O'REILLY-BROOKES
v.
EXPERIAN INFORMATION SOLUTIONS, INC.
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The court held that the plaintiff sufficiently alleged facts to state a plausible claim under the Florida Consumer Collection Practices Act, denying the defendant's motion to dismiss.
Plaintiff received medical services, was later sent a collection letter for an alleged debt, and made payments. The debt was then reported as unpaid t…
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This cause comes before the Court on Defendant U.S. Anesthesia Partners of Florida, Inc.’s (“Defendant Anesthesia Partners”) Motion to Dismiss Count VI of the Complaint (Doc. 22 (the “Motion”)) and Plaintiff Maria O’Reilly- Brookes’ response in opposition (Doc. 31 (the “Response”). Upon consideration, the Motion is due to denied.
I. BACKGROUND1
This lawsuit arises from a dispute between Plaintiff and Defendants regarding the reporting and attempted collection of Plaintiff’s alleged debt. (See generally Doc. 1). On October 21, 2020, Plaintiff obtained medical services from Defendant Anesthesia Partners. (Id. ¶ 21). Although under the impression all respective charges had been paid, Plaintiff received a collection letter from Defendant Anesthesia Partners on September 27, 2021 for $750.32 (the “Debt”). (Id. ¶¶ 22–
25). This total was the aggregate of two supposedly past due bills, each for $375.16, stemming from Plaintiff’s aforementioned medical visit. (Id. ¶¶ 26–27). Shortly thereafter, Defendant Anesthesia Partners assigned the Debt to Professional Finance Company, Inc. (“PFC”), a licensed Consumer Collection Agency, for collection. (Id. ¶¶ 18, 30). Subsequently, PFC mailed Plaintiff its own collection letter. (Id. ¶ 31). In response, Plaintiff’s husband sent two checks: one check to PFC for $375.47 on December 17, 2021, and another check to Defendant Anesthesia Partners for $375.16 on January11, 2022. (Id. ¶¶ 32–33). However, in February 2022, PFC began reporting the Debt as an unpaid collection account, with a balance of $375, to nationwide credit reporting agencies,
44). As part of the approval process, BOA obtained a consumer report from Corelogic Credco, LLC (“Corelogic”). (Id. ¶ 39).3 To Plaintiff’s surprise, BOA was unable to approve Plaintiff’s application because PFC’s collection tradeline lowered Plaintiff’s credit score. (Id. ¶¶ 42–44).4 Around April1, 2022, Plaintiff disputed the accuracy of the PFC collection account to Corelogic, revealing the Debt had been fully paid long before its reporting status as “unpaid” began. (Id. ¶¶ 45–46). CoreLogic notified Experian of the issue, and Experian initiated an Automated Consumer Dispute Verification Request (“ACDV”). (Id. ¶¶ 49–53). The ACDV was subsequently forwarded to PFC, and PFC informed Defendant Anesthesia Partners of the dispute. (Id. ¶¶ 36– 37).5 Defendant Anesthesia Partners sent PFC results from their respective
“invoice balance” of $375.16. (Id. ¶¶ 58–59, 61). Yet, PFC verified the reporting as accurate, sending Plaintiff another collection letter that indicated Defendant Anesthesia Partners itself confirmed the Debt was unpaid. (Id. ¶ 62; Doc. 1-1, p. 6). On July 14, 2022, Plaintiff initiated this lawsuit, asserting various causes of action against Defendants CoreLogic,7 Experian,8 PFC, and Anesthesia Partners.
(Doc. 1). However, as is relevant here, Plaintiff asserts a sole claim against Defendant Anesthesia Partners for unlawful debt collection under the Florida Consumer Collection Practices Act (“FCCPA”), Section 559.72(9) (Count VI).9 Defendant Anesthesia Partners now moves to dismiss Count VI for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, and the matter is ripe for review.
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
A complaint must contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a)(2). Thus, to survive a
III. DISCUSSION
Defendant Anesthesia Partners moves to dismiss Count VI of the Complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. (See generally Doc.
22). Specifically, Defendant Anesthesia Partners challenges Plaintiff’s FCCPA claims on two primary fronts. First, Defendant Anesthesia Partners contends that Plaintiff failed to adequately allege actual knowledge the debt was illegitimate. (Id.). Second, Defendant Anesthesia Partners claims Plaintiff alleges inadequate facts to either support a conclusion that Defendant Anesthesia Partners attempted to claim, collect, or threaten to enforce the Debt after it was allegedly paid in full, or asserted the existence of some other legal right that did not exist. (Id.). The Court disagrees with both arguments and will address its reasoning in turn. In general, the FCCPA prohibits persons from engaging in certain practices while attempting to collect consumer debt. § 559.72.10 In particular, Section 559.72(9) of the FCCPA prohibits a person, in collecting consumer debts, from
“claim[ing], attempt[ing], or threaten[ing] to enforce a debt when such person knows that the debt is not legitimate, or assert[ing] the existence of some other legal right when such person knows that the right does not exist.” § 559.72(9). To plead a viable cause of action under Section 559.72(9), a party must
A. Actual Knowledge
The crux of Defendant Anesthesia Partners’ initial argument centers upon its contention that Plaintiff failed to allege it had the requisite “actual” knowledge the debt was illegitimate. (Doc. 22, pp. 5–6). Although Defendant Anesthesia
Partners repeatedly asserts that Plaintiff has failed to allege sufficient facts to establish a facially plausible claim, the Complaint demonstrates otherwise as certain crucial allegations establish “actual” knowledge for purposes of the present Motion. Most explicitly, for example, Plaintiff states that Defendant “had proof of payment in its possession and/or control and was informed by [Plaintiff] that
Defendant logically would have direct knowledge the debt was not legitimate. Accordingly, the aforementioned statements alone likely suffice to meet the standard for alleging “actual knowledge” at this point in the litigation. In any event, the following “reasonable inference” based on agency theory provides an additional avenue for Plaintiff to meet her burden. (See Doc. 31, pp. 5–8).
