. Limestone

Cnty., Ala., 198 F. App’x 893, 897 (11th Cir. 2006)2 (citing Durmer v. O’Carroll, 991 F. 2d 64, 69 (3d Cir. 1993); White v. Farrier, 849 F. 2d 322, 327 (8th Cir. 1988)). As demonstrated by his allegations that Defendants Crews and Dixon are responsible for overseeing their subordinates, Plaintiff seeks to proceed against Defendants Crews and Dixon solely on a theory of vicarious liability.

See Compl. at 5-6. He does not allege they themselves were deliberately indifferent to a serious medical need, nor does he allege facts demonstrating a causal connection between their actions or inactions and an alleged constitutional deprivation. See Cottone, 326 F. 3d at 1360. See also Ancata, 769

F. 2d at 705-06. As non-medical providers responding to Plaintiff’s grievances about medical care, Defendants Crews and Dixon reasonably were permitted to rely on the doctor’s decisions and evaluations. See Williams, 198 F. App’x at 897. As such, they are due to be dismissed from this action.

2 VQ - fo fton—| |, 67am

BRIAN/I, DAVIS

United States District Judge

Jax-6 C: Lukens Martelus