As other district courts within the Eleventh Circuit have suggested, “corporation and agency principles . . . imput[e] the actions of a corporation’s agents . . . to the corporation itself, which is the only entity that must have knowledge of the illegitimacy of the debt.” Scott v. Fla. Health Scis. Ctr., Inc., No. 8-CV-1270, 2008 WL 4613083, at *3 (M.D. Fla. Oct. 16, 2008). To illustrate, in Kaplan v. Assetcare, Inc., 88 F. Supp. 2d 1355, 1358 (S.D. Fla. 2000), plaintiff was treated for a medical condition at a hospital. Although plaintiff allegedly fulfilled his payment obligations, he received a letter from the hospital indicating additional funds were due for the medical services purportedly covered by his HMO healthcare plan. Id. Later, the hospital sent a debt collection agency the account for collection. Id. In turn, the debt collection agency sent collection letters to plaintiff, demanding payment that exceeded the amount supposedly owed. Id. The Kaplan plaintiff argued that the requisite knowledge the debt was illegitimate under the FCCPA could be imputed to the debt collector as an agent of the hospital, who had already supposedly been paid. Id. at 1363. Thus, the court denied defendants’ motion to dismiss “based on insufficient allegations of knowledge” because it could not determine “[a]t this stage of the proceedings . . . [whether] it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiffs can prove no set of facts that would support their claims.” Id. Similarly, here, Defendant Anesthesia Partners “assigned [Plaintiff’s] Debt to PFC for collection.” (Doc. 1, ¶ 30). At this stage in the litigation, the Court need not delve into the extent or intricacies of the relationship between PFC and
Defendant Anesthesia Partners—a reasonable inference leads to the conclusion that PFC is an agent of Defendant Anesthesia Partners for the purposes of debt collection. In fact, the Complaint attaches a letter in which PFC plainly confirms Defendant Anesthesia Partners is its client. (Doc. 1-1, p. 6). Thus, upon resolving “doubts as to the sufficiency of the [C]omplaint in the [P]laintiff’s favor,” Hunnings, 29 F. 3d at 1484, this Court can reasonably infer that knowledge of PFC collecting approximately half the Debt could be imputed to Defendant Anesthesia Partners. As a result, Defendant Anesthesia Partners may be charged with actual knowledge of the Debt’s illegitimacy after January11, 2022 because, by that time,1) Defendant Anesthesia Partners received a check for roughly half of the amount it was allegedly owed (Doc. 1, ¶ 33; Doc 1-1, p. 2), and2) its agent PFC had previously collected the other half (Doc. 1, ¶ 32; Doc 1-1, p. 2). For the aforementioned reasons, the Court finds that Plaintiff has sufficiently alleged Defendant Anesthesia Partners acquired actual knowledge of the debt’s invalidity.
B. Claim, Attempt, or Threaten to Enforce a Debt
Defendant Anesthesia Partners further contends that the Complaint sets forth “no allegations whatsoever” that it acted to collect Plaintiff’s Debt at any time after December 17, 2021. (Doc. 22, pp. 6–7). Defendant Anesthesia Partners argues that it merely assigned the Debt to PFC for collection, PFC then mailed Plaintiff a collection letter, and the Debt was subsequently paid in full. (Id. at p. 5). However, Defendant Anesthesia Partners fails to consider the allegations that sometime after April1, 2022—months after the Debt was allegedly paid—it received notice of the
ACDV and verified in a letter to PFC, its client, that “[Plaintiff’s] balance [was] still owing.” (Doc. 1, ¶¶ 45, 55–62; Doc. 1-1, p. 6).12 Again, at the current stage in the proceedings, the Court can reasonably construe the aforementioned communication from Defendant Anesthesia Partners as an attempt to help enforce collection of the Debt by affirming its legitimacy. Moreover, when actions of a corporation’s agents are “performed within the scope of their duties, and done in furtherance of the corporation's business, they
PAUL G.
UNITED STATES*DISTRICT JUDGE Copies furnished to: Counsel of Record Unrepresented Parties
